Ricky Cain v. Ouvita Hodge

CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 25, 2024
Docket2022 CA 001365
StatusUnknown

This text of Ricky Cain v. Ouvita Hodge (Ricky Cain v. Ouvita Hodge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ricky Cain v. Ouvita Hodge, (Ky. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2022-CA-1365-MR

RICKY CAIN APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE RODNEY DARREL BURRESS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 21-CI-00011

OUVITA HODGE APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Ricky Cain, and Appellee, Ouvita Hodge, lived

together for a short period of time before separating. Hodge sued Cain, seeking to

obtain various items of personal property and damages. Cain failed to respond to

the suit and the Bullitt Circuit Court granted a default judgment. Cain filed a

motion to set aside the default judgment, which was denied. He appeals to this

Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Although default judgments are not favored, trial courts possess

broad discretion in considering motions to set them aside and we will not disturb

the exercise of that discretion absent abuse.” Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d

690, 692 (Ky. App. 1988) (citation omitted). A trial court does not abuse its

discretion unless its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by

sound legal principles.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky. 2004)

(citation omitted). CR1 55.02 provides: “For good cause shown the court may set

aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule 60.02.” (Emphasis added.)

See VerraLab Ja LLC v. Cemerlic, 584 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Ky. 2019) (“Good cause

is not mere inattention on the part of the defendant . . . .”) (citation omitted).

CR 60.02 provides in relevant part: “On motion a court may, upon

such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final

judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . . or (f) any other reason of an

extraordinary nature justifying relief.” “We review the denial of a CR

60.02 motion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Foley v. Commonwealth,

425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted). With these standards in mind,

we now return to the present case.

1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-2- ANALYSIS

Cain’s primary argument on appeal is that he was not properly served

under CR 4.04(2):

Service shall be made upon an individual within this Commonwealth . . . by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint (or other initiating document) to him personally or, if acceptance is refused by offering personal delivery to such person, or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint (or other initiating document) to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process for such individual.

The circuit court addressed this issue in its order denying Cain’s motion to set

aside the default judgment as follows:

[T]estimony from Special Bailiff J.C. Wantland indicates that Mr. Wantland appeared at Defendant’s residence, that Defendant opened the door to his home, that Mr. Wantland displayed to him both the Summons and the Complaint through the glass storm door based on pandemic recommendations of social distancing at the time. Mr. Wantland informed Defendant of this action and left said copies of Summons and Complaint between the storm and front doors.

Cain appears to argue that the bailiff was required to place the Summons and

Complaint in his hands in order to complete service of process. We disagree. And

without citation or explanation, Cain also argues that the court “completely failed

to address the balance of the default judgment test.” There is no indication that

Cain properly preserved or adequately developed this issue before the circuit court.

“It is an unvarying rule that a question not raised or adjudicated in the court below

-3- cannot be considered when raised for the first time in this court.” Combs v Knott

Cnty. Fiscal Court, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ky. 1940). In any event, the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion here.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Bullitt Circuit Court’s

order granting a default judgment, and its order denying Cain’s motion to set aside

the default judgment.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Timothy Dennison James Winchell Louisville, Kentucky Shepherdsville, Kentucky

-4-

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Related

Miller v. Eldridge
146 S.W.3d 909 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2004)
Howard v. Fountain
749 S.W.2d 690 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1988)
Combs, Judge v. Knott County Fiscal Court
141 S.W.2d 859 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1940)
Foley v. Commonwealth
425 S.W.3d 880 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Ricky Cain v. Ouvita Hodge, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ricky-cain-v-ouvita-hodge-kyctapp-2024.