Ricupero v. Mancini

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided August 24, 1994·No. 94-1211·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


August 24, 1994
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1211

KEVIN RICUPERO,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

DAVID E. MANCINI, ETC., ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Selya and Cyr,
Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

Kevin Ricupero on brief pro se.
______________
Russell F. Hilliard, Beth George-Kane and Upton, Sanders & Smith
___________________ ________________ ______________________
on brief for appellees.

____________________

____________________

Per Curiam. Plaintiff appeals the denial of leave
__________

to amend his civil rights complaint. We affirm.

The events leading to the denial of plaintiff's

motion for leave to amend are, briefly, as follows.

Plaintiff's complaint initially asserted claims under 42

U.S.C. 1983, and state law, against five defendants. After

a screening by the magistrate revealed defects in the

statement of some of the claims, plaintiff was afforded an

opportunity to amend or face a dismissal of the defective

claims. Plaintiff chose not to amend at that time, resulting

in dismissal of the case against three of the defendants.

The remaining two defendants were the Town of

Bennington, New Hampshire, and David E. Mancini, the Town's

Chief of Police. The federal claims against them fell into

two groups. First, there were claims stemming from Chief

Mancini's alleged failure to obtain a search warrant prior to

conducting a search of plaintiff's property. Second,

plaintiff claimed that Mancini, acting in the capacity of

town prosecutor, wrongfully initiated and prosecuted certain

misdemeanor charges against plaintiff.

At a pretrial conference in July, 1993, defendants

indicated that they expected to file a summary judgment

motion on various grounds. The district judge set September

15, 1993 as the last date for the filing of a summary

judgment motion, and December 15, 1993 as the closing date

for discovery.

Defendants filed their summary judgment motion,

replete with affidavits and exhibits, on the scheduled date.

Plaintiff offered voluminous materials in opposition, much of

it irrelevant. Summary judgment was awarded to defendants on

a showing that in fact Mancini had obtained a facially valid

search warrant from a neutral and detached state judge prior

to the challenged search. As to the second group of claims,

Mancini was insulated from civil liability by the doctrine of

absolute prosecutorial immunity, see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
___ _______ ___________

113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615 (1993), and there were no facts showing

that the Town had pursued an unlawful policy or practice

causally related to any constitutional violation. The

pendent state claims were simultaneously dismissed.

Plaintiff does not here renew his challenge to the summary

judgment.

Plaintiff filed the subject motion to amend nine

days after defendants filed their summary judgment motion.

The amendment was apparently designed to avoid the thrust of

defendants' summary judgment arguments. It added three new

federal claims based on the new premise that even if there

was a warrant for the search, the underlying affidavit was

false and the warrant invalid. In addition, plaintiff

-3-

included constitutional challenges to the manner in which the

search and arrest were effected.

A decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Colmenares Vivas v. Sun Alliance Ins. Co., 807 F.2d 1102,
________________ _______________________

1108 (1st Cir. 1986). It will be disturbed only on a clear

showing of abuse, meaning that "no sufficient justification

appears." Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d
_______________ __________________

49, 59 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
_____ _____

182 (1962)); accord Clair Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Flynn, 897
______ ___________________________ _____

F.2d 623, 625 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Colmenares, 807 F.2d
___ ____ __________

at 1108. While Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that "leave to

amend shall be freely given when justice so requires," the

court need not "grant every request to amend, come what may."

Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 59; Colmenares, 807 F.2d at
_______________ __________

1108. Rather the court may, indeed must, give due

consideration to factors such as the substantive merits of

the amendment, the need to prevent undue delay, bad faith,

and prejudice to the opposing party. Foman v. Davis, 371
_____ _____

U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

We see no abuse here. The magistrate found that

while the amendments might not be substantively futile, on

balance leave to amend should be denied because,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Ricupero v. Mancini, (1st Cir. 1994).

Ricupero v. Mancini (Ricupero v. Mancini) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)