Ricky Rojas v. State

Opinion

NO. 07-05-0127-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

APRIL 26, 2007

______________________________

RICKY HAROLD ROJAS, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE _________________________________

FROM THE 181^ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;

NO. 16,316-B; HONORABLE JOHN BOARD, JUDGE _______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

OPINION

Ricky Harold Rojas appeals his conviction of the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance. He presents two issues on appeal, contending the trial court erred by failing to conduct an inquiry into his competence to stand trial and he was denied effective assistance of counsel through counsel's failure to raise the issue of his competency. We affirm.

The indictment under which appellant was tried contained two counts. The first count alleged possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The second count alleged possession of marihuana. The judgment also contained an enhancement paragraph alleging a prior felony conviction in federal court. Over his plea of not guilty, the jury found appellant guilty of both counts and found the enhancement paragraph true. The trial court assessed punishment at 99 years confinement on count one and two years confinement on count two, to be served concurrently.

A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial unless proven incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(b) (Vernon 2006). A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003 (Vernon 2006). If evidence suggesting the defendant may be incompetent comes to the attention of the trial court, it must determine, sua sponte, by informal inquiry whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. art. 46B.004(c). A competency inquiry is not required, however, unless the evidence is sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the judge whether the defendant is legally competent. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003) (applying former Article 46.02, Code of Criminal Procedure). ⁽¹⁾ Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt regarding competency if it shows "recent severe mental illness, at least moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant." Id.

The record reflects the trial court engaged in some questioning of appellant and his counsel about their level of communication, and the court's comments suggest that the subject may have been discussed off the record. See Lawrence v. State, 169 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd) (discussing nature of informal inquiry into competence). We view appellant's complaint on appeal as challenging the trial court's failure to formally suggest he may be incompetent to stand trial, Art. 46B.004(b), or take the next procedural step and appoint an expert to evaluate appellant. Art. 46B.005(a). We review a trial court's decision not to appoint an expert to examine a defendant under an abuse of discretion standard. See Young v. State, 177 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (denial of psychiatric examination); Lawrence, 169 S.W.3d at 322 (decision not to conduct competency hearing).

The events on which appellant relies to show trial counsel and the trial court should have pursued the issue of appellant's competency include numerous instances of unsolicited comments by appellant during the trial. His brief also asserts that portions of appellant's testimony was "nonsensical," and points to his statement to the trial court that he "sometimes . . . didn't understand he was - like what [defense counsel] was talking about." On appeal appellant does not contend the record shows recent severe mental illness or moderate retardation. His argument is that his conduct at trial was sufficiently bizarre to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency.

When a defendant makes improper comments or outbursts during trial, courts look to the content of the statement, not merely the fact the defendant violated rules of procedure or courtroom decorum. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); LaHood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 619 (Tex.App.-Houston [14^th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd). Our examination of appellant's conduct at trial must focus on whether it was an indication appellant was incompetent to stand trial under the statutory standard. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon 2006); Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395..

The record shows most of appellant's unsolicited comments occurred during voir dire. His brief lists fourteen instances. We list representative examples.

Prosecutor: So I'm going to ask the group as a whole - do you believe that possession of meth should be a crime?

Appellant: Yes. I do. I do.

* * *

Prosecutor: Because you haven't heard any evidence yet whether he is or he isn't [Guilty.] . . . Until I do that, he is presumed to be innocent.

Appellant: I'm guilty, though.

* * *

Prosecutor: [D]oes everybody know what paraphernalia is?

Venireperson: Scales.

Prosecutor: Scales.

Venireperson: Baggies.

Prosecutor: Baggies.

Vinireperson: Pipes.

Appellant: Writing tablets.

Prosecutor: Writing tablets, things of that nature.

During defense counsel's examination of the venire, this exchange occurred:

Appellant: You [defense counsel] said not a lot of peers as far as drugs. I'm not living in Potter County.

Defense counsel: Right. That was my point. Thank you. And Mr. Rojas is going to help me out from time to time.

Appellant: Sorry.

Defense counsel: It is his case. So I appreciate all the help I can get.

