Rikin Mehta v. Hirsh Singh

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 1, 2025
• Docket: A-0409-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0409-23

RIKIN MEHTA and MEHTA FOR U.S. SENATE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

HIRSH SINGH and SINGH FOR SENATE,

Defendants-Respondents. ___________________________

Submitted April 30, 2025 – Decided July 1, 2025

Before Judges Currier, Marczyk, and Paganelli.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0068-21.

Murray-Nolan Berutti LLC, attorneys for appellants (Ronald A. Berutti, on the briefs).

Hirsh Singh, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM The dispute between the parties arises out of a contentious political race

in which the two candidates vied for the Republican nomination for New Jersey's

United States Senate seat in 2020. Plaintiffs, Dr. Rikin Mehta (Mehta) and

Mehta for U.S. Senate, instituted suit, alleging defendants engaged in a

defamatory smear campaign against plaintiffs, including the publication of

numerous allegedly false and defamatory press releases as well as the hiring of

third parties to spread misinformation about plaintiffs.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the

motion, finding: (1) plaintiffs failed to show by clear and convincing evidence

that defendants acted with actual malice in making their publications; and (2)

defendants' actions were not defamatory as their publications constituted

opinions and hyperbole rather than assertions of fact. We affirm.

I.

Mehta is an adjunct law professor as well as a co-founder and board

member of two companies that operate in the medical resource and

pharmaceutical fields. From 2008 to 2014, Mehta worked for the United States

Food and Drug Administration in the compliance office. Mehta then worked for

the District of Columbia Department of Health as a Senior Deputy Director. In

A-0409-23 2 2015, Mehta moved to New Jersey where he switched his voter registration from

Democrat to Republican.

In March 2020, Mehta filed sixteen petitions containing a total of 1,117

signatures.1 After twelve of the signatures were rejected because the circulator

of the petition was a registered Democrat, violating N.J.S.A. 19:23-11, Mehta

filed more than 600 additional signatures. In April, a voter formally challenged

Mehta's petitions to the Secretary of State of New Jersey, who then transmitted

the matter to the Office of Administrative Law.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing. The petitioner-

voter asserted Mehta's name was listed in two slightly different formats,

requiring the invalidation of some of the signatures. The ALJ concluded there

was no evidence that the variation misled voters. The ALJ also found that even

if all the challenges were successful, Mehta would still have had the required

signatures to obtain the nomination. Therefore, the ALJ ordered that Mehta 's

name be placed on the ballot. The ALJ's decision was adopted in its entirety by

1 To participate in a primary election at the time of these events, an individual had to submit 1,000 valid signatures from registered voters of the same party affiliation. N.J.S.A. 19:23-8. The statute was amended in 2025 and now requires 2,500 votes. A-0409-23 3 the Secretary of State. Mehta won the Republican nomination and lost in the

general election in November 2020 to Democrat Cory Booker.

A.

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in January 2021, alleging claims of

false light, defamation, and defamation per se. These claims arose out of the

following publications (and others): (1) A Shore News Network (Shore)

headline from October 30, 2019, that stated "Obama Era Administrator, Big

Pharma Rep Announces Run for U.S. Senate in New Jersey"; (2) a Shore

headline from November 21, 2019, stating "Stuart Meissner and Rik Mehta, both

running for Senate are newly minted Republicans with deep ties to the Democrat

party"; (3) Shore headlines from February 2, 2020, stating "if elected, . . . Mehta,

who is challenging Booker says he will protect the opioid supply chain for the

pharmaceutical industry," and "pharmaceutical executive . . . Mehta who has

come under fire this week for his support of the pharmaceutical industry and

easier access to opioid-based prescription drugs"; (4) a Shore headline from

February 4, 2020, stating "Somerset County Republicans joined the Union

County Republicans in backing pharmaceutical executive [Mehta] who has

come under fire this week for his support of the pharmaceutical industry and

easier access to opioid-based prescription drugs"; (5) Shore headlines from

A-0409-23 4 February 10, 2020, stating "Mehta, [who] worked for opioid producing giant

