Rickie Reese v. State

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: December 1, 2010
• Docket: 01C01-9707-CC-00314
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED JULY SESSION, 1998 August 7, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson RICKIE D. REESE, ) Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9707-CC-00314 ) Appe llant, ) ) ) BEDFORD COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. CHARLES LEE STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appe llant. ) (Post-Co nviction Re lief)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

RICKIE D. REESE JOHN KNOX WALKUP Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter SCCC - Apollo A - 218 P. O. Box 279 CLINTON J. MORGAN Clifton, TN 38425-5346 Coun sel for the S tate 425 Fifth Avenu e North Nashville, TN 37243-0493

MIKE MCCOWN District Attorney General

ROBERT CRIGLER Assistant District Attorn ey One Public Square, Ste. 100 Shelbyville, TN 37160

ORDER FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED PURSU ANT TO RU LE 20

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE ORDER Appellant Rickie D. Reese pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated rape.

He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to fifteen years incarceration

with the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant presents the following

issue for our conside ration on this ap peal: w hethe r the trial c ourt er red in

dismiss ing App ellant's pe tition for post-c onviction re lief.

After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Appellant filed his pro se petition for post-conviction re lief in the Bedford

Coun ty Circuit Court on May 30, 1997. On July 7, 1997, the trial court dismissed

Appe llant's petition, determining that the petition was time barred and that it failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In his petition, Appellant

alleges that he has been incarcerated for five years and fourteen days. He

contends, inter alia , that he is being illegally restrained beyond the lawful period

of incarcera tion beca use the Tenn essee Board of Paroles denie d his re lease until

March 2000. He furthe r claims th at the trial cou rt neglecte d to apprise him that

the plea agreement could be violated at a later date and that the stipulated

condition as to h is thirty percent release eligibility date was discretionary and not

manda tory.

Prior to the adoption of the recent Post-Conviction Procedure Act, petitions

like the present one had to be filed within three years of the date of the final

action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal was taken. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-1 02 (1995, Repl.). However, the new Post-Conviction

Procedu re Act, which took effect on May 10, 19 95, su bseq uently shortened the

three-year statute of limitations to one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et

seq. (Supp. 1996). Appellant's statute of limitations for the filing of a petition for

-2 - post-conviction relief began to run in 1992, the year in which he avers that he

pleaded guilty. Under either the old or th e new P ost-Co nviction P rocedu re Act,

Appe llant's petition is time barred because he filed the petition five years after the

date of his conviction. W e conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the

May 30, 1997 petition as being barred by the statute of limitations.

Acco rdingly , we affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Court of

Crimina l Appea ls Rule 2 0.

____________________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, JUDGE

___________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE

-3 -