Appellant also offered his views of the benefits of the legalization of drug use and of the differing treatment of drug users in other parts of the world. While his lawyer was discussing drug enforcement policy with venire members, appellant asked, "Can I say something, [counsel]?" When his lawyer responded positively, appellant gave what his brief calls a "soliloquy," in which he further expounded his opinions on federal drug policy and related subjects. In total, the statement occupies more than a page of the reporter's record.

After this lengthy statement from appellant, the prosecution voiced an objection to his conduct. Out of the presence of the jury, the trial judge admonished appellant about speaking up during the proceeding. He instructed appellant to communicate with his attorney in writing, noting "you guys seem to be communicating well. And I want to encourage that. But I don't want you to say those things out loud in front of the jury, okay?" The record shows the instruction was largely effective. Appellant did make additional isolated comments during the presentation of the State's case. Each of these comments were relevant to the issue being addressed.

Appellant initially stated he would not testify during the guilt-innocence phase but decided he would testify after consulting with his attorney. He testified to his history and to events surrounding his arrest. His answers tended to go beyond the question asked, prompting objections that the answers were not responsive. ⁽²⁾ Appellant seized any opportunity to express his view that police conspired to frame him.

Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot agree that appellant's conduct at trial necessarily should have raised in the trial court's mind a bona fide doubt that he had the ability to meaningfully consult with his attorney or had a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon 2006). His comments, while procedurally improper and almost certainly unwise, evidenced a proper understanding of the proceeding and the factual basis for his prosecution. Appellant's statement to the trial court that he didn't always understand what counsel told him fails to show an inability to consult with "a reasonable degree of rational understanding." See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 394 (assertion by defense counsel of unspecified difficulties in communicating with client not sufficient to require competency hearing). Appellant's tendency to interject his thoughts and go beyond the questions asked is similar to the conduct of the defendant in Lawrence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded such conduct revealed the defendant "simply wanted his day in court and wanted an opportunity to tell his story his way." 169 S.W.2d at 322. Appellant expressed this very desire just before his testimony by stating: "All I want to do is tell this jury that I have been set up, and these people have used me." The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct further informal inquiry or appoint an expert to evaluate appellant. We overrule appellant's first issue.

The same analysis applies to appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to raise the issue of his competency. Nothing in the record shows counsel observed or otherwise was aware of conduct different than that we have recounted. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must be affirmatively supported by the record). We overrule appellant's second issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James T. Campbell

Justice

Publish.

1. See Richardson v. State, No. 01-04-00281-CR, 2005 WL 267708 at *2 n.3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 3, 2005, no pet.) (applying McDaniel "bona fide doubt" standard under Art. 46B.004).

2. On one occasion appellant questioned the relevance of questions from his own attorney. The prosecutor agreed, raising an objection on that basis. The objection was sustained.

Accent 3"/>

NO. 07-10-00105-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

NOVEMBER 17, 2010

JOHN BETLISKEY, APPELLANT

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

 FROM THE 147TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY;

NO. D-1-DC-10-904002; HONORABLE WILFORD FLOWERS, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, John Betliskey, was convicted of aggravated assault causing bodily injury by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon.[1]  During the punishment portion of the trial, the jury found the allegations of the enhancement paragraph of the indictment true and sentenced appellant to confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of life and assessed a fine of $10,000.  Appellant appeals raising three issues.  We will affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

            Appellant and Gilda Garcia Ruiz lived together in Austin, Texas.  On November 26, 2008, appellant and Ruiz had an argument.  As a result of the argument, appellant attacked Ruiz and began to strangle her.  Ruiz testified that she was unable to remove appellant’s hands from around her neck, and she felt as if she could not breathe.  At some point during the struggle, Ruiz urinated on herself.  As the struggle continued with appellant on top of Ruiz, Ruiz found herself on her stomach when she felt wetness on her face.  Ruiz’s face was bleeding from bites inflicted by appellant.  Ruiz described how appellant picked her up off of the floor by her neck while strangling her and wrenching her neck.  After falling back to the floor, Ruiz tried to strike appellant with a stool.  Ruiz testified that she regained consciousness and found herself across the room from where she last remembered.  Eventually, Ruiz got out of the grasp of appellant.  Ruiz asked appellant why he was doing this and stated she loved him.  At this point, appellant got up, and Ruiz took the opportunity to run from the house.

