Riger v. M. E. Leming Lumber Co.

236 S.W. 689, 210 Mo. App. 322, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 208
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 14, 1922
StatusPublished

This text of 236 S.W. 689 (Riger v. M. E. Leming Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Riger v. M. E. Leming Lumber Co., 236 S.W. 689, 210 Mo. App. 322, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922).

Opinions

This is an action for personal injury. The cause was tried below to a jury, and verdict *Page 327 and judgment went in favor of plaintiff for $5000. Motions for new trial and in arrest were overruled, and defendant appealed.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant at Remoc in Bollinger County, and was engaged in loading logs from the ground onto cars. The loading outfit was on a spur or switch adjacent to the railroad. The loading was carried on by steam power, wire cable, tongs, etc. A car of coal was placed on a switch leading to the loader, and in order to unload this car of coal it was necessary to move it down the switch to the coal bin. To do this the wire cable, the tongs and a pulley attached to the car of coal were used. The tongs were made fast to a stump and the cable passed through the attached pully and then fastened to one of defendant's engines on adjacent logging track. The cable was fastened to the tongs by being tied to the ring thereof. The force exerted on the cable drew the knot in the cable at the tongs' ring so tight that it could not be loosened except by cutting the cable. After the car of coal was moved, plaintiff laid the knot in the cable on a railroad rail, and with a cold chisel and a hammer was attempting to cut the cable to release the tongs. While so engaged and after plaintiff had made four or five licks a small piece of severed wire about a quarter of an inch in length struck plaintiff in the left eye and totally destroyed the sight thereof.

Plaintiff alleges that defendant's foreman directed him to cut the cable and that said cable where plaintiff attempted to cut it was rotten and brittle. Omitting some preliminaries the petition alleges: "That the said iron cable was old and at the end in which the said knot was tied as aforesaid was frazzled and the many small wires of which the same was composed had become loose, unraveled and unwoven and this defendant and its said foreman, officers, agents and employees knew or should have known, and the said defendant and its officers, agents and employees had caused and permitted the said wire rope or cable to be dragged in the mud and water until the same and the many small wires composing it had *Page 328 become rusty, rotten and brittle, and when plaintiff began to cut the said wire cable at the knot the small pieces of wire of which it was composed, because of the rusty, rotten and brittle condition as aforesaid, flew with great force and violence in all directions, one of them striking the plaintiff in the left eye, causing the said left eye to entirely perish away and to be put out and lost to the plaintiff, and another one of the small pieces of wire striking the plaintiff on the left side of the upper lip, passing through the same and into the plaintiff's mouth and gums.

Plaintiff states that the said wire rope in its said rotten and brittle condition was not a reasonably safe appliance for the work and purpose for which plaintiff as aforesaid used and worked with the same for the defendant, for the reason that its said rotten and brittle condition, in case it became necessary to cut the said wire rope as aforesaid, was liable to cause the said small wires composing the said wire rope to break into small pieces during such cutting and cause injury to the person cutting the same, and its said rotten and brittle condition and the danger arising therefrom were at the time known to the defendant and its said foreman and agent and servants, or should have been known to them by the exercise of ordinary care upon their part, and the said wire rope was furnished by the defendant for the said use as aforesaid, and the said defendant was in duty bound to furnish the plaintiff with reasonably safe tools and appliances and this said duty towards the plaintiff said defendant neglected and, on the contrary, did furnish for use in the said work in which the plaintiff was engaged the said wire rope in its said rotten and brittle condition, and plaintiff alleges that it was negligence upon the part of defendant toward the plaintiff to furnish the said wire rope in its said rotten, brittle, unsafe and dangerous condition for use in the said work of the plaintiff for the defendant, and that as a direct result of the said negligence and carelessness of the defendant in furnishing as aforesaid the said defective wire, the plaintiff was injured." *Page 329

The answer is a general denial, contributory negligence, and a plea that plaintiff's injury arose out of the ordinary risks incident to the work in which plaintiff was engaged, and that the thing or incident which caused plaintiff's injury was something that defendant could not, by ordinary care, have anticipated.

Defendant predicates error upon the court's action in (1) overruling an ore tenus objection to the petition; (2) overruling its demurrer at the close of the case; (3) giving instructions; (4) failing to grant a new trial on the ground of alleged unfair tactics or conduct on the part of plaintiff in concealing the fact that he had in his possession the section of the wire cable where the knot was cut, and notwithstanding this possession plaintiff made much ado about defendant's failure to produce the said section of cable.

We do not think that plaintiff can recover, and it is not necessary to consider any assignment except the refusal of the peremptory request. This record to our mind shows conclusively that plaintiff was injured in such manner as to render defendant not liable. Plaintiff was either injured because of his own carelessness in cutting the cable, or from a condition of the cable which defendant could not in the exercise of ordinary care know or anticipate, or that plaintiff's injury was due to a pure accident without fault on the part of any one. The burden of plaintiff's petition is that defendant was negligent in furnishing him an old rotten and brittle cable, and that when he went to cut it the strands broke because of this old, rotten and brittle condition and a piece struck plaintiff in eye. The evidence fails utterly to show that the cable was old, rotten and brittle or defective in any way. The cable was shown to be somewhat rusty on the outside, and the end near the knotflared; but this falls far short of tending to establish that the cable was old, rotten and brittle, and that by reason thereof the slivers or sections were easily dislodged or broken off. Plaintiff testified that the cable was old, and that some of the inside strands were rusty and that it *Page 330 was frazzled about four feet back from the end. In the statement learned counsel have set out the material part of plaintiff's evidence as follows: "The end of it (the wire cable) was flared and blared up and some of the boys, I don't know who, tied the end of that in the ring on the tongs that we had been moving the logs with. We wanted to unload the car of coal and load logs into the car, and after we got this done, the day before we was supposed to get the car unloaded, why I says to Mr. Snider, that's a nice job, and he says, yes, that's a dandy job for you when you get through with the other. He was referring to getting the tongs loose off of the cable. So I went out there to cut that cable. I laid it down on the ball of the rail and I hit, I don't know, four or five licks, and I stopped and was sitting there looking at it and I placed my chisel and hit it again, and went to raise the cable, and as I raised the cable something hit me in the eye. I mean as I raised the hammer. I asked them to get down and get the rust or whatever it was out of my eye.

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Bluebook (online)
236 S.W. 689, 210 Mo. App. 322, 1922 Mo. App. LEXIS 208, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/riger-v-m-e-leming-lumber-co-moctapp-1922.