Pfizer and most recently worked for a company that sells Narcan has come under

fire in recent weeks over a video that surfaced where he [stated] . . . '[w]e must

protect America's opioid supply chain,'" "[Mehta] says we should protect

America's opioid supply chain," and "[t]he newly minted Republican with deep

campaign pockets and deep ties to the opioid epidemic plaguing New Jersey";

(6) a Shore headline from March 6, 2020, stating "[d]ays earlier, the group, led

by its panel of leadership insiders on the screening committee unanimously

endorsed . . . Obama era Democrat . . . Mehta for Senate to fulfill their obligation

to North Jersey Republicans controlling this year's election statewide"; (7) a

Shore headline from April 7, 2020 that stated "Swamp News: Mehta Turns on

His Own Democrats; Criticizes Booker, Menendez"; (8) a Singh for Senate

release titled "Democrat Judge allows [Mehta] to stay on ballot"; (9) a Shore

headline from April 9, 2020 that stated "How Alleged Voter Fraud Almost Kept

Former Democrat . . . Mehta Off 2020 Primary Election Ballot" as well as

accompanying text from the article quoting Singh stating that Mehta relied on

"the voting base of the Democrat Party and Green Party machinery to get on to

the ballot prov[ing] . . . he is a pawn of the progressive establishment"; (10) a

Singh for Senate release and a Shore headline from April 16, 2020 stating:

A-0409-23 5 "Mehta's 'N-Word' Problem" with an accompanying photograph of Mehta next

to an individual wearing blackface; (11) a Shore headline from May 2, 2020

stating "Hirsh Singh Says Opponent, Former Democrat . . . Mehta Could

Endorse Biden, Not Trump if His Ex-Boss is Tapped as Biden VP"; (12) a social

media post, dated May 16, 2020, that stated "U[.]S[.] Senate candidate . . . Mehta

wants to mandate COVID-19 vaccine to make his other pharmaceutical

Democratic opiate peddlers rich!"; (13) press releases by Singh for Senate dated

May 26, 2020, accusing Mehta of involvement with prescription drugs related

to birth control and stating that Mehta is not pro-life; (14) a May 29, 2020 press

release from Singh for Senate describing Mehta as a "Trojan Horse to keep

Corey Booker in power"; (15) a statement made by Singh on June 29, 2020,

describing Mehta as "a Democrat plant"; (16) a July 1, 2020, Singh for Senate

press release accusing Mehta of being a lifelong Democrat; and (17) other press

releases and statements by Singh made after the 2020 general election accusing

Mehta of voter fraud as well as various other statements by news outlet pundits

and social media posts. 2

2 The press releases and statements have similar themes as those already noted: characterizing Mehta as a Democrat plant who benefitted from voter fraud, has ties to pharmaceutical companies, is pro-opioids and pro-abortion, was embroiled in a racism scandal, and exposed citizens to COVID-19 by failing to quarantine after being exposed to the virus. A-0409-23 6 B.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in lieu of an answer pursuant

to Rule 4:6-2(e). The trial court granted the motion in part, dismissing the

defamation per se claim but allowing the defamation and false light claims to

proceed. In a corresponding written opinion, the court found that plaintiffs had

pled a cause of action for defamation and since Mehta was a public figure, a

finding of actual malice was necessary to establish the claim, which could not

be determined on a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion.

In dismissing the defamation per se claim, the court cited to McLaughlin

v. Rosanio, Bailets & Talamo, Inc. 331 N.J. Super. 303, 313-14 (App. Div.

2000), and explained that only four kinds of statements qualify as slander per

se: that is, accusing another: "(1) of having committed a criminal offense, (2)

of having a loathsome disease; (3) of engaging in conduct or having a condition

or trait incompatible with his or her business, or (4) of having engaged in serious

sexual misconduct." The court found that plaintiffs' contention that defendants'

Facebook post falsely alleged that Mehta was recklessly exposing crowds to

COVID-19 while he was campaigning did not amount to defamation per se, "as

the statement . . . d[id] not by itself allege that . . . [Mehta] had COVID[-19] or

A-0409-23 7 any other 'loathsome disease.'" Plaintiffs' subsequent motion for reconsideration

of the dismissal of the defamation per se count was denied.