            Ruiz fled to the home of Victor Valdez, appellant and Ruiz’s neighbor.  Valdez testified that Ruiz arrived at his home in a very excited and upset state.  Valdez immediately noticed Ruiz had marks and bruising on her face.  After Ruiz had been in his home for a short period of time, appellant began knocking on the door.  When Valdez did not answer the door, appellant began pounding on it.  Valdez eventually went outside and spoke with appellant.  Appellant immediately accused Valdez of having sexual relations with Ruiz.  Valdez testified that appellant appeared extremely angry.  Ruiz eventually left Valdez’s home through the back door. 

            After escaping from appellant, Ruiz was taken to the hospital by her mother.  The attending emergency room doctor, Stefan Hood, testified about his observations of Ruiz on the night in question.  During his testimony, Hood opined that an individual’s hands, when used to strangle someone, would qualify as a deadly weapon.  Appellant’s trial counsel cross-examined Hood extensively regarding Ruiz’s appearance when examined and whether or not she appeared to be suffering from any serious bodily injury. 

            During the guilt-innocence portion of the trial, the State introduced a number of photographs that depicted Ruiz’s injuries.  Of particular note were three sets of photographs that, according to the record, showed the same areas of Ruiz’s body at different times.  Appellant objected that the second and third set of these photographs were cumulative and their probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The trial court overruled the objections, ruling that they demonstrated the degree of injury by showing the affected areas at different times. 

            After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated assault causing bodily injury by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon.  During the punishment portion of the trial, appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph.  After the State had closed the evidence on punishment, appellant’s stepmother testified on his behalf.  During her testimony on direct examination, she answered some questions about the impact of appellant’s criminal history on his deceased father.  During the State’s closing argument on punishment, reference was made to the testimony regarding the impact of appellant’s criminal history on his father.  This led to an objection by appellant.  The trial court overruled the objection.  The jury found the punishment enhancement allegation true and assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement for life in the ID-TDCJ and a fine of $10,000. 

            Appellant appeals by three issues contending that 1) the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment; 2) the trial court erred in admitting certain cumulative photographs of Ruiz; and 3) the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the improper jury argument of the State.  Disagreeing with appellant, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

            As an initial consideration, we observe that appellant’s appeal contends that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient.  Appellant’s brief was prepared and filed before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion in Brooks v. State, No. PD-0210-09, 2010 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 1240 *25-*26 (Tex.Crim.App. Oct. 6, 2010), wherein the court ruled that there is no distinction between a claim of legal as opposed to factual insufficiency of the evidence.  Further, the court expressly overruled Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), and its purported application to factual sufficiency questions.  Id. at *57.  The court appears to urge the reviewing court to apply a more rigorous application of the sufficiency test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).  See id. at *58.  Therefore, we will review appellant’s claims of evidentiary sufficiency under the standard of review set forth in Jackson.  See 443 U.S. at 319.

Standard of Review

            In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 620 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004).  We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge.  See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).  Finally, when reviewing all of the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding.  See Brooks, 2010 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 1240 at *37, *39-*40 n.26 (discussing Judge Cochran’s dissent in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 448-50 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single evidentiary standard of review).[2]

Analysis

            To prove aggravated assault causing bodily injury by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, as charged in the indictment, the State must prove:

1)    on or about November 26, 2008

2)    appellant

3)    intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

4)    caused bodily injury to

5)    Gilda Garcia Ruiz

6)    by grabbing Ruiz on or about the neck

7)    and appellant did use or exhibit a deadly weapon

8)    to-wit: his hands.

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2);[3] Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.  The Penal Code defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”  See § 1.07(a)(8)(Vernon Supp. 2010).  Further, the Penal Code defines “deadly weapon,” for purposes of this analysis, as “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” See § 1.07(a)(17)(B).  Finally, “serious bodily injury” is defined in the Penal Code, in part, as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death.”  See § 1.07(a)(46). 

