Ridgelawn Realty Co. v. Corci

Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

Ridgelawn Realty Co. v. Corci

9 Misc. 2d 286, 172 N.Y.S.2d 357, 1957 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2216

CourtAppellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York

DecidedNovember 8, 1957

StatusPublished

This text of 9 Misc. 2d 286 (Ridgelawn Realty Co. v. Corci) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ridgelawn Realty Co. v. Corci, 9 Misc. 2d 286, 172 N.Y.S.2d 357, 1957 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2216 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1957).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Defendant’s claim that the clause reading “ Subject to my attorney’s approval,” contained in the binder agreement, made the formal contract, entered into later by the defendant and the purchaser, subject to such approval, raises, at best, a question of fact with respect to whether the parties intended the aforesaid “ approval ” clause to apply only to the terms and conditions specifically contained in the binder agreement, or whether they intended it to apply to all the terms of the sale as embodied in a later formal contract. Intent, where the language is ambiguous, constitutes a question of fact. (Italian Benevolent Inst. v. Elaine Co., 240 App. Div. 196; Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Nettleton Co., 263 N. Y. 25, 30; see, also, Dowdle v. Richards, 2 A D 2d 486.) Such question cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment.

The question whether the failure of title to pass was sufficient to bar recovery by plaintiff must await the determination of the question of fact arising out of the construction of the “ approval ” clause in the binder agreement.

The order and judgment should be reversed on the law and facts, with $30 costs to plaintiff, and motion denied.

Pette, Hart and Di Gtovanna, JJ., concur.

Order and judgment reversed, etc.

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Per Curiam.

Defendant’s claim that the clause reading “ Subject to my attorney’s approval,” contained in the binder agreement, made the formal contract, entered into later by the defendant and the purchaser, subject to such approval, raises, at best, a question of fact with respect to whether the parties intended the aforesaid “ approval ” clause to apply only to the terms and conditions specifically contained in the binder agreement, or whether they intended it to apply to all the terms of the sale as embodied in a later formal contract. Intent, where the language is ambiguous, constitutes a question of fact. (Italian Benevolent Inst. v. Elaine Co., 240 App. Div. 196; Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Nettleton Co., 263 N. Y. 25, 30; see, also, Dowdle v. Richards, 2 A D 2d 486.) Such question cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment.

The question whether the failure of title to pass was sufficient to bar recovery by plaintiff must await the determination of the question of fact arising out of the construction of the “ approval ” clause in the binder agreement.

The order and judgment should be reversed on the law and facts, with $30 costs to plaintiff, and motion denied.

Pette, Hart and Di Gtovanna, JJ., concur.

Order and judgment reversed, etc.

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Bluebook (online)

9 Misc. 2d 286, 172 N.Y.S.2d 357, 1957 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ridgelawn-realty-co-v-corci-nyappterm-1957.

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