Rick Murphy v. Acw Cbp Maine LLC

Ninth Circuit

Rick Murphy v. Acw Cbp Maine LLC

711 F. App'x 863

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedOctober 24, 2017

Docket16-16048

StatusUnpublished

This text of 711 F. App'x 863 (Rick Murphy v. Acw Cbp Maine LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Rick Murphy v. Acw Cbp Maine LLC, 711 F. App'x 863 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

Rick Murphy (“Murphy”) appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of ACW CBP Maine LLC (“ACW”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We review the summary judgement de novo, construing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of ACW on Murphy’s breach of contract claim. The parties agree Maine law governs this action. Section 13004 of Maine’s Real Estate Brokerage Licensing Act, Me. Stat. tit. 32, § 13004, precludes a party from maintaining an action for a real estate broker’s fee, unless the party is a licensed real estate broker in Maine. Because Murphy did not prove licensure in Maine, he is precluded from maintaining this action.

2. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of ACW on Murphy’s unjust enrichment claim. Section 13004 prohibits maintaining “any action,” including equitable actions, for recovery of broker’s fees. Because Murphy did not prove his licensure in Maine, his equitable claim is “statutorily barred.” See Smith v. Cannell, 723 A.2d 876, 880 (Me. 1999) (emphasis original).

3. Murphy’s argument that section 13004 only bars him from bringing an action in Maine state court, but not elsewhere, is incorrect. Section 13004 is Maine substantive law, and so a federal court sitting in diversity applies that law as a Maine state court would apply it. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-28, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Thus, because Murphy’s claim would be barred in Maine state court, it is barred in federal court as well. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (“[Wjhere a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM ***

Rick Murphy (“Murphy”) appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of ACW CBP Maine LLC (“ACW”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We review the summary judgement de novo, construing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011).

1. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of ACW on Murphy’s breach of contract claim. The parties agree Maine law governs this action. Section 13004 of Maine’s Real Estate Brokerage Licensing Act, Me. Stat. tit. 32, § 13004, precludes a party from maintaining an action for a real estate broker’s fee, unless the party is a licensed real estate broker in Maine. Because Murphy did not prove licensure in Maine, he is precluded from maintaining this action.

2. The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of ACW on Murphy’s unjust enrichment claim. Section 13004 prohibits maintaining “any action,” including equitable actions, for recovery of broker’s fees. Because Murphy did not prove his licensure in Maine, his equitable claim is “statutorily barred.” See Smith v. Cannell, 723 A.2d 876, 880 (Me. 1999) (emphasis original).

3. Murphy’s argument that section 13004 only bars him from bringing an action in Maine state court, but not elsewhere, is incorrect. Section 13004 is Maine substantive law, and so a federal court sitting in diversity applies that law as a Maine state court would apply it. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426-28, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Thus, because Murphy’s claim would be barred in Maine state court, it is barred in federal court as well. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) (“[Wjhere a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”).

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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711 F. App'x 863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rick-murphy-v-acw-cbp-maine-llc-ca9-2017.

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