Riego v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-3190
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 27 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VENANCIO E. RIEGO, No. 24-3190 Agency No. Petitioner, A031-325-887 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 24, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: NGUYEN and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and KERNODLE, District Judge.***

Venancio Riego petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

(“BIA”) decision upholding the immigration judge’s order denying his application

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jeremy D. Kernodle, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the BIA’s factual findings for

substantial evidence and its legal determinations de novo, see Velasquez-Samayoa

v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2022), we deny the petition for review.

1. Riego contends that the agency improperly discounted the testimony of

his expert, Professor Vicente Rafael, that Riego’s “criminal record will most likely

be made available to officials in the Philippines.” Any error was harmless because

the agency also found, “assuming that Philippine authorities will learn of [Riego’s]

past drug activities,” that he “has not established that it is more likely than not that

he will be targeted based on the war against drugs and subsequently tortured.”

Substantial evidence supports this finding.

The only drug-related activity in Riego’s criminal history records is a 1990

arrest for drug possession. Professor Rafael testified that “it’s hard to say” whether

Philippine officials would share this information with local police, putting him at

risk for being placed on a drug list and extrajudicially killed. When asked about

the likelihood that someone with a drug-related arrest but not conviction would

face consequences after being removed to the Philippines, Professor Rafael

“[didn’t] have a statistical figure to give.” Nor did he know of an individual with a

similar rap sheet experiencing any consequences.

2 24-3190 Professor Rafael estimated that there is “a strong possibility” that Riego

would be harmed or killed by the Philippine government based on his assumption

that Riego would likely live “in one [of] the areas that have been rife with drug

killings.” But Professor Rafael testified that he did not know where Riego would

be living in the Philippines, and Riego presented no evidence that he is likely to

settle in an area that is affected by the war on drugs.

2. Riego also contends that the agency did not consider whether it would be

impossible for him to relocate to a part of the Philippines where he is not likely to

be tortured. But Professor Rafael testified that “there’s always [the] possibility” of

internal relocation because “the Philippines is a very large archipelago.” And even

if relocation would be difficult because Riego would be “out of touch with friends

and family,” the agency need only “consider the possibility of relocation—without

regard for the reasonableness of relocation.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32

F.4th 696, 705 (9th Cir. 2022).

3. Given the uncertainty that Riego would be tortured in the Philippines and

the possibility that he could relocate to an area that is not a focus of the drug war,

the record does not compel the conclusion that Riego “more likely than not . . .

would be tortured” in the Philippines. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); see Velasquez-

Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1154. Therefore, we need not address Riego’s contention

that any torture would be “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent

3 24-3190 or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(1).

PETITION DENIED.

4 24-3190