IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION THERON RILEY, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-0203-JB-B ) SAMUEL BERRY, et al., ) ) Defendants. )
ORDER This ac)on is before the Court on Defendant Dr. Low’s Mo)on for Summary Judgment (Doc. 149), Plain)ff Theron Riley Jr.’s Response (Doc. 159), and Defendant’s reply (Doc. 164). A hearing was held on March 18, 2024, and the Court has reviewed the mo)on, suppor)ng briefs and the various exhibits filed in support of the mo)on. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Mo)on for Summary Judgment (Doc. 149) is GRANTED. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Theron Riley, Jr. (“Riley”) filed the instant ac)on against various defendants, including Dr. Elizabeth Low, alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights were violated when he was injected with an an)psycho)c medica)on against his will pursuant to a standing order issued by Dr. Low. (Doc. 76).1 The record reveals Dr. Low is a family physician who acted as the medical director of the Escambia County Deten)on Center from 2018-2023. (Doc. 149 at 2).
1 Plain’ff’s ini’al Complaint was filed on January 19, 2021, and did not include Dr. Low as a Defendant. (Doc. 1). However, the Opera’ve Complaint is Plain’ff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 76). All claims against all other Defendants have been seNled. (Doc. 159 at n.2). Further, Plain’ff withdrew his claim against Dr. Low for an injec’on that occurred on January 4, 2020, leaving only a single claim against Dr. Low pursuant to § 1983 based on a Fourteenth Amendment viola’on with respect to an injec’on which occurred on November 18, 2020. (Id.) When she became director, Dr. Low “inherited” standing orders, including the standing order at issue in this li)ga)on, from the previous medical director, which she reviewed and signed. (Id. at 2-3).
The underlying facts establish the following: On November 18, 2020, Riley, a pre-trial detainee at the Escambia County Deten)on Center, was escorted to the Escambia County Courthouse for his bond hearing. (Doc. 159 at 2). While in the hallway of the Escambia County Courthouse Riley and anther detainee were singing a rap song that contained the words, “f*** the D.A.” While he was singing, a Bailiff approached him from behind and an alterca)on occurred. (Id.). Riley was taken back to the jail and placed in
a one-man isola)on cell. (Id.) Shortly thereaber, Riley was taken out of the cell and strapped into a restraint chair. (Id.). His placement into the restraint chair was observed by Nurse Megan Langford (“Nurse Langford”), who determined that she did not need to see Riley in her office for evalua)on, due to his behavior. (Id.). Aber being restrained in the restraint chair, Nurse Langford observed Riley maneuvering the restraint chair or aeemp)ng to turn the chair over. (Doc. 149
at 4). Nurse Langford had previously observed an inmate flip a restraint chair over. (Id.). Ul)mately, Nurse Langford determined Riley was non-compliant and a danger to himself and administered a chemical restraint to Riley pursuant to a standing order signed by Dr. Low. (Id.). The standing order states: IM injec)on for severely agitated/manic inmates who are unable to restrain oneself. Injec)on includes the following medica)ons to be given in separate injec)ons
o 1-2mg A)van IM injec)on
Mixed with o Halaperidol IR 5mg Im injec)on o (in a separate injec)on by itself) Benadryl 50mg IM injec)on
These are to be given in one sejng, may repeat Benadryl 50mg IM every 2 hours un)l pa)ent is sedated.
