AFFIRM; Opinion Filed July 18, 2022
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00905-CV
RICK PAGE, Appellant V. JOHN BAKEWELL, Appellee
On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-04329
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Smith Opinion by Justice Schenck In this accelerated, interlocutory appeal, Rick Page appeals the trial court’s
denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act
(TCPA). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011. In three issues,
Page argues appellee John Bakewell’s claim for defamation per se (1) is not
exempted from the TCPA, (2) is based on or is in response to Page’s right of free
speech or right to petition, and (3) must be dismissed because Page established an
affirmative defense of absolute privilege as a matter of law. While we agree with
Page’s contention that the TCPA applies, he has not shown he is entitled to dismissal. We accordingly affirm. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue
this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
BACKGROUND
On April 7, 2021, Bakewell filed suit against Page, alleging Page had
assaulted him in a restaurant, causing him physical harm, and that after he filed a
criminal complaint against Page, Page “retaliated by filing an affidavit in
[Bakewell’s] pending family court matter.” According to the petition, Page has
accused Bakewell of hiring hit men to “take care of” Bakewell’s ex-wife’s fiancé
and alleged Bakewell had admitted to that felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.03(a)(3) (criminalizing employment of another to commit murder for
remuneration). The petition further alleged “[t]hose untrue, defaming, [libelous] and
slanderous statements have been conveyed via written and verbal communications
to numerous persons.” Bakewell asserts that these statements accuse him of criminal
conduct and thus amount to defamation per se, entitling him to recovery of presumed
damages.1
After answering with general denials and affirmative defenses, Page moved
to dismiss Bakewell’s claim for defamation per se pursuant to the TCPA. Bakewell
1 Defamation per se refers to statements that are so obviously harmful that general damages may be presumed. See Mohamed v. Ctr. for Sec. Policy, 554 S.W.3d 767, 777 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied) (citing In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (Tex. 2015)). The law presumes certain categories of statements are defamatory per se, including statements that (1) unambiguously charge a crime, dishonesty, fraud, rascality, or general depravity or (2) are falsehoods that injure one in his office, business, profession, or occupation. See id. –2– responded2 to the motion, alleging his claims for assault, negligence per se, and
defamation per se involve bodily injury and are thus exempted from TCPA
coverage. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(3). The trial court conducted a
hearing on Page’s motion to dismiss, but did not rule on the motion within thirty
days, thus denying the motion by operation of law. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.008.
This accelerated, interlocutory appeal followed. See id.
THE TCPA AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is an “anti-SLAPP
statute,” meaning that the legislature enacted it to curb “strategic lawsuits against
public participation.” Am. Heritage Capital, LP v. Gonzalez, 436 S.W.3d 865, 868
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Its main feature is a motion-to-dismiss procedure
that allows defendants at an early stage to seek dismissal, attorney’s fees, and
sanctions for the filing of a meritless suit in response to a defendant’s proper exercise
of a protected right. Equine Holdings, LLC v. Jacoby, No. 05-19-00758-CV, 2020
WL 2079183, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
A Chapter 27 movant bears the initial burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence “that the legal action is based on or is in response to the party’s
exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association.”
2 Bakewell’s response included allegations as to the relationship between himself and Page, as well as a possible explanation for Page’s alleged assault on Bakewell. According to Bakewell, Page is a friend of the fiancé of Bakewell’s ex-wife, Page is also involved in divorce proceedings, and Page’s physical assault on Bakewell was due to his belief that Bakewell had spoken negatively of Page to Page’s soon to be ex- wife. –3– See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b); see also Brenner v. Centurion Logistics LLC ex
rel. Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC, No. 05-20-00308-CV, 2020 WL 7332847, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding amendments
to TCPA do not change burden of “preponderance of the evidence” established by
Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017)). If the movant carries his or her
initial burden, the nonmovant must then establish “by clear and specific evidence a
prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” See CIV. PRAC.
& REM. § 27.005(c). Notwithstanding the nonmovant’s proof of a prima facie case,
however, the court shall dismiss a legal action against the movant if the movant
establishes as a matter of law a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim. Id.
§ 27.005(d).
Section 27.010(c) exempts “a legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury”
from the application of the TCPA. Id. § 27.010(c). The nonmovant bears the burden
of proving a statutory exemption. See Kirkstall Rd. Enters., Inc. v. Jones, 523
S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.) (citing Tervita, LLC v.
