Richwagon v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Richwagon v. State

466 So. 2d 10, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 658, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12942

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 13, 1985

DocketNo. 83-2695

StatusPublished

This text of 466 So. 2d 10 (Richwagon v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Richwagon v. State, 466 So. 2d 10, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 658, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12942 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).

Pincite

Opinion

LETTS, Judge.

In this case, the defendant was charged and convicted of vehicular homicide. He appeals claiming that the nurse who drew [11]*11his blood at the hospital was not a registered nurse as required by section 316.-1932(l)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1983) and, therefore, the results of the blood sample showing the blood alcohol concentration at .063 was not admissible. We disagree and affirm the conviction.

Defendant was driving a motorcycle on which the deceased was a passenger. The accident occurred because the defendant was performing a “wheelie,” a show-off performance where the driver lifts the front wheel off the ground while accelerating.

The defendant’s blood sample was drawn at the hospital allegedly by a “practical nurse.” In fact, she was already a graduate nurse, was allowed to function as a registered nurse, had received her diploma (an A.S. Degree in Nursing), had already passed her boards and was only waiting to receive her registered license which arrived exactly two days after the blood sample was drawn. As the supreme court noted in State v. Gillman, 390 So.2d 62, 64 (Fla.1980), “the partial purpose of section 322.-261[¹] is to guard the health of those individuals subjected to this analysis. Our holding today in no manner thwarts the section’s purpose_” (emphasis supplied) Based on Gillman, we have no reason not to arrive at the same conclusion in the case before us.

AFFIRMED.

GLICKSTEIN and BARKETT, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

LETTS, Judge.

In this case, the defendant was charged and convicted of vehicular homicide. He appeals claiming that the nurse who drew [11]*11his blood at the hospital was not a registered nurse as required by section 316.-1932(l)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1983) and, therefore, the results of the blood sample showing the blood alcohol concentration at .063 was not admissible. We disagree and affirm the conviction.

Defendant was driving a motorcycle on which the deceased was a passenger. The accident occurred because the defendant was performing a “wheelie,” a show-off performance where the driver lifts the front wheel off the ground while accelerating