Rico v. Doe

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedMay 6, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01029
StatusUnknown

This text of Rico v. Doe (Rico v. Doe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rico v. Doe, (C.D. Ill. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS PEORIA DIVISION

MIGUEL RICO, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25-1029 ) JOHN DOE., ) Defendant. )

ORDER COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge: Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1), Petitions to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Docs. 4, 6, 9), and Motions for Identity of Case (Docs. 11, 12) filed by Plaintiff Miguel Rico, a prisoner at Pontiac Correctional Center. I. Complaint A. Screening Standard Plaintiff’s Complaint is before the Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to “screen” the pleading and, through such process, identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. A claim is defective if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construes them liberally in his favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Page 1 of 5 However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). B. Facts Alleged Plaintiff asserts he was subjected to medication and injections against his will by

the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). C. Analysis Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that plaintiffs “need do no more than narrate a grievance simply and directly, so that the defendant

knows what he has been accused of”). In addition to describing the claim, a plaintiff must also give “some indication . . . of time and place.” Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s account does not provide the minimal specificity required under Rule 8

Page 2 of 5 to state a claim for relief against a specific person and does not state a claim for relief against IDOC. See Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a building, such as a jail or correctional facility, cannot be sued under § 1983); see also White v. Knight, 710 F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is owned by a corporate entity or a government agency does not make the building a suable person

under § 1983.”). Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. However, if Plaintiff believes he can revise his pleading to state a cause of action, he may file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, his amended pleading must be attached to his motion for leave.

The Court does not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s amended pleading must stand independently without reference to his initial filing and contain all claims against all defendants. Plaintiff’s amendment must specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff

must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”). The Court informs Plaintiff that any attempt to join unrelated claims and defendants in his amended complaint is not permitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In other words, multiple claims against a single defendant are allowed, but “Claim A

Page 3 of 5 against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” Id. Additionally, the Court instructs Plaintiff that “a prisoner may not file a lawsuit before exhausting his administrative remedies, even if he exhausts those remedies while

the litigation is pending.” Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Permitting a prisoner to sue first and then ask the prison to address issues that are now the subject of pending litigation defeats the purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.”); see also Perez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be

dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.”). The Court cautions Plaintiff that if he files an amended pleading, he should ensure he has exhausted his administrative remedies on his alleged claim before filing a lawsuit. II. Remaining Motions

On March 3, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP Petition (Doc. 7) and assessed an initial partial filing fee of $11.39. Thus, Plaintiff’s remaining IFP petitions (Docs. 4, 6, 9) are moot. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motions for Identity of Case (Docs. 11, 12) are moot upon entry of this Order.

Page 4 of 5 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff IFP petitions (Docs. [4], [6], [9]) and Motions for Identity of Case (Docs. [11], [12]) are MOOT.

2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. [1]) is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a federal claim.

3) Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days of the entry of the Court’s Merit Review Order and in compliance with the Court’s guidance.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Anthony N. Smith v. Knox County Jail
666 F.3d 1037 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Brian K. Thomson v. Odie Washington
362 F.3d 969 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Jane Doe v. Jason Smith
429 F.3d 706 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Michael Alexander v. United States
721 F.3d 418 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Katiuska Bravo v. Midland Credit Management, Inc
812 F.3d 599 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Donyall White v. Wendy Knight
710 F. App'x 260 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Rico v. Doe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rico-v-doe-ilcd-2025.