            Appellant’s evidentiary sufficiency argument focuses on the question of the deadly weapon.  Specifically, appellant contends that there was no evidence that appellant’s hands were capable of causing serious bodily injury in the manner of their use.  The fact that appellant stops his contention at that point in the definition of a “deadly weapon” is illustrative of the failure of appellant to fully understand the import of the testimony of Dr. Hood.  The full definition of a deadly weapon includes not only the manner of the use or intended use of the alleged deadly weapon but also the capability of the alleged deadly weapon to cause death or serious bodily injury.  See § 1.07(a)(17)(B).

            Whether an item is a deadly weapon is determined by reviewing a totality of the facts of the case.  See Blain v. State, 647 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983).  To show that the hands are a deadly weapon, the State need not show that the hands actually caused serious bodily injury so long as the evidence shows that the hands in the manner of their use were capable of causing serious bodily injury.  See Jefferson v. State, 974 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).  The State produced the testimony of Dr. Hood, who was qualified by experience, education, and training to render an expert opinion about appellant’s use of his hands as a deadly weapon.  See Tex. R. Evid. 702.[4]  Hood testified that the use of the hands to strangle a victim by interfering with the blood or air flow could cause serious bodily injury.  Further, the State also produced the testimony of Dr. David Dolinak, Chief Medical Examiner for Tarrant County, Texas, who testified that the hands can be used as a deadly weapon.  Dolinak’s opinion was rendered after extensive questioning by the State regarding the evidence of manual strangulation apparent on Ruiz. 

            When all of this evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury’s determination that appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was not an irrational act.  See Brooks, 2010 Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 1240 at *37, *38-*39 n.26.  Accordingly, appellant’s first issue is overruled.

Photographs

            Appellant’s second issue complains about the introduction of three series of photographs depicting the injuries suffered by Ruiz.  The first series of photographs, State’s Exhibits 8 through 13, were introduced without objection.  The testimony showed that those photographs were taken at the hospital on the night of the assault.  The State then moved to introduce State’s Exhibits 14 through 19.  Appellant objected that exhibits 16 thru 19 were cumulative and that their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial impact.  The trial court, after ascertaining that the photographs were taken at a later date than the first exhibits, overruled appellant’s objection.  The third series of photographs were State’s Exhibits 20 through 25.  These photographs were the last photographs taken of Ruiz’s injuries and were taken on December 1, 2008.[5]  Appellant again objected that these photographs were cumulative and that their probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial impact. 

Standard of Review

            In Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals set forth the standard of review.  First, the admissibility of a photograph is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Id. at 762.  A photograph is generally admissible if verbal testimony as to the matters depicted in the photograph would be admissible.  Id.  However, even if a photograph is relevant and admissible, it may be excluded if the probative value of the photograph is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  Id. (citing Rule 403).  Rule 403 favors admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.  Id. (citing Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 196 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)).  Finally, we note that a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 403 objection is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard as set forth in Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh’g).  That is to say, to be erroneous, the trial court’s decision must be outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.  Id.

Analysis

            Initially, we observe that appellant’s argument infers that he is contending that the photographs were not relevant.  The State asserts that the objection made at the time the exhibits were offered did not contain any statements that can be construed to be an objection to the admissibility of the exhibits on the basis of relevance.  Our review of the record reveals that appellant objected to State’s Exhibits 16 through 25 on two grounds.  First, appellant objected that the exhibits were cumulative of the other photographs previously admitted.  Second, appellant objected, as stated above, that the probative value of the second and third sets of photographs was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial impact.  The first objection is actually part of the analysis for the second objection, a Rule 403 objection.  See Rule 403.  The second objection is clearly a Rule 403 objection.  Therefore, we agree with the State, and to the extent appellant is attempting to argue that the photographs are not relevant, that error was not preserved for appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

