Rico v. Department of Veterans Affairs

404 N.W.2d 404, 1987 Minn. App. LEXIS 4301
CourtCourt of Appeals of Minnesota
DecidedApril 28, 1987
DocketNo. C8-86-1877
StatusPublished

This text of 404 N.W.2d 404 (Rico v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rico v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 404 N.W.2d 404, 1987 Minn. App. LEXIS 4301 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

OPINION

RANDALL, Judge.

Following termination of his employment, Rico moved for a “just cause” hearing pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 43A.33 (1984). The administrative law judge (AU) found appellant was not entitled to a “just cause” hearing, and he dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction. Rico appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Edward Rico worked as a Personnel Director II for 9½ years in the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA). The Personnel Director II position was classified as a civil service position. On September 21, 1984, William J. Gregg, Commissioner of the DVA asked the Commissioner of the Department of Employee Relations to convert the classified position of Personnel Director II to an unclassified position, Assistant to the Commissioner. The request was granted on October 22, 1984. Commissioner Gregg notified appellant of the change and appointed appellant to the new position. Appellant was given an approved leave from the classified service to accept the appointment.

On July 25, 1986, Commissioner Gregg advised appellant by letter that he was removing appellant from the Assistant Commissioner position. The Commissioner informed appellant that, because he had been a Personnel Director II in the classified service prior to his appointment to the unclassified position, he was entitled to return to a Personnel Director II position. He further advised appellant that, under department rules, because the Personnel Director II position had been abolished, appellant had the right to bump the least senior Personnel Officer, Senior or accept a layoff. Appellant accepted the layoff.

Appellant brought an action in Hen-nepin County District Court, and he commenced this action through the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), claiming he was entitled to a “just cause” hearing under Minn.Stat. § 43A.33 (1984). Section 43A.33 states, in part, “[n]o permanent employee in the classified service shall be * * discharged * * * except for just cause.” Procedures for a “just cause” hearing are set out in Minn.Stat. § 43A.33, subd. 3 (1984). The DVA moved for dismissal, claiming the OAH lacked jurisdiction. DVA argued only classified employees are entitled to a “just cause” hearing under § 43A.33, and appellant was not a classified employee. The AU agreed and dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction. Rico petitioned the clerk of this court for, and was granted, writ of certiorari. Neither party filed briefs on appeal, and each relied on its briefs presented at the administrative level.1

Rico claimed, in his memorandum in opposition to respondent’s motion for dismissal, that he was fired in retaliation for [406]*406complaints he filed with the governor’s office concerning:

1) administrative mismanagement at the Minneapolis Veterans Home; 2) misuse of agency funds by VA officials for personal benefit; 3) excessive salary increases awarded to senior VA officials in violation of State guidelines requiring salary increases based upon performance; and 4) gifts received by senior VA officials from private individuals in exchange for continued lobbying efforts.

ISSUE

Did the administrative law judge properly dismiss appellant’s appeal, finding the OAH lacked jurisdiction over the matter?

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

On review of an AU’s decision, this court will reverse only if substantial rights have been prejudiced and the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Minn.Stat. § 14.69(e) (1986). Substantial evidence is:

1. Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
2. More than a scintilla of evidence;
3. More than some evidence;
4. More than any evidence; and
5. Evidence considered in its entirety.

Cable Communications Board v. Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership, 356 N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn.1984).

Appellant’s Status

Under Minn.Stat. § 43A.33, subd. 1 (1984), a permanent classified employee may not be “discharged, suspended without pay, or demoted, except for just cause.” The DVA contends appellant is entitled only to protection afforded to unclassified employees under Minn.Stat. § 43A.07, subd. 6 (1984). Under § 43A.07, subd. 6, an unclassified employee can be terminated on 30 days prior notice. If appellant is permanent classified employee, he may not be discharged without an administrative hearing. However, if appellant is found not to be a permanent classified employee, he would not be entitled to a just cause hearing and the OAH would not have jurisdiction over his case.

Appellant argues that, because he is on approved leave from a classified position, he is a permanent classified employee. He also argues that under § 43A.02, subd. 30 (1984), because he completed a six month probationary period, he is a permanent classified employee. He claims that at all times during his approved leave from the classified service, he was entitled to the protection afforded to classified employees. Appellant attained permanent status while in the classified service. This status remained in effect while he was a classified employee. However, once he left the classified service, his status changed from permanent to inactive. Minn.Stat. § 43A.07, subd. 5 (1984), states:

An employee who is granted a leave of absence from a position in the classified service to accept a position in the unclassified service shall retain an inactive classified service status.

We hold no statutory right of appeal accrues to employees holding inactive classified status. The AU correctly concluded that appellant’s inactive classified status did not confer upon him permanent classified status or entitle him to a “just cause” hearing, but merely permitted him to return to a classified position when his unclassified position was terminated. Moreover, once appellant waived his rights to bump into the Personnel Director, Senior position, appellant no longer possessed permanent status necessary to institute an appeal under § 43A.33. His rights on termination, thus, are governed solely by Minn.Stat. § 43A.07.

The terms and conditions of unclassified employment are governed by the Commissioner’s Plan and the Managerial Plan promulgated pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 43A.18 (1984). Appellant argues that the policies outlined in ch. 9 of the Managerial Plan give him protection greater than that given an unclassified employee not on leave from a classified position:

[407]*407A manager appointed to an unclassified position may be terminated at any time by the Appointing Authority and shall have no further rights to State employment unless s/he is on an approved leave of absence from a position in the classified service.

Managerial Plan, p. 9-3. He contends this language is authority for giving him the same protection he would have had in a classified position. We do not agree.

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Related

Cable Communications Board v. Nor-West Cable Communications Partnership
356 N.W.2d 658 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1984)

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Bluebook (online)
404 N.W.2d 404, 1987 Minn. App. LEXIS 4301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rico-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-minnctapp-1987.