Rickl v. Brand S Lumber Co.

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: February 16, 1977
• Docket: 13544
• Status: Published

Opinion

No. 13544 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIE STATE OF I4ONTANA

ELLEN J. RICKL,

Plaintiff and Xespondent,

BRAND S. LUMBER COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant:

Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record:

For Appellant: Robert L. Kelleher argued, B illings, Montana For Respondent : Leonard H. McKinney argued, Lewistown, Montana

Submitted: January 21, 1977

Decided: CEfi 16 ?Qn -.-+ Filed: -'k[3i:.k M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

This i s an appeal from an award of damages by t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t , Fergus County, s i t t i n g without a jury. P l a i n t i f f Ellen

J . Rick1 owned a p i e c e of land adjacent t o land on which defendant

Brand S. Lumber Company had secured consent t o c u t timber. The

lumber company admitted by s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t i t had gone upon t h e

r e a l property belonging t o p l a i n t i f f and c u t 208,000 board f e e t

of timber.

The s o l e i s s u e a t t r i a l and on appeal i s t h e measure and

amount of damages.

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t found t h e s e f a c t s :

1 ) P l a i n t i f f d i d not e n t e r i n t o any c o n t r a c t t o s e l l timber

and d i d n o t want t h e timber disturbed.

2) The t r e s p a s s was n o t w i l l f u l nor malicious b u t t h e r e

was i n d i c a t i o n of l a c k of due c a r e .

3) The land was damaged a s a r e s u l t of t h e logging.

4) The f a i r value of t h e timber taken was $25 per thousand

board f e e t stumpage o r $75 per thousand board f e e t a t t h e m i l l .

The c o u r t ' s conclusions of law held:

1) P l a i n t i f f s u f f e r e d l o s s 05 t h e timber removed and d e t r i -

ment t o t h e r e a l property not e a s i l y t r a n s l a t a b l e t o money damages.

2) A damage award based on stumpage value would give

defendant t h e b e n e f i t of i t s own wrong.

3) P l a i n t i f f should recover damages i n t h e amount of $75

per thousand board f e e t , together with c o s t s .

I n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p l a i n t i f f argued s e c t i o n 17-503,

R.C.M. 1947, which g r a n t s t r e b l e damages f o r i n j u r y t o t r e e s where t h e t r e s p a s s was o t h e r than c a s u a l o r involuntary was t h e a p p l i -

cable s t a t u t e . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted damages based on a c t u a l

detriment only and n o t t r e b l e damages, P l a i n t i f f abandoned argu-

ment t h a t s e c t i o n 17-503, R.C.M. 1947, was t h e proper s t a t u t e

during o r a l argument t o t h i s Court.

The lumber company c i t e d t e x t s and c a s e s from o t h e r

s t a t e s holding t h a t t h e general measure of damages i s t h e v a l u e

a t t h e time of conversion. Section 17-404, R.C.M. states:

"The detriment caused by t h e wrongful conversion of personal property i s presumed t o be:

1. The value of t h e property a t t h e time of i t s conversion, with t h e i n t e r e s t from t h a t time; o r where t h e a c t i o n has been prosecuted w i t h reasonable d i l i g e n c e , t h e h i g h e s t market value of t h e property a t any time between t h e conversion and t h e v e r d i c t , without i n t e r e s t , a t t h e option of t h e i n j u r e d p a r t y ; and,

2. A f a i r compensation f o r t h e time and money properly expended i n p u r s u i t of t h e property."

The h i g h e s t value of t h e lumber i n t h e hands of t h e p a r t y

t h a t converted i t i s t h e market value a t t h e m i l l . I t i's c l e a r

t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f e l t t h a t stumpage value alone would g i v e t h e

lumber company t h e b e n e f i t of i t s own wrong and encourage t r e s p a s s

and conversion, e s p e c i a l l y where t h e r e i s b e t t e r timber on

adjoining land where t h e owner w i l l n o t s e l l . Since t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t d i d n o t g r a n t i n t e r e s t i t i s obvious t h a t h i g h e s t value was

used.

W e f i n d no e r r o r . The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t

i s affirmed. ,? W e Concur:

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chief Just c e