Riess v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs

177 A.D. 845, 164 N.Y.S. 878, 1917 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5808
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided May 4, 1917·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Laughlin, J.:

It is not contended on the appeal that there was any question of fact for the consideration of the jury, and if there were the right to have it submitted to the jury was waived for both parties moved for a direction of a verdict and stipulated that it might be directed without the presence of the jury.

The defendant is a fraternal beneficiary order, incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland, and consists of a supreme conclave and about 800 local conclaves' in different parts of the country, one of which, known as Schubin Conclave, No. 607, was located in New York city. The plaintiff’s husband joined it on the 13th day of January, 1908, and received a benefit certificate issued by the defendant on that day, by which it agreed that if he complied with each and every provision of the laws, rules and regulations governing the con[847] clave and relating to the benefit fund, then in force or that might thereafter be enacted, and remained in good standing in the order, it would pay, out of its benefit fund, to his wife, the plaintiff, therein named, on satisfactory proof of his death and upon surrender of the certificate,'the sum of $1,000 or not more than the amount of one assessment, in accordance with and under the laws of the order governing said fund, subject to certain conditions and exceptions not material to the question presented for decision. The plaintiff alleged that her husband remained a member of the order in good standing until his death, which occurred on the 2d day of March, 1916. The defendant denied that he remained a member in good standing until his death and alleged as a defense that the conclave of which he was a member failed to make the monthly remittance for assessments and per capita tax on the 15th day of December, 1915, which had been duly called on the first day of November, that year, and failed to pay all subsequent assessments and that the members thereof became suspended thereby;' and that plaintiff also failed to pay his assessments and was not in good standing in the order at the time of his death.

We are of opinion that there is no merit in the contention that Conclave No. 607 and all of its members were suspended and their rights and the rights of their beneficiaries forfeited, owing to the failure of the treasurer of the local conclave to remit the monthly assessments to the supreme treasurer, for manifestly when the members paid their assessments to the financier of No. 607 and he delivered the money to the treasurer, the latter must be deemed to have held it as the agent of the defendant which enjoined upon him the duty of transmitting the money to it notwithstanding the fact that it attempted to provide in section 416 of the general laws that the subordinate conclave and its officers should be the agents of the members only and not the agents of the defendant. (See Knights of Pythias v. Withers, 177 U. S. 260; Matter of Brown v. Order of Foresters, 176 N. Y. 132.) Moreover, although provision was made in section 377 of the general laws for the admission of a member of a suspended conclave into another conclave, application therefor had to be made by him and he [848] Would have been obliged to pay the assessments and dues again snd that did not protect his rights for the reason that the scheme devised by the defendant for the suspension of a local conclave on failure to transmit the monthly assessments did not provide for notice to the members and if it were given effect their rights and the rights of their beneficiaries might become forfeited without notice or any opportunity to protect their rights, notwithstanding the fact that all assessments due from the members had been duly paid as required by the laws of the order, and, therefore, I am of opinion that a by-law or regulation adopted by the order, no matter by what name it may be designated, which would accomplish such a result would be unreasonable and void. (See Matter of Brown v. Order of Foresters, 176 N. Y. 132.) Furthermore, although the member agreed for himself and his beneficiary in his application for membership that in any controversy, action or trial arising between him or his beneficiary and the defendant it should “be presumed and taken prima facie that every officer of said supreme and of any subordinate conclave in the sending of notice, and otherwise, has in all respects fully performed his duty and fully complied with all the laws of the order, and that the burden of proving their failure of such performance or compliance ” would be upon him and his beneficiary — still it fairly appears by the evidence, and it must be assumed that it was found by the trial court in directing the verdict, that the supreme secretary did not comply with the requirements of section 344 of the general laws of the order providing for the suspension of a local conclave on the failure of its treasurer to transmit the monthly assessments to the supreme treasurer, in that he did not record the suspension of the former members of the local conclave and give notice of such suspension to the secretary of the local conclave and to the supreme archon, as therein provided.

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Riess v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs, 177 A.D. 845, 164 N.Y.S. 878, 1917 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5808 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917).

177 A.D. 845 (Riess v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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