(Doc. 159 at 4; Doc. 48-6; Doc. 149 at 4). Although the standing order specifies that an inmate be “unable” to restrain oneself, Dr. Low tes)fied that the chemical restraint may be given when an inmate is “unwilling” to restrain themselves based on their behavior. (Doc. 159 at 6). Further, although the standing order does not so expressly state, Dr. Low tes)fied that the standing order was permieed to be used in situa)ons where an inmate was dangerous to himself or others. (Doc. 149-1 at 20). Similarly, according to Nurse Langford, the standing order was to be used “only when manual forms of restraint fail to adequately protect others from harm by the inmate and/or adequately protect the inmate from harming himself or herself.” (Doc. 164 at 10; Doc. 48- 5). Kristy Godwin, another nurse working at the jail, tes)fied that she had been instructed to use the standing order “[a]ny )me one was showing harm to themselves or others, and when they were ac)ng erra)c, unruly, or out of control.” (Doc. 164-5 at 2-3). Riley’s medical records from the Escambia County Deten)on Center contain a hand- wrieen note from Nurse Langford dated November 18, 2020, which states “[Inmate] noncompliant, assaul)ng "c spit and s)ll maneuvering restraint chair. Admin standing Order of Haldol 5mg, A)van 2mg, Benadryl 50mg [. . .]”. (Doc. 159 at 3). Nurse Langford’s
contemporaneous typed note states as follows: “[a]t approximately 1009 on 11-18-2020, Theron Riley received standing orders for chemical restraint. Inmate had already assaulted officer by spijng, already restrained in restraint chair, and s)ll able to maneuver himself in the chair. Inmate tolerated injec)ons without issues. It is now 1025 and inmate is calm, coopera)ve and willing to comply. Chemical restraint deemed effec)ve at this )me.” (Id. at 4). There is no dispute that the standing order does not require a nurse to obtain approval prior to administering the subject medica)on, that Nurse Langford did not contact Dr. Low, or any other physician prior to medica)ng Riley, that the administra)on of the medica)on was
involuntarily, or that the medica)on was administered as a chemical restraint. (Id. at 5). There is addi)onally no dispute that Nurse Langford considered Riley to be mentally capable of controlling his ac)ons, she did not consider Riley to be psycho)c, nor could she diagnose anyone as “manic.” (Id. at 2-3). Plain)ff does, however, dispute that the restraint chair could have been overturned. In that regard he tes)fied that the chair could not be )pped over. (Doc. 159 at 16; Doc. 159-2 at 7).
Plain)ff also points to the tes)mony of Dr. Mark Choqueee, (Dr. Low’s designated expert) that he has never seen a restraint chair be overturned and the odds of someone doing so would be slim. (Doc. 159 at 7). George Hardinger (former warden) addi)onally tes)fied that in his two decades as warden, he had never seen or heard of an inmate overturning a restraint chair. (Id. at 8; Doc. 159-5 at 4). Finally, Dr. Pelmore (Plain)ff’s designated expert), Dr. Low, and Nurse Wright all
tes)fied that either they had not seen an inmate overturn a restraint chair or that it was unlikely. (Doc. 159 at 18). II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted: “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en)tled to judgment as a maeer of law.” The trial court’s func)on is not “to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the maeer but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002) (quo)ng Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly proba)ve, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, at 249-250. (internal cita)ons omieed). The basic issue before the court on a mo)on for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a maeer of law.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252. The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell
v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). In evalua)ng the argument of the moving party, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999). “If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery
Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (ci)ng MercanCle Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). Once the movant sa)sfies his ini)al burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party “must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each essen)al element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Howard v. BP Oil Company, 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1994) (ci)ng Celotex Corp. v. CatreM, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). Otherwise
stated, the non-movant must “demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment.” See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The non-moving party “may not rely merely on allega)ons or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Vega v. Invsco Group, Ltd., 432 F. App'x 867, 870 (11th Cir. June 24, 2011). “A mere ‘scin)lla’ of evidence suppor)ng the
[non-moving] party’s posi)on will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (cita)on omieed). “[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and jus)fiable inferences in the record taken as a whole.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a ra)onal trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 at 587 (1986) (internal quota)on and cita)on omieed). III. DISCUSSION A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Plain)ff alleges Dr. Low is liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because her standing order violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Rights. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability
on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or immuni)es secured by the Cons)tu)on and laws.” To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plain)ff must allege: (1) Defendants deprived him of a right secured under the United States Cons)tu)on or federal law, and (2) such depriva)on occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). There is no dispute that Dr. Low acted under color of state law. However, Dr. Low contends she is en)tled to qualified immunity because it was
not established, much less clearly established, that her standing order violated Plain)ff’s cons)tu)onal rights. (Doc. 159). Because a finding of qualified immunity is disposi)ve, the Court will address Dr. Low’s defense first. B. Qualified Immunity