Shortly thereafter, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) issued a ruling

in response to a complaint which alleged defendants paid Shore to publish

favorable coverage of Singh's campaign, and negative coverage and criticism of

Mehta in online articles and on social media, and did not include the proper

disclaimers required by the Federal Election Campaign Act (Act) of 1971, 52

U.S.C. §§ 30101 to -30146. The FEC made a finding of no reason to believe

with respect to the alleged violations because

the information in the record before [them] indicated that [Shore's] activities fell . . . under the Act's media exemption . . . [and] therefore [Shore was] not required to append disclaimers to its content, to register as a political committee, or to report in-kind contributions resulting from its favorable coverage of Singh or negative coverage of his opponent. . . . [And] the [c]omplaint failed to present credible evidence that [Shore] and the Singh Committee impermissibly coordinated on communications regulated by the Act.

....

The available information . . . d[id] not indicate that the Singh Committee paid for the articles . . . placed on the [Shore] website. The record d[id] not contain any evidence to substantiate the allegation[s] . . . that the Singh Committee's payments to [another magazine] were for the publishing of . . . articles . . . and not for traditional advertising on the [Shore] website.

A-0409-23 8 C.

In May 2023, defendants moved for summary judgment; plaintiffs filed a

cross-motion for similar relief.

In a well-reasoned written decision and accompanying orders, the court

granted defendants summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion. The

court cited to Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 528 (1994), and addressed the

threshold question of whether the alleged statements were reasonably

susceptible to defamatory meanings. The court noted it must scrutinize the

language of the statements, giving them their literal meanings as well as a fair

and natural reading under an objective reasonable person standard. The court

further cited to Lynch v. New Jersey Education Ass'n, 161 N.J. 152, 168-69

(1999), and noted that statements of opinion cannot be proved to be true or false.

Using this framework, the court found the statements made by defendants

were not false or defamatory, but rather protected statements of opinion. The

court reasoned that the statements constituted "loose, figurative . . . and

rhetorical hyperbole that were uttered during an election for public office," and

that readers of the statements were able to draw their own conclusions as to

whether the opinions were justified. Specifically, the court emphasized that the

phrases used, such as "baby killer," "opioid peddler," and "voter fraud" did not

A-0409-23 9 make specific accusations of criminal activity but rather, were "pejorative

rhetoric even though they m[ight] be considered extreme and vituperous."

The court further found that even if the statements were defamatory and

not opinions, plaintiffs' claims would still fail. The court stated plaintiffs had

not established actual malice because the record did not "show by clear and

convincing evidence that the statements were false or published with reckless

disregard for the truth." The court further explained that even though actual

malice is a subjective standard, plaintiffs did not assert facts from which a

factfinder could conclude that defendants "knew or entertained serious doubts

as to the truth of the statements," because defendants "pointed to [their] sources,

and failure to investigate all sources does not establish malice" as articulated in

Lynch. The court's reasoning applied to both the defamation and false light

claims.

II.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in dismissing the

defamation per se claim under Rule 4:6-2(e) and subsequently granting

defendants summary judgment on the remaining claims.

A-0409-23 10 A.

We begin with the summary judgment order. We review the trial court's

grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard used by the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022).

Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that a motion for summary judgment must be

granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment or order as a matter of law." The court must "consider whether the

competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder

to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

"To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court

must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non -moving

party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)).

Generally, "a statement is defamatory if it is false, communicated to a

third person, and tends to lower the subject's reputation in the estimation of the

A-0409-23 11 community or to deter third persons from associating with [them]." Lynch, 161

N.J. at 164-65.

False statements about public officials and public figures must be made

with actual malice to be actionable. Ibid. (citing New York Times Co. v.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388

U.S. 130, 154 (1967)). "To satisfy the actual-malice standard, a plaintiff must

show by clear and convincing evidence that the publisher either knew that the

statement was false or published with reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at

165 (citing New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80).

"Statements of opinion, like unverifiable statements of fact, generally

cannot be proved true or false." Id. at 167. Further, "[a] statement made in the

heat of an election contest supplies the paradigm for that commitment to free

debate." Id. at 166. "When a candidate enters the political arena, he or she must

expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal." Ibid. (quoting

Harte–Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687 (1989))

(internal quotation marks omitted). "Readers know that statements by one side

in a political contest are often exaggerated, emotional, and even misleading."

