Ricketts v. First Trust Co.

73 F.2d 599, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 2769
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedOctober 29, 1934
DocketNo. 10068
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 73 F.2d 599 (Ricketts v. First Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ricketts v. First Trust Co., 73 F.2d 599, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 2769 (8th Cir. 1934).

Opinion

GARDNER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court reversing an order of the referee in bankruptcy which required appellee to turn over to appellant certain alleged assets of the bankrupt Lincoln Trust Company. Appellant, trustee in bankruptcy, filed with the referee bis petition for an order requiring appellee to turn over to appellant the sum of $1,947.75, alleging that it was an asset of the bankrupt estate, of which the trustee was entitled to immediate possession.

The Lincoln Trust Company, before adjudication in bankruptcy, was engaged in business as a trust company, making real estate loans and selling securities to the public. The Lincoln Safe Deposit Company, an affiliate, was engaged in the same kind of business and is also bankrupt. Appellant is trustee in bankruptcy of both these companies. Some of the loans hero, involved were made by the Lincoln Safe Deposit Company, but as the Lincoln Trust Company became the owner of them before bankruptcy, and there is no difference in the character of the securities involved, all loans will be treated as though made directly by the Lincoln Trust Company.

Two different methods were used in the handling or negotiation of the loans here involved. Jn one, the bankrupt would make a loan, taking a note or bond and a) mortgage securing same to itself. These original securities were kept by the bankrupt in its own name and were in its possession until bankruptcy. The bankrupt would then issue and [600]*600sell to investors so-called “certificates of participation,” by the terms of which an equitable interest in the original note and mortgage to the extent of a designated amount was assigned to the purchaser. These certificates of participation bore interest at a lower rate than the original notes or bonds, and provided for no penalty interest. They were not obligations of the bankrupt, but were made payable only “when collection is made.” Neither in the original note, bond, nor mortgage, was any reference made to participation certificates. This deferred differential in interest was carried on the books of the bankrupt as a “potential asset.” When installments Were paid on the original note or bond, they were credited on this record and set up as a.profit of the bankrupt, and the money was put into the general account of the company. Expenses of the transaction were paid out of the general funds the same as other operating expenses of the bankrupt.

The other method of handling was the taking of “companion” or commission notes. These notes were executed by the borrowers at the same time as the principal notes and mortgages, and were secured by the same mortgages as the principal note. These notes were payable in installments on the interest-paying dates of the principal loan.

On adjudication in bankruptcy, a receiver was appointed who applied both to the District Court of the United States, for the District of Nebraska, Lincoln Division, and to the referee in bankruptcy for instructions, and prayed that authority be granted him to apply to the district court of Lancaster county, Neb., for an order transferring the trusteeship of all the bankrupt’s loans to some suitable successor trustee. On these applications, orders were entered, granting authority to make such application to the state court “upon the express condition, however, that the bankruptcy -court shall retain jurisdiction over the said successor trustee and the said trust properties for the purpose of ascertaining the interest of the bankrupt estate, if any, in said trust property, and making appropriate provision to protect such interest.” Upon petition filed, the state court entered a decree appointing the First Trust Company of Lincoln, Neb., appellee herein, successor trustee, with recognition of the right and power of the United States District Court and the referee in bankruptcy to retain and exercise “jurisdiction for the purpose of an accounting, for the fixing of any lien, right, title or interest, if any, that the bankrupt estates may have in the trust property and for the purpose of making appropriate orders for the protection of said bank-' rupt estates.” An order was subsequently made by the bankruptcy court, authorizing the trustee in bankruptcy to deliver the books, records, and all other papers in connection with the loans to the appellee, with a similar reservation of jurisdiction as contained in the decree of the state court.

Appellee, as successor trustee, has collected the full rate of interest due on the original notes and mortgages, and has paid over to investors only the amounts called for by the participation certificates, and has retained the difference in its possession. The purpose of the proceeding below was to compel the appellee to turn over to the trustee in bankruptcy the whole sum collected and, retained by it, being the difference between collections on original securities and the amounts paid to the holders of participation certificates, and also to compel appellee to turn over the amount of commission notes collected by it, the former aggregating $1,887.75 and the latter $60. The referee entered the order as prayed for, but upon review the order was vacated and reversed, and this appeal is from that order.

The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualification, is, subject to certain exceptions not here material, vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt to all property which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by any means have transferred, or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him. Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, e. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 565, as amended by Act of Feb. 5, 1903, e. 487, § 16, 32 Stat. 8001, and Act of May 27, 1926, e. 406, § 16, 44 Stat. 667, title 11, U. S. C., § 110 (11 USCA § 110).

In the petition to the state court, filed by the receiver or trustee, it is alleged that, “The plaintiff as receiver and the trustee in bankruptcy, when elected, does not have the means or authority to properly safeguard .the interest of said investors, so that it is imperative that a new trustee be appointed forthwith to take over said duties.”

The bankruptcy court, in its order on the petition, found: “That the bankrupt is trustee of a large number of mortgage loans and has active duties to perform as such trustee in connection with the servicing of said loans, collection of interest and principal, foreclosing defaulted mortgages and handling property acquired thereunder, which work must be promptly and efficiently han[601]*601died in order to prevent the impairment of tho security and irreparable injury and great financial loss to the many thousand holders of securities issued thereunder, and also injury and loss to the bankrupt estate on account of the inability of Ihe bankrupt estate to obtain reimbursement for advances which it has heretofore made on certain of said loans or on account of other interests that the bankrupt estate may have therein. (Italics supplied)”

The petition in tho bankruptcy court for leave to apply to the state court for an order appointing a successor trustee contains the following allegation: “'The bankrupt estate does not have sufficient money to properly service the said trust properties and in the opinion of your receiver it would not be expedient for it to attempt to do so.”

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Related

In re Engelbrecht
10 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Iowa, 1935)

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Bluebook (online)
73 F.2d 599, 1934 U.S. App. LEXIS 2769, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ricketts-v-first-trust-co-ca8-1934.