Riggs Investment Management Corp. v. Columbia Investment Partners, L.L.C.

975 F. Supp. 14, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12054, 1997 WL 467907
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided July 31, 1997·No. Civil Action 96-0014 (RCL)·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAMBERTH, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on defendant Columbia Investment Partners’, L.L.C. (“Columbia Partners”) motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law and to alter the judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the opposition thereto, and the reply, defendant’s motion is hereby DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In January of this year, this court conducted a bench trial in which the Riggs Investment Management Corporation (“RIMCO”) accused Columbia Partners, another investment management firm, of various forms of false or misleading advertising under the Lanham Act. The court found the defendant corporation liable under the Act, noting that in some instances, Columbia Partners had “operated willfully and in bad faith with respect to its advertising.” (Op. at 41). Upon making this determination, the court awarded plaintiff defendant’s profits for the fourth quarter of 1995 and half of the first quarter of 1996 — representing the time for which Columbia Partners acted in bad faith.

The court awarded RIMCO $265,071.25, a figure which represented Columbia Partners revenues from equity fees during that period. Because the burden of proving deductions from revenue to arrive at profit is a task which falls on the defendant in such circumstances, the court made no deductions from this amount, finding that defendant had “not made a reasonable effort” to do so. Now, Columbia Partners seeks to amend this court’s order for two reasons. First, it claims that under the law, when there has been a finding that certain monies earned by the defendant were not earned as a result of the wrongdoing, that figure must be deducted from any damage award. Second, Columbia Partners believes it did prove its profits at trial and this court merely erred by improperly including money which should have been deducted as defendant’s expenses.

RIMCO, on the other hand, objects to any such reconsideration. First, it states that the prerequisites for relief under a motion for reconsideration, have not been met. Second, it criticizes defendant’s analysis of the law, and finally, argues that defendant is merely trying to prove too late arguments it should have proven at trial.

For the reasons given below, the court will deny defendant Columbia Partners’ motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 permits a party to move to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law after it has been entered by the court. A Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds (1) an intervening change of controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1996); EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 116 F.3d 110, 112 (4th Cir.1997). The only applicable element of review in this case would be the need to correct clear error or to prevent manifest injustice.

This court awarded approximately four months of defendant’s profit to RIMCO as a result of defendant’s bad faith marketing behavior during that period. The court determined that plaintiffs need prove only defendant’s revenues: the burden of proving deductions to calculate profit fell upon Columbia Partners. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (stating, “[i]n assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of *16 cost or deduction claimed”). The court found that Columbia Partners had not met its burden of proving deductions, and therefore the court made none, awarding a total of $265,071.25 to RIMCO — representing defendant’s equity revenue during the period of its bad faith conduct. Op. at 44. Columbia Partners argues, however, that (1) the law required the court to deduct fees not obtained through the use of false and misleading advertising — here fees earned from the Upholsterers International Union (“UIU”) — and this court’s failure to deduct these sums resulted in clear error; and (2) defendant’s revenues should be reduced by its legitimate expenses, which it believes were proven at trial.

1. UIU’s Fees

Originally, RIMCO had asked for a separate award of all fees paid by UIU to Columbia Partners as a measure of damages based on breaches of fiduciary duty by RIM-CO’s former Chief Executive Officer Richard von Pentz, now employed by defendant Columbia Partners. The court found that UIU’s desire to switch investment firms and sign on with Columbia Partners was not attributable to any breach of. duty by von Pentz. The court did not find that UIU’s move was unaffected by false advertising, however. Thus, it would not be clear error for this court to award UIU’s profits to RIM-CO on this basis, nor would it be even inconsistent with the court’s prior opinion in this case. It is true that UIU has never complained about Columbia Partners’ false advertising nor has UIU removed its account from Columbia Partners’ management. This does not mean UIU was unaffected by defendant’s violations of the Lanham Act, nor does it mean that Columbia Partners has a right to return of these funds.

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Riggs Investment Management Corp. v. Columbia Investment Partners, L.L.C., 975 F. Supp. 14, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12054, 1997 WL 467907 (D.D.C. 1997).

975 F. Supp. 14 (Riggs Investment Management Corp. v. Columbia Investment Partners, L.L.C.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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