            All of the photographs of which appellant complains show Ruiz’s neck, arms, face, eyes, and the side of her head.  The State offered the different sets of photographs to show the severity of the wounds inflicted by appellant based upon how they appeared at different points in time.  We view these photographs in light of the analysis set forth by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 196 and Rule 403.  There were six photographs in the original series and then a total of ten photographs in the second and third series.  The record before this Court demonstrates that the photographs are black and white and do not depict any gruesome scenes.  A review of the record demonstrates that the amount of time spent offering and discussing these photographs did not unduly delay the trial.  Although appellant is correct when he points out that many of the photographs are of the same area of Ruiz’s body, they do not demonstrate the same degree of injury, as they were taken at different times.  This is a factor the jury could use in determining the amount of force appellant used in strangling Ruiz.  Likewise, the photographs of the bite marks at different times demonstrates the apparent anger of appellant at the time of the assault by the lasting imprint of his teeth on Ruiz’s arm and head.  This evidence goes directly to the totality of the circumstances of the assault.  See  Blain, 647 S.W.2d at 294.  All in all, we cannot say that the probative value of these exhibits is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact of these exhibits on the jury.  See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 764.  Therefore, the trial court’s decision to admit the photographs did not fall outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.  See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391.  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs, and appellant’s second issue is overruled.  See id.

Improper Argument

            Appellant’s last issue contends that the State engaged in an improper jury argument during the punishment phase of the trial.  The argument in question centered upon testimony elicited by appellant from his stepmother.  The essence of the testimony was that appellant’s father had a very difficult time with appellant’s prior criminal conviction.  Appellant’s father had several heart attacks, had to have a pacemaker put in, and died within a few months of appellant’s latest arrest.  Appellant did not mention the testimony during his final argument on punishment.  However, during the State’s closing argument the following statement was made:

I felt bad for the stepmother because you know who did that to her?  He did.  Can you imagine that?  You know who did that to his father?  You shouldn’t feel bad for him because his father died while he was in jail for a second felony crime.  You should hold him responsible for that.  He did that to his stepmother, he did that to his father.

At that time, appellant objected saying, “Judge, that’s improper, I object.”  The trial court then overruled the objection without comment.  The State did not further refer to the testimony during closing argument.

            Appellant now contends that the argument was improper because the argument was manifestly improper and did not fall within any of the recognized areas for proper jury argument.  Appellant also contends that the argument was an attempt to accuse appellant of the extraneous offense of homicide against his father. 

            Appellant has two manifest problems with his analysis of the alleged improper argument.  First, the objection lodged was nothing more than a general objection and may not be sufficient to preserve error for appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).  If the legal basis for the objection is obvious to the trial court and to opposing counsel, then a general objection may preserve error.  Id.  Therefore, if we assume the trial court understood the objection to be addressing the fact that the argument did not go to one of the four recognized areas of proper jury argument[6] as set forth in Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 767, then we have a situation where the issue on appeal does not comport with the objection made at trial.  Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 273 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (op. on reh’g).  This is because his complaint before this Court is that the argument attempted to charge appellant with an extraneous offense. 

            The result is that either appellant made a general objection that did not preserve anything for appeal, Buchanan, 207 S.W.3d at 775, or appellant’s current complaint does not comport with the objection at trial and nothing is preserved for appeal.  Dixon, 2 S.W.3d at 273.  Under either scenario, we overrule appellant’s third issue.

Conclusion

            Having overruled appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                                Mackey K. Hancock

                                                                                                            Justice

Do not publish. 

---

[1] See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2010).

[2] We note that this Court has at times quoted Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) for the proposition that we had to uphold the verdict of the jury unless it was irrational or unsupported by more than a mere modicum of evidence.  We view such a statement, insofar as a modicum of evidence being sufficient evidence, as contrary to a rigorous application of the Jackson standard of review urged by the court in Brooks.

[3] Further reference to the Texas Penal Code will be by reference to “section ____,” “sec. ___,” or “§ ___.”

[4] Further reference to the Texas Rules of Evidence will be by reference to “Rule ___” or “rule ___.”

[5] We note that this date would indicate that the third series of photographs were taken at a point in time between the first and second series of photographs.

[6] 1) summation of the evidence; 2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; 3) answer to arguments of opposing counsel; and 4) pleas for law enforcement.  Even if appellant’s complaint regarding proper jury argument was preserved, we note that the State’s argument referred to evidence appellant himself elicited from his stepmother.  The State then made a plea for law enforcement based on this evidence.  Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 767.