Sutterfield, 482 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied)).
We review de novo the trial court’s determinations that the parties met or
failed to meet their respective burdens under section 27.005. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.005 (b), (c); see also Brenner, 2020 WL 7332847, at *3 (holding amendments
to TCPA do not change de novo appellate standard of review). In conducting this
review, we consider, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the pleadings and
–4– any supporting and opposing affidavits and other evidence stating the facts on which
the claim or defense is based. See Fishman v. C.O.D. Capital Corp., No. 05-16-
00581-CV, 2017 WL 3033314, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 18, 2017, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a). However, the plaintiffs’
pleadings are generally “the best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the
action.” Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467.
DISCUSSION
I. Bakewell’s Claim for Defamation Per Se Is Not Exempted from the TCPA
In his first issue, Page argues his motion should not have been denied on the
basis that Bakewell’s claim for defamation per se was exempted from the TCPA.3
In his response to Page’s motion, Bakewell alleged his claims for assault, negligence
per se, and defamation per se involve bodily injury and are thus exempted from
TCPA coverage. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(3). As the nonmovant,
Bakewell bears the burden of proving the statutory exemption. See Kirkstall, 523
S.W.3d at 253.
The TCPA exempts from coverage a legal action seeking recovery for bodily
injury, wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action.
See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.010(a)(3). Bakewell’s petition alleges Page assaulted
3 As discussed in this Court’s recent opinion of Temple v. Cortez Law Firm, No. 05-21-00367-CV, 2022 WL 1955755, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2022, no pet. h.), nothing in the TCPA or the supreme court’s opinion in Castlemen v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam), preclude our consideration of an exemption before addressing a TCPA movant’s step-one burden to show the TCPA applies. –5– him and did so in violation of the penal code such that his actions were negligent per
se and asserts that Page’s actions caused Bakewell injury and physical harm.
Bakewell’s petition also asserts a claim for defamation per se related to Page’s
alleged statements accusing Bakewell of having hired hit men to harm his ex-wife’s
fiancé and to admitting to that felony.
Page’s motion seeks to dismiss only the defamation per se claim, not the
assault and battery or negligence per se claims. See United Dev. Funding, L.P. v.
Megatel Homes III, LLC, No. 05-19-00647-CV, 2020 WL 2781801, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“legal action” under TCPA
“can consist of an entire lawsuit or a subsidiary part”) (citing Creative Oil & Gas,
LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019)). To the extent
Bakewell argues the defamation per se claim is exempt, we do not agree because his
petition makes it clear the injury he alleges is to his reputation and business, not
bodily injury. See Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467 (plaintiff’s pleadings generally “the
best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action”).
Bakewell argues the entirety of his case against Page relates to the events of
Page’s alleged assault on Bakewell, including recovery for not just the bodily injury
but also for damages Bakewell sustained from Page’s allegedly false statements
about the attack and his statements discrediting Bakewell.
Bakewell relies on this Court’s opinion in Kirkstall and an opinion from the
Austin Court of Appeals to assert his defamation per se claim is exempt from the
–6– TCPA. In Kirkstall, this Court concluded that because the plaintiff’s claim sought
to recover for bodily injuries that he claimed to have sustained as a result of the
defendant’s negligence, the claim was exempted pursuant to the plain language of
the TCPA. See Kirkstall, 523 S.W.3d at 252–53. In Superior HealthPlan, Inc. v.
Badawo, the appellate court held the bodily-injury exemption applied to a claim for
medical negligence “if that claim seeks recovery for bodily injury.” See Superior
HealthPlan, Inc. v. Badawo, No. 03-18-00691-CV, 2019 WL 3721327, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We conclude those cases are distinguishable from the current case. In both
cases, the causes of action sought recovery for bodily injury. Here, Bakewell seeks
recovery for bodily injuries he claims he sustained due to Page’s assault and
negligence per se, but his claim for defamation per se seeks no such relief for
physical harm or bodily injury. Thus, we cannot conclude his claim for defamation
per se is a legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.010(a)(3).
