Rickel v. Republic Mutual Fire Insurance

282 P. 757, 129 Kan. 332, 1929 Kan. LEXIS 79
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedDecember 7, 1929
DocketNo. 28,949
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 282 P. 757 (Rickel v. Republic Mutual Fire Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rickel v. Republic Mutual Fire Insurance, 282 P. 757, 129 Kan. 332, 1929 Kan. LEXIS 79 (kan 1929).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Hopkins, J.:

This controversy presents the question whether under the terms of an insurance policy the word “grain” included 'cottonseed meal. The trial court held that it did not, and plaintiff appeals.

The facts were substantially these. The plaintiff carried insurance in defendant company for the total amount of $3,700, of which $2,000 was upon grain on the premises, in the barn, crib, gran[333]*333ary, stack or shock. The insurance was against fire, lightning and windstorm. The plaintiff had cottonseed meal stored in a granary on the premises valued at $1,700, which was destroyed by fire.

The defendant is a mutual company organized under R. S. 40-421 and R. S. 40-423, and was incorporated to write insurance on—

“Dwelling houses, barns (except livery or hotel bams), accompanying outbuildings and their contents, schoolhouses, schoolhouse furniture, churches, church furniture, farm implements, hay, grain, wool and other products, live stock, wagons, carriages, harness, household goods, wearing apparel, provisions, musical instruments and libraries, being upon farms as farm property, or in dwellings, or in accompanying outbuildings, or in schoolhouses, or in churches, that constitute detached risks in villages and cities, and belonging to the member of the company. All risks in cities and villages which shall be fifteen feet or more from any contiguous risk shall be deemed detached within the meaning of this act.”

The articles mentioned in the policy in question included “grain on premises, in barn, crib, granary, stack or shock.”

The plaintiff invokes the rule with relation to stock insurance companies that policies of insurance are, under certain circumstances, construed most strongly against the insurer.. This rule of construction does not have general application to policies of insurance written by mutual companies, such as the defendant. The insured under such a policy is in effect the insurer as well as the insured, so that the same strict rule of construction does not apply. This court has recognized the distinction between stock insurance companies and mutual insurance companies. For instance, in Kennedy v. Farmers Alliance Ins. Co., 127 Kan. 768, 275 Pac. 214, it was said in the opinion:

“It is the duty of an agent soliciting insurance to prepare the application so it will accurately and truthfully state the result of the negotiations, and it has been held, in Pfiester v. Insurance Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245, and allied cases, that the agent’s failure to do so is in legal effect the fault o'f the insurance company. But that was said with reference to stock companies. A different rule applies to mutual companies organized under R. S. 40-421, et seq. See Alters v. Farmers Alliance Ins. Co., 118 Kan. 241, 234 Pac. 956, and cases there collected. These companies are organized by property owners who desire mutually to insure the property of their members. Before a person can have his property insured by such a company he must become a member of it and join with other members in their mutual obligations. In a sense he is both the insurer and the insured. The premiums paid by members constitute the fund from which losses and expenses are paid; the members share in the profits in proportion to their interest, and control and regulate the affairs of the company. (32 C. J. 1018.) The mutuality of obligation, of insurance, and of all the advantages is the main and essential feature of such a company. (32 C. J. 1019.) No policy of insurance is issued except on [334]*334written application. (R. S. 40-425.-) The persons insured form the membership of the company. (Brenn v. Insurance Co., 103 Kan. 517, 520, 175 Pac. 383.) The members elect their officers. (R. S. 40-427 to 40-429.) By-laws are authorized. (R. S. 40-436.) Each policy must have attached to it or printed thereon a copy of the by-laws, and these must be signed by the president and secretary of the company, and by the insured member. (R. S. 40-441.)” (p. 770.)

The plaintiff contends that cottonseed meal is “grain” the same as corn meal, or flaxseed meal, brans, shorts and other ground feeds or any other products of this character. We think not. The word “grain” has a clear, definite meaning. Webster gives this definition:

“1. In modern usage the seed or seedlike fruit of any cereal grass, as wheat, maize, oats, rice, millet, etc.
“2. Collectively: The unhusked or the threshed seeds or fruits of various food plants, now usually, specif., the cereal grasses, but in commercial statutory use (as in insurance policies, trade-lists, etc.), also flax, peas, sugar-cane, etc.”

In 28 C. J. 757 “grain” is thus defined:

“Grain. A generic term; a kernel, especially of those plants, like wheat, whose seeds are used for food; specifically, a seed of one of the cereal plants collectively; a single seed or hard seed of a plant, particularly of those kinds whose seeds are used for food of man or beast; a single small seed; a small hard seed; the gathered seed of cereal plants in mass; the fruit of certain plants which constitute the chief food of man and beast; also the.plants themselves, whether standing or gathered. Sometimes the term is used to designate a crop in a field, or cereals in the straw: In accordance with the context or the connection in which it is employed the term may include barley; bran; broom-corn; corn, in general, com and millet hay; flax; hay or stalk; maize, millet; millet hay; oats, peas, rye, sugar-cane seed; wheat.”

Cotton is not a common crop to this state. In 3 World Book, page 1607, the following are listed as states where cotton is generally produced: Oklahoma, Arkansas, North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, Alabama, Texas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Georgia, Missouri, Florida and Virginia. Therefore we should say that since cotton is not grown generally in Kansas, neither it nor its products are the subject of an insurance policy covering farms and farm products unless specifically provided for. Cottonseed meal is a by-product of cotton “obtained by grinding the hard, dry cake left after the oil has been pressed out of the seeds. When sifted like flour it is an excellent stock food, and when mixed with acid phosphate it becomes a valuable fertilizer.” (3 World Book, 1607.)

Cottonseed cake is a product of the cotton seed only and is com[335]*335posed principally of the kernel with such portion of the hull as is necessary in the manufacture of oil. Cottonseed meal is cottonseed cake finely ground but not necessarily bolted. It must conform in all other respects to the definition of cottonseed cake. Cottonseed feed is a mixture of cottonseed meal and cottonseed hulls, containing less than 36 per cent protein. Cottonseed cake and meal are recognized under the law as commercial feeding stuffs under the provisions of the statute (R. S. 2-1001 et seq., Laws 1925, ch. 4), and are treated as manufactured feeding stuffs. (See sec. B, Report of Control Division, Kansas State'Board of Agriculture, 1928, pp. 5, 21.)

In the 1928 Lincoln Library of Essential Information, page 1364, it is said:

“Cottonseed products. For every pound of cotton that is grown, about two pounds of cottonseed are produced. This seed was for many years considered a nuisance and was wasted or burned.

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Bluebook (online)
282 P. 757, 129 Kan. 332, 1929 Kan. LEXIS 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rickel-v-republic-mutual-fire-insurance-kan-1929.