Rico v. Ducart

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 27, 2026
• Docket: 24-3038
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE ANDRADE RICO, No. 24-3038 D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01989-KJM-DB Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* CLARK E. DUCART; JIM ROBERTSON; D BRADBURY; Associate Warden G. W. OLSON; B. RAMSEY; TAYLOR MELTON, Personal Representative,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 22, 2026**

Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Jorge Andrade Rico appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Eighth Amendment arising from his incarceration at Pelican Bay State Prison. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dunn v. Castro, 621

F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Rico’s action because defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. See Cuevas v. City of Tulare, 107 F.4th 894, 898

(9th Cir. 2024) (“Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability

under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and

(2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)); Rico v. Ducart, 980 F.3d 1292, 1300 (9th

Cir. 2020) (holding that case law does “not put beyond debate the lawfulness of

periodic noise resulting from court-ordered suicide-prevention checks and the

immutable characteristics of a solitary confinement unit” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

because it is apparent from the record that amendment would be futile. See

Chappel v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that futility of amendment is a proper

justification for the denial of leave to amend).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

2 24-3038 appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 986 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-3038