The defense of qualified immunity completely protects government officials performing discre)onary func)ons from suit in their individual capaci)es unless their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or cons)tu)onal rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2003) (quo)ng Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). “The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their discre)onary du)es without the fear of personal liability
or harassing li)ga)on, protec)ng from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly viola)ng the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal cita)on and quota)on omieed). An official seeking qualified immunity must ini)ally establish that he was ac)ng within his discre)onary authority. Id. If the official was ac)ng within the scope of his discre)onary authority, the burden shibs to the plain)ff to show that immunity is not
appropriate. Id. To meet this burden, a plain)ff must first show that a defendant's conduct violated a cons)tu)onal right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Second, a plain)ff must show that “the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the )me of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Id. (quo)ng Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). “For an asserted right to be clearly established for purposes of qualified
immunity, ‘the law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that “what he is doing” violates federal law.’” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (11th Cir. 2000)(cita)ons omieed). There are three avenues by which Plain)ff can meet his burden to show that the officers
violated clearly established cons)tu)onal law. “First, the plain)ffs may show that a ‘materially similar case has already been decided.’ … Second, the plain)ffs can point to a ‘broader, clearly established principle [that] should control the novel facts [of the situa)on].’ … Finally, the conduct involved in the case may ‘so obviously violate[] th[e] cons)tu)on that prior case law is unnecessary.’” Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal cita)ons omieed). When determining whether a right was clearly established, the Court “looks only to binding
precedent—cases from the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the state under which the claim arose—to determine whether the right in ques)on was clearly established at the )me of the viola)on.” Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011)(cita)on omieed). Plain)ff does not appear to contest that Dr. Low was ac)ng within the scope of her
discre)onary du)es. Nevertheless, “a government official can prove he acted within the scope of his discre)onary authority by showing ‘objec)ve circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his ac)ons were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his du)es and within the scope of his authority.’” Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988). The Court is sa)sfied that Dr. Low was clearly ac)ng in her discre)onary authority. As a result, the Court will determine whether Plain)ff has sufficiently shown that Dr. Low’s standing order violated
Plain)ff’s clearly established substan)ve and procedural due process rights. 1. Due Process Plain)ff contends Dr. Low’s standing Order violates his substan)ve and procedural due process rights as established by Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). (Doc. 76; Doc. 159 at
9). More specifically, according to Plain)ff, Harper established that in order to sa)sfy substan)ve due process, factual circumstances must establish that (1) an inmate has a serious mental illness, (2) he is a danger to himself or others, and (3) the involuntary administra)on is in the inmate’s medical interest. (Id. at 9-19).2 With respect to procedural due process rights, Plain)ff asserts that the standing order violates his rights because it does not require that the decision to inject a detainee be “based upon a doctor’s ‘professional judgment.’” (Doc. 159 at 19-21). Defendant
contends Harper’s due process requirements do not apply in emergent situa)ons, such as this one, where an inmate/detainee is a danger to himself or others. (Doc. 149 and 164, generally).3 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against depriva)ons of “life, liberty, or property without the due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees have “a significant liberty
interest in avoiding the unwanted administra)on of an)psycho)c drugs.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 1036, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies to convicted prisoners); see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135,
2 Plain’ff asserts that Dr. Low’s Mo’on for Summary Judgment addresses only one of the three prongs set forth in Harper and, therefore, concedes a ques’on of fact exists as to the other two elements. (Doc. 159 at 10). However, as the Court understands Dr. Low’s posi’on, summary dismissal is warranted because Harper’s analysis does not apply. More specifically, Dr. Low contends the injec’on of medica’on in this instance did not violate Plain’ff’s rights because the standing order applied only when the facts demonstrated that an inmate was a “danger to himself or others.” 3 Defendant also argues that a § 1983 ac’on alleging forcible medica’on with an’psycho’cs should be treated as an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. (Doc. 149 at 8-9; Doc. 164 at 13-14). However, the Court agrees with Plain’ff that the issues here should be addressed as a Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and, therefore, does not separately analyze the deliberate indifference standard. 112 S.Ct. 1810, 1815, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992) (providing that pretrial detainees have an interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in avoiding forced an)psycho)c medica)on). While the right to refuse psychotropic drugs in a correc)onal sejng is not absolute, “involuntary-medica)on
orders must meet minimum standards of substan)ve and procedural due process.” Dunn v. Dunn, 219 F.Supp.3d 1100, 1153, (M.D. Ala. November 25, 2016). “[T]he substan)ve issue involves a defini)on of th[e] protected cons)tu)onal interest, as well as iden)fica)on of the condi)ons under which compe)ng state interests might outweigh it. The procedural issue concerns the minimum procedures required by the Cons)tu)on for determining that the individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed in a par)cular instance.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 220 quo)ng Mills v.
