Rifkin v. New York City Department of Probation

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Rifkin v. New York City Department of Probation

270 A.D.2d 94, 704 N.Y.S.2d 469, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2806

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 14, 2000

StatusPublished

This text of 270 A.D.2d 94 (Rifkin v. New York City Department of Probation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Rifkin v. New York City Department of Probation, 270 A.D.2d 94, 704 N.Y.S.2d 469, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2806 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.), entered April 17, 1998, which denied the petition, treated as a motion by petitioner, for leave to file a late notice of claim against the municipal respondent, and granted the municipal respondent’s cross motion for dismissal, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner has not previously disputed respondent’s contention that his claim against the municipal defendant is subject to a one-year and 90-day limitation of action (General Municipal Law § 50-i), and in the absence of any dispute as to the nature of the claim, the IAS Court properly found that since that statutory period had expired, petitioner was time-barred from seeking leave to file a late notice of claim. Concur— Rosenberger, J. P., Mazzarelli, Ellerin, Lerner and Friedman, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.), entered April 17, 1998, which denied the petition, treated as a motion by petitioner, for leave to file a late notice of claim against the municipal respondent, and granted the municipal respondent’s cross motion for dismissal, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner has not previously disputed respondent’s contention that his claim against the municipal defendant is subject to a one-year and 90-day limitation of action (General Municipal Law § 50-i), and in the absence of any dispute as to the nature of the claim, the IAS Court properly found that since that statutory period had expired, petitioner was time-barred from seeking leave to file a late notice of claim. Concur— Rosenberger, J. P., Mazzarelli, Ellerin, Lerner and Friedman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

270 A.D.2d 94, 704 N.Y.S.2d 469, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2806, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rifkin-v-new-york-city-department-of-probation-nyappdiv-2000.

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