The TCPA also exempts from its application statements regarding a legal
action seeking recovery for bodily injury. See id. The statements Bakewell
complains of in his petition are that “John Bakewell had hired two men to have
[Bakewell’s ex-wife’s] fiancé . . . ‘taken care of,’” that Bakewell “admitted to
committing a felony by putting a hit on [Bakewell’s ex-wife’s] fiancé,” and that Page
denied assaulting Bakewell as Bakewell alleges in his petition. These statements
–7– relate to the alleged conduct underlying Bakewell’s claims for assault and
negligence, both of which seek recovery for bodily injury. However, the language
of the statute is as follows: “This chapter does not apply to . . . a legal action seeking
recovery for bodily injury . . . or to statements made regarding that legal action.”
See id. Thus, the statute exempts statements regarding the “legal action,” not the
alleged underlying conduct. This interpretation is consistent with our prior opinion
in Kirkstall in which we previously noted that our primary objective when construing
statutes is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent and that the plain meaning of the
text is generally the best expression of that intent. See Kirkstall, 523 S.W.3d at 253
(citing Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628, 635
(Tex. 2010)); but see Temple v. Cortez Law Firm, No. 05-21-00367-CV, 2022 WL
1955755, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2022, no pet. h.) (holding as exempt
statements regarding law firm’s alleged misconduct that “occurred during and only
because of” legal action for bodily injury).
We sustain Page’s first issue.
II. Bakewell’s Claim of Defamation Per Se Is Based On or In Response to His Right of Free Speech
In his second issue, Page argues Bakewell’s claim of defamation per se is
based on or is in response to his right of free speech or right to petition. Page urges,
and we agree, that Bakewell’s claim is a “legal action” within the definition of the
TCPA. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(6). The exercise of the right of free speech
means a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern. See –8– id. § 27.001(3). The definition of the exercise of the right to petition similarly
requires a communication. See id. § 27.001(4). A “communication” includes the
making of or submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium,
including oral, visual, written, audiovisual, or electronic. See id. § 27.001(1).
Bakewell’s petition alleges that in response to his filing criminal charges
against Page, Page “retaliated by filing an affidavit in [Bakewell’s] pending family
court matter, in which he alleged that [Bakewell] ‘had hired two men to have
[Bakewell’s ex-wife’s fiancé] “taken care of” . . . [had] admitted to committing a
felony by putting a hit on [Bakewell’s ex-wife’s fiancé].’” Bakewell’s petition
further alleges, “Those untrue, defaming, liable, and slanderous statements have
been conveyed via written and verbal communications to numerous persons.” Also,
Bakewell complains of Page’s testimony denying the alleged assault and more
broadly states, “[Page] has, and continues, to publicly disparage [Bakewell], and is
even willing to commit perjury in order to further his vendetta against [Bakewell].”
Construing the petition in favor of Bakewell as the nonmovant, we conclude the
foregoing describe “communications.” See id.
The TCPA defines a “matter of public concern” to include “a matter of
political, social, or other interest to the community; or a subject of concern to the
public.” See id. § 27.001(7). Public matters include, among other things,
“commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings
arising from the prosecutions.” See Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex.
–9– 2017) (citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975)). And, as this
Court has recently held, TCPA case law is clear that criminal acts are matters of
public concern. See Beard v. McGregor Bancshares, Inc., No. 05-21-00478-CV,
2022 WL 1076176, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 11, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.)
(citing Miller v. Schupp, No. 02-21-00107-CV, 2022 WL 60606, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Jan. 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (statements regarding assaults were
matters of public concern); CBS Stations Grp. of Tex., LLC v. Burns, No. 05-21-
00042-CV, 2021 WL 4398031, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 27, 2021, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (news broadcast involving robbery, high-speed chase, and arrest of
suspect were matters of public concern); Duncan v. Acius Grp., LP, No. 05-18-
01432, 2019 WL 4392507, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 13, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (accusing someone of abusing/killing animals was matter of public concern)).
While the general allegations of “public disparagement” are not specific
enough to conclude were made in connection with a matter of public concern, we
conclude the allegations that Bakewell engaged in and admitted to engaging in
criminal activity are communications made in connection with a matter of public
concern. See Beard, 2022 WL 1076176, at *6; see also PENAL § 19.03(a)(3)
(criminalizing employment of another to commit murder for remuneration).
Accordingly, we conclude those allegations are exercises of Page’s right to free
speech.