Ibid. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 32 (1990)).

A-0409-23 12 Preliminarily, we can dispense of plaintiffs' claims regarding many of the

alleged statements and news articles because they were not actually made or

published by defendants or their agents. The news outlet responsible for

publishing most of the articles cited by plaintiffs in their complaint was Shore,

who is not a party to this action.

Here, because Mehta is running for public office, plaintiffs must

demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, the statements were made with

actual malice. As to claims regarding specific press releases made by

defendants, the trial court properly determined that the statements constituted

opinion and hyperbole and therefore cannot be proven true or false. See Lynch,

161 N.J. at 167.

Mehta was involved in a controversy concerning an advisor who used the

"N-word" on video and a dispute involving his petition signatures. The

statement that Mehta was a "Democrat" who "rigged the election" is also

properly read as opinion and hyperbole. Finally, while offensive, the image in

the press release did not show Mehta in blackface but rather juxtaposed his

picture next to a caricature of a person in blackface.

Plaintiffs' assertions that defendants stated Mehta promoted opioid use,

abortion, and would mandate the COVID-19 vaccine if elected can similarly be

A-0409-23 13 described as opinion and hyperbole. Mehta was employed by Pfizer as the head

of its regulatory affairs department. Even if Mehta was not directly responsible

for the approval of certain products mentioned in the press release, defendants

had a factual basis to associate Mehta with Pfizer at the time the drugs were

promoted. Readers were free to make their own decisions on the veracity of the

statements.

The press releases issued by defendants were on Singh for U.S. Senate

letterhead and began with language such as "Singh is strongly condemning . . .

Mehta," clearly evidencing Singh's opinion. Moreover, plaintiffs have not

demonstrated that defendants "fabricate[d] a story, publishe[d] one that is

wholly unbelievable, or relie[d] on an informant of dubious veracity, or

purposely avoid[ed] the truth." Id. at 165.

We turn to Mehta's false light claim. To establish the claim, a plaintiff

must show:

(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and

(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.

[Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 294 (1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652E) (Am. L. Inst. 1977).]

A-0409-23 14 "A false light claim against a public official [is] similar to a defamation

claim [in that they both] utilize[] the actual malice standard." DeAngelis v. Hill,

180 N.J. 1, 19 (2004). In light of our determination that plaintiffs have not

proven actual malice, we are satisfied the trial court properly dismissed the false

light claim.

B.

We now address the order dismissing the defamation per se claim. Our

review of a "Rule 4:6-2(e) motion[] to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted" is de novo. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC,

246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citing Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley,

Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019)). In considering a Rule

4:6-2(e) motion, "[a] reviewing court must examine 'the legal sufficiency of the

facts alleged on the face of the complaint,' giving the plaintiff the benefit of

'every reasonable inference of fact.'" Ibid. (quoting Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J.

at 107). The test for determining the adequacy of a pleading is "whether a cause

of action is 'suggested' by the facts." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.

Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,

109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)). Notwithstanding this standard, "if [a] complaint

A-0409-23 15 states no claim that supports relief, . . . the action should be dismissed."

Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J at 107.

Mehta alleges defendants recklessly and maliciously fabricated a story

during the COVID-19 pandemic that Mehta was exposed to COVID-19 at the

Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in 2020 and then campaigned

among at-risk people without first quarantining.

"The terms 'libel per se' and 'libel per quod' have long been used to

differentiate between writings defamatory on their face and those defamatory

solely in the light of extrinsic facts." Lawrence v. Bauer Publ'g & Printing, 89

N.J. 451, 459 (1982). A finding of libel per se means that as a matter of law

"the statements were not reasonably susceptible of a nondefamatory

interpretation." Ibid.

The record confirms that Mehta posted a picture of himself on social

media in February 2020 indicating that he was at CPAC. The caption of the post

read "[a]lways great to be #jerseyproud in Washington! #cpac2020." Therefore,

he represented that he attended the conference. Defendants relied on the

representation in making their comments. Because the article had a factual

basis—Mehta's own post—plaintiffs cannot sustain an action of defamation per

A-0409-23 16 se. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the count.

Affirmed.

A-0409-23 17