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 2448, 73 L.Ed.2d 16 (1982) (cita)ons omieed). a. The Standing Order did not Violate PlainXff’s Clearly Established SubstanXve Due Process Rights
According to Plain)ff, to sa)sfy substan)ve due process, factual circumstances must establish that (1) an inmate has a serious mental illness, (2) he is a danger to himself or others, and (3) the involuntary administra)on is in the inmate’s medical interest. (Id. at 9-19). In essence, Plain)ff’s posi)on is that Harper establishes the cons)tu)onal minimum for the administra)on of an)psycho)c medica)on and because Dr. Low’s standing order fails to comply with the substan)ve or procedural standards enunciated in Harper, it is uncons)tu)onal. This Court is not persuaded by Plain)ff’s posi)on. In Harper, the Supreme Court considered whether a policy permijng the long-term involuntary administra)on of an)psycho)c medica)on to treat mental illness violated the Due Process Clause. But Harper did not, as Plain)ff argues, hold that the standards of the subject policy were the minimum federal due process requirements for involuntary medica)on. Instead, the Supreme Court held that the subject policy did not violate federal cons)tu)onal requirements. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222, 110 S.Ct. at 1036–37; Leeks v. Cunningham, 997 F.2d 1330, 1333 (11th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1014, 114 S.Ct. 609, 126 L.Ed.2d 573 (1993).
(“Although the Court held that Harper had a protec)ble liberty interest, the Court nonetheless concluded that the State's policy as to administering unwanted an)psycho)c medica)on comported with due process requirements as it was reasonably related to the State's legi)mate interest in preven)ng harm to the inmate and others and was in the inmate's medical interest.”) Further, in Harper, the Court recognized the requirements of the prison sejng and held prison officials are permieed to forcibly treat a mentally ill pretrial detainee with an)psycho)c
medica)on “if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. at 1039–40; see also Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135, 112 S.Ct. at 1815. As such, post-Harper, it remains that “under appropriate factual circumstances, the government at )mes may force an individual to take psychiatric medica)ons against his will.” Grider v. Cook, 590 F. App'x 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2014) ci)ng Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. Indeed,
following Harper, courts have determined that no substan)ve due process viola)on occurred when the issue was not the long-term use of an)psycho)cs, but the one-)me use of medica)on in emergent or dangerous situa)ons. See, e.g. Spaulding v. Poiter, 548 Fed. Appx. 587, 591 (11th Cir. 2013) (Plain)ff’s liberty interests were not violated by the administra)on of a single dose of an)psycho)c medica)on because he was a danger to himself and others.); Webb v. Streeter, 2022 WL 3587363, *8 (D. Neb. August 22, 2022) (finding no procedural or substan)ve due process
viola)on when inmate was involuntarily medicated aber becoming aggressive with staff and applicable policies were followed). As an ini)al maeer, the par)es both make arguments as to the cons)tu)onality of the standing order based on whether the facts show Plain)ff was a danger to himself or others. More specifically, whether the facts establish Plain)ff could succeed in flipping over the restraint chair.
However, the issue before this Court is not whether Nurse Langford’s ac)ons were uncons)tu)onal in her administra)on of the medica)on, it is whether the standing order implemented by Dr. Low was uncons)tu)onal. In that regard, although Plain)ff points out that the standing order doesn’t expressly qualify its intended use, Plain)ff has presented no evidence to refute that the standing order permieed the administra)on of a single dose of an)psycho)c medica)on in situa)ons where an individual was a danger to himself or others per the tes)mony
of Dr. Low, Nurse Langford, and Nurse Godwin. Because the policy limits the administra)on of a single dose of medica)on when an inmate poses a danger, a manner that considers both the inmate’s medical interests and the legi)mate needs of the prison, it does not violate substan)ve due process. Harper, 494 U.S at 227. Nevertheless, the Court is addi)onally sa)sfied that Plain)ff posed a danger to himself. It
is undisputed that Plain)ff was involved in an alterca)on leading to his placement in an isola)on cell and then a restraint chair. It is addi)onally undisputed that once restrained, Plain)ff did not calm down but aeempted to maneuver the restraint chair with some success. Even considering Plain)ff’s tes)mony that the restraint chair could not be flipped over or the tes)mony that the probability the overturning the chair was slim, there is no dispute that Plain)ff was aeemp)ng to maneuver the chair and that Nurse Langford had previously witnessed an inmate overturn a
restrain chair. Thus, a dispute over the probability of overturning the restraint chair does not defeat that a danger existed. Finally, there is no dispute that if Plain)ff overturned the restraint chair, he would be defenseless to a fall which could result in serious injuries. As a result, the facts demonstrate that Plain)ff was a danger to himself and therefore, the administra)on of a single dose of an)-psycho)c medica)on by Nurse Langford pursuant to the standing order did not
violate his substan)ve due process rights. See Spaulding, 548 Fed. Appx. at 590 (“[P]rison officials are cons)tu)onally permieed to forcibly treat an inmate with an)psycho)c medica)on when that inmate is a danger to himself or others.) (cita)on omieed). Assuming, however, that the standing order violated Plain)ff’s substan)ve due process rights, Dr. Low is s)ll en)tled to qualified immunity because Plain)ff has not shown that his substan)ve due process right was clearly established by binding precedent. As set forth above,
“[f]or an asserted right to be clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, ‘the law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that “what he is doing” violates federal law.’” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (11th Cir. 2000)(cita)ons omieed). The only case relied on by Plain)ff to support that his right was clearly established is Harper, but as
set forth above, Harper is materially dis)nguishable. Namely, Harper considered the implica)ons of due process on a policy rela)ng to the administra)on of long-term an)psycho)cs for mentally ill prisoners, not the one-)me use of an)psycho)cs for dangerous behavior. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that Harper made it “obvious to all reasonable government actors”, in Dr. Low’s posi)on, that her standing order violated federal law. See Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1164-65. Moreover, Plain)ff has not pointed to any case since Harper with facts similar to this one clearly
establishing Dr. Low’s standing order violated his substan)ve due process rights. Accordingly, Dr. Low is en)tled to qualified immunity. b. The Standing Order did not Violate PlainXff’s Clearly Established Procedural Due Process Rights
Plain)ff addi)onally argues that the standing order violates Plain)ff’s procedural due process rights because it does not require that the decision to inject a detainee be “based upon a doctor’s ‘professional judgment’” pursuant to Harper. (Doc. 159 at 19-21). Procedural due process involves ascertaining “whether the State’s nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the facts in a par)cular case are sufficient.” Harper, 494 U.S. at 220, 110 S.Ct. at 1035. But again, as discussed herein above, Harper addressed long-term treatment of mentally ill prisoners, not the administra)on of involuntary medica)on when an inmate poses a danger to himself or others. As such, Harper did not establish the cons)tu)onal minimum for procedural due process in emergent or dangerous situa)ons. See, e.g. Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1116-17 (4th Cir. 1996) (gran)ng qualified immunity to doctor who administered single dose of an)psycho)c
medica)on to an inmate in danger of injuring himself aber understanding Harper to have “addressed to the circumstance of long-term treatment there at issue, and not as extending to emergencies.”); see also Webb, 2022 WL 3587363 at *8 (Following Harper, “it has become widely accepted that ‘the decision to administer an)psycho)c medica)on over an inmate's objec)on comports with due process if the decision was made in the exercise of professional medical judgment and arose in the context of an emergency situa)on where the inmate posed a danger
to himself or others.’”) (cita)ons omieed); Pinkston v. Mississippi Dep't of Corr., 2021 WL 1206412, at *11 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 30, 2021) (“Ordinarily, the failure to provide the required procedural protec)ons before forcible administra)on of a drug will result in a viola)on of a plain)ff's procedural due process rights. However, a prisoner is not en)tled to such procedural protec)ons when the circumstances suggest that he poses ’such an imminent and serious danger to himself or others‘ that the defendant could not comply with the no)ce and hearing requirements.”). As a result, the failure of the subject standing order to comply with the procedural standards set forth in Harper, does not establish that the order violated Plain)ff’s
procedural due process rights.4 Moreover, even if the order violated procedural due process, Dr. Low is en)tled to qualified immunity because the same has not been clearly established. Again, Plain)ff relies solely on Harper to show that the standing order clearly violated procedural due process. But Harper is materially dis)nguishable from the facts of this case for numerous reasons set forth above. Harper, then, did not make it “obvious to all reasonable government actors”, in Dr. Low’s
posi)on, that her standing order violated federal law. See Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1164-65. Because Plain)ff has not pointed to materially similar binding case that established his procedural due process rights were violated, Dr. Low is en)tled to qualified immunity. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed below, the Defendant’s Mo)on for Summary Judgment (Doc. 149) is GRANTED.5
DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of September, 2024. /s/ JEFFREY U. BEAVERSTOCK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 Defendant addi’onally argues that the standing order sa’sfies the procedural due process requirements because it permits a nurse, present with an inmate, to exercise professional judgment. However, the Court need not address whether Plain’ff’s procedural due process rights were met by some standard other than those set forth in Harper, because even if Plain’ff’s due process right were violated, the same was not clearly established by binding precedent. 5 Because summary judgment is granted on the only remaining claim in this ac’on, Defendant’s Mo’on to Exclude (Doc. 150) is MOOT.