Rikstad v. Department of Labor & Industries

41 P.2d 391, 180 Wash. 591, 1935 Wash. LEXIS 488
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 14, 1935
DocketNo. 25212. En Banc.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 41 P.2d 391 (Rikstad v. Department of Labor & Industries) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rikstad v. Department of Labor & Industries, 41 P.2d 391, 180 Wash. 591, 1935 Wash. LEXIS 488 (Wash. 1935).

Opinions

Millard, C. J.

About ten a. m., August 20, 1932, John Rikstad was injured while employed as a truck driver in highway construction. A truck operated by Rikstad was stalled in the mud. The sudden jerk of another truck used to pull Rikstad’s truck from the mire threw him against the end of a steel rod used to open the tail gate of the truck. The impact of the rod against his right abdomen under his ribs caused great *592 suffering to the victim for a period of from five to ten minutes. He then went to the front of his truck, started its engine, and operated the truck the remainder of the working day, during all of which time there was pain in the region of the place where the end of the steel rod struck him.

Rikstad was compelled to be idle the following day because of inclement weather. Thereafter, until September 1st, “I stayed in bed most of the time at home, cramped up.” He never returned to work of highway construction. On September 1st he was assigned by the charity commission of Grays Harbor county to the work of weeding at the county welfare farm. After five minutes of that toil, he became so ill that he returned to town. That same day, he was sent by the county charity commissioner to a hospital as a charity patient. He remained in the hospital until September 23rd.

His employer did not, nor did the physician who attended him at the hospital, make any report to the department of labor and industries of Rikstad’s injury. The department did not receive any information concerning the accident until November 21, 1932, when Rikstad filed a claim for compensation because of the injury. The employer refused to sign the report of accident, claiming that his firm had no knowledge of the accident and was unable to locate anyone who had any knowledge of the injury.

Claimant testified that the foreman, a member of the firm that employed Rikstad, was standing in a position where he must have seen the accident. Two others testified to the same effect. Claimant also testified that, after leaving the hospital, he met the foreman on the street and informed him respecting the injury. The foreman told him it was “too bad.” Claimant also testified that, when he entered the hospital on September 1st, he informed his attending *593 physician as to the canse of his injury, and that the physician advised the claimant that his injury was not compensable.

The physician testified that the patient did not, at the time he entered the hospital, give a history of any accident that occurred to him; that, sometime after claimant left the hospital, he called on the physician “and asked me if an accident could have caused his condition.” The physician advised him that it could not.

Prior to this controversy, the attending physician prepared a report, which became a part of the records of the hospital, which is corroborative of the physician’s testimony that he knew nothing of an injury to claimant during the time he was a patient in the hospital. That hospital record was made September 3, 1932, the day after an X-ray examination disclosed that the claimant was suffering from a large penetrating ulcer of the lesser curvature. That is, the record was written two weeks after claimant’s injury, two days subsequent to the date he became a patient in the hospital, and at least three weeks prior to the time the physician claimed he first learned that the claimant had suffered the injury for which he now seeks compensation. That report reads:

“Patient entirely well until 1929 at which time he first noticed epigastric distress coming on a few hours after eating, at this time he was drinking considerable moonshine. He has had this pain of a burning* character — non radiating since that time. Its location has changed to under left rib margin into M. C. L. Lately he has had a few tarry stools. Never vomited.”

On December 1, 1932, the claim filed November 21, 1932, by Rikstad for compensation was denied “for the reason that the workman’s condition was not the result of injury alleged.” On January 25, 1933, the *594 claimant applied to the joint board for a rehearing, which was granted. He prayed

“ . . . that the refusal of his said claim be reversed; and his said claim reopened; that he be allowed time loss from the date of his injury until same is cured or until the extent and degree of his permanent disability can be determined; and that he then be allowed compensation for such permanent disability, if any, . . . ”

On February 15, 1933, a hearing on the claim was had at Hoquiam before an examiner. No witnesses were called by the department. Four witnesses, in addition to claimant, testified in behalf of claimant. One, a physician, testified that, if the claimant had ever had ulcer prior to the accident, it would have entirely healed, and that his accident was the sole cause of his disability. Two of the witnesses were fellow workmen of claimant, and they corroborated claimant’s testimony as to the way the accident happened, how many minutes elapsed after the accident before the claimant could operate his truck, and that the foreman was so close to the accident he must have seen it. One other witness testified respecting claimant’s freedom from pain or discomfort when, as an amateur pugilist, he was subjected to hard blows to the stomach by boxers and sparring partners. This was to support the claimant’s position that, though in 1928 and 1929 he had vomited blood three times, due to excessive use of “moonshine,” he became, in July, 1929, and still is, a total abstainer, and that, since the date he discontinued the use of intoxicants, he has not had any stomach trouble.

After the transcript of the testimony of the foregoing hearing was submitted to it, the joint board decided that the physician who attended claimant while a patient should be called as a witness. On March 20, *595 1933, the joint board entered an order to that effect; and on April 26, 1933, the department held another hearing at Hoquiam (designated “a continuation of a hearing” of February) for the purpose of taking the testimony of that physician. The recitals of the order entered by the joint board March 20, 1933, so far as material here, are as follows:

“This matter comes before the Joint Board for a review of the order of the Supervisor of Industrial Insurance, dated December 1,1932, rejecting the above claim upon the grounds that the workman’s condition of gastric ulcer was not due to an injury received by him August 19, 1932.

“That a review of the claim file indicates that on November 20, 1932, the claimant, while in the employ of James Tobin & Son, contractors, engaged in backing a loaded truck, which was being towed by a Cater-piller tractor, the Caterpillar started off with a jerk and threw the claimant against a steel rod of the truck, striking his abdomen; that his breath was taken away but he continued working; that the employer declined to certify to said injury and Dr. Harry Watkins of Aberdeen stated that claimant did not consult him for any injury.

“That the claim file shows a written X-ray report of the claimant by Dr. E. D.

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Bluebook (online)
41 P.2d 391, 180 Wash. 591, 1935 Wash. LEXIS 488, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rikstad-v-department-of-labor-industries-wash-1935.