Riemer v. Hooker

392 F. Supp. 145
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedApril 2, 1975
DocketCiv. A. 74-311
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 392 F. Supp. 145 (Riemer v. Hooker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Riemer v. Hooker, 392 F. Supp. 145 (D.N.H. 1975).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

BOWNES, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this motion to declare invalid certain portions of Section 2603.-1 of the New Hampshire Public Assistance Manual, as amended, or alternatively, to hold defendant in contempt for failure to act in conformity with the Opinion and Order of this court issued November 5, 1974. In relevant part, that Order required that:

The assistance grants of each working AFDC recipient will be determined within thirty days hereof in accord with the holding in Shea v. Vialpando and any increase in benefits due to such determination shall be retroactive to November 1,1974.

In her motion filed February 13, 1975, plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed in several respects to determine AFDC in accordance with Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 94 S.Ct. 1746, 40 L.Ed.2d 120 (1974). A hearing was held on March 10, 1975, at which time the parties agreed to try to resolve among themselves all issues except one: whether or not defendants’ regulations regarding child care costs conform with 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) as interpreted by Shea v. Vialpando, supra.

Qualification for AFDC grants depends upon whether or not an applicant’s net income for AFDC purposes falls below a specified level. In determining net income, each state allows certain deductions. New Hampshire recently promulgated a revised regulation addressed to the allowance of certain deductions. That regulation, Section 2603.1 (Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Memorandum and appended hereto as Exhibit A), provides in part that: “Child care may not be disregarded as a work expense. Child care will, however, continue to be provided as a social service.” Defendants also recently published SR 75-20 (Exhibit B to Plaintiff’s Motion and appended hereto as Exhibit B), which provides that child care service will be available without cost to former and potential AFDC recipients who either “do not have gross monthly income which exceeds 150% of the State’s standard of need,” or are “in need of day care to continue employment.”

I rule that child care must be considered as a work expense. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) states that a State shall, “in determining need, take into consideration . . . any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of” income, as defined by Section 601 et seq. The Supreme Court ascribes “normal meaning of the term ‘any’.” Shea v. Vialpando, supra at 260, 94 S.Ct. at 1753. There is nothing in the “normal meaning” of the words “any expenses” to suggest a per se exclusion of child care costs. Indeed, the only basis for excluding costs from consideration as expenses is that such are not “reasonably attributable to the earning of” income. The very sense of the word “reasonably” operates against a blanket preordained exclusion. Child care expenses must be dealt with on an individual basis. Emphasis upon individual treatment is consistent with the mandate of Shea v. Vialpando, supra, viz.: 42 U.S.C. § 602 income and expenses must be considered on an “individualized basis.” (Id. at 260, 262, 94 S.Ct. 1746)

My ruling that child care costs shall be considered as a work expense does not, however, prevent the State from paying such expenses itself, thereby eliminating them as an AFDC deduction. Providing the State with this option does not frustrate the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7), which, as interpreted by Shea v. Vialpando, supra at 263, 94 S.Ct. 1746, is in part to do away with state regulations that function as a *147 “disincentive” to working by failing to consider work expenses in determining eligibility for AFDC aid.

Shea considered transportation expenses under a Colorado regulation that had placed an absolute limitation upon their deductibility. As a consequence, those AFDC applicants who spent more than the $30 permitted by the regulation for transportation between home and office were incompletely reimbursed for this expense. In effect, they were subsidizing their employment.

In some instances, the disallowance of transportation expenses in excess of $30 excluded applicants from AFDC grants, because deductions from gross income were insufficient to bring it under the standardized level of the AFDC need requirement.

Finally, the state regulation examined in Shea may have also resulted in providing less money to individuals who worked than those who did not.

It is unclear from reading Shea whether or not the third possibility befell Mrs. Vialpando, but it is clear that the local regulation compelled her to subsidize her employment and rendered her ineligible for AFDC assistance.

The Court found that these effects were a “disincentive” to working. Accordingly, the question asked of the subject regulation is whether or not it also acts as a disincentive to working. Based on the probabilities, I find that it does not.

None of the possible consequences of the regulation examined in Shea can result here. No New Hampshire applicant will have to subsidize his/her employment. 1 The State will either pay the child care costs, or the applicant will be able to deduct them. It should be noted here that it was stated at the hearing that applicants are not required to use State subsidized child care centers.

No New Hampshire applicant will be ineligible for AFDC assistance despite having out-of-pocket expenses that, if considered, would bring the applicant’s net income within the range of the AFDC need requirement. Such expenses will now either not be out-of-pocket, because the State pays for them directly, or, if out-of-pocket, be deductible.

The elimination of what would otherwise be out-of-pocket expenses by state subsidization is not unique to this situation. Perhaps analogy can be made with treatment of food stamps. Like the SR 75-20 handling of child care costs, food stamps are subsidized by the state. Like child care subsidization, food stamps are not considered- income. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(4)(ii)(a). Like child care subsidization, food stamps are not deducted in determining net income for purposes of AFDC, because no money is actually expended. It is actual expenditure that the Court referred to when it wrote:

Such expenses reduce the level of actually available income, and if not deducted from gross income will not produce a corresponding increase in AFDC assistance. (Shea v. Vialpando, supra at 264, 94 S.Ct. at 1755)

Finally, no New Hampshire applicant will have less funds available by working than by not. As plaintiff noted at pages 6-7 of her memorandum, this possibility existed so long as child care costs were not deductible.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Simpson v. Miller
535 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Illinois, 1982)
PEGGY SM v. State
397 A.2d 980 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1979)
Peggy S. M. ex rel. John Boy M. v. State
397 A.2d 980 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
392 F. Supp. 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/riemer-v-hooker-nhd-1975.