–10– Finally, we conclude Bakewell’s claim for defamation per se is based on and
is in response to Page’s exercise of his right to free speech, as the petition itself seeks
to recover for those alleged communications as “defaming . . . and slanderous
statements.” See Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467. Thus, we sustain Page’s second issue
without addressing whether Bakewell’s claim for defamation per se is based on or
related to Page’s exercise of his right to petition. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
III. Page Did Not Establish an Affirmative Defense as a Matter of Law
In his third issue, Page argues that, presuming Bakewell establishes a prima
facie case of defamation per se,4 he established as a matter of law the affirmative
defense of privilege, both absolute and qualified, such that the trial court erred by
not dismissing Bakewell’s claim for defamation per se. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.005(d).5 Page argues his statements were privileged and thus not actionable
because Bakewell’s petition alleges they were “testimony in [Bakewell’s] divorce
case that is absolutely privileged.” Page argues alternatively that even if not
absolutely privileged, his statements should be entitled to qualified privilege because
they were made to the trial judge and anyone else present in Bakewell’s divorce case.
See Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021)
(“The judicial-proceedings privilege is straightforward: ‘Communications in the due
4 Page presumes Bakewell established a prima facie case for the purpose of his third issue. 5 As noted above, notwithstanding the nonmovant’s proof of a prima facie case, the court shall dismiss a legal action against the movant if the movant establishes as a matter of law a valid defense to the nonmovant’s claim. Id. § 27.005(d). –11– course of a judicial proceeding will not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel
or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made.’”)
(quoting James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982)).
However, in addition to the affidavit and courtroom testimony Bakewell
describes in his petition, he also asserts the alleged “defaming . . . and slanderous
statements have been conveyed via written and verbal communications to numerous
persons.” In the portion of the petition seeking a temporary injunction against Page,
Bakewell asserts Page “has chosen to disseminate the allegations to third parties in
order to damage [Bakewell’s] name and reputation and defame him.” Thus, even
assuming, without deciding, Page established as a matter of law that the alleged
statements made in Bakewell’s divorce case were privileged, he has not established
as a matter of law that all of the allegedly defamatory statements were made in the
course of judicial proceedings and thus privileged. See Moldovan v. Polito, No. 05-
15-01052-CV, 2016 WL 4131890, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 2, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) (“one who
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had
originally published it”)).
Accordingly, we overrule Page’s third issue.
As noted above, Page does not challenge the whether Bakewell met his burden
as the nonmovant to establish each and every essential element of his claim of
defamation per se. Whether this Court may presume Bakewell did so and thus affirm
–12– the trial court’s dismissal order is a question we need not decide because we
conclude the record adequately establishes Bakewell did meet that burden. A cause
of action for defamation requires (1) the publication of a false statement of fact to a
third party, (2) that was defamatory concerning the plaintiff, (3) with the requisite
degree of fault, and (4) damages. See Mohamed v. Ctr. for Sec. Policy, 554 S.W.3d
767, 774 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied) (citing In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d
579, 593 (Tex. 2015)). And, as previously noted, defamation per se refers to
statements, including those that unambiguously charge a crime, that are so obviously
harmful that general damages may be presumed. See id. at 777 (citing In re Lipsky,
460 S.W.3d at 596).
Bakewell’s petition alleges that in response to his filing criminal charges
against Page, Page “retaliated by filing an affidavit in [Bakewell’s] pending family
court matter, in which he alleged that [Bakewell] ‘had hired two men to have
[Bakewell’s ex-wife’s fiancé] “taken care of” . . . [had] admitted to committing a
felony by putting a hit on [Bakewell’s ex-wife’s fiancé].’” Bakewell’s petition
further alleges, “Those untrue, defaming, liable, and slanderous statements have
been conveyed via written and verbal communications to numerous persons.”
Bakewell’s petition is supported by his declaration in which he attests to the above
assertions. We conclude Bakewell met his burden as the nonmovant to establish a
prima facie case of defamation per se.
–13– CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Page’s motion to dismiss pursuant
to the TCPA.
/David J. Schenck/ DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE
210905F.P05
–14– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
RICK PAGE, Appellant On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-21-00905-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-04329. Opinion delivered by Justice JOHN BAKEWELL, Appellee Schenck. Justices Osborne and Smith participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee JOHN BAKEWELL recover his costs of this appeal from appellant RICK PAGE.
Judgment entered this 18th day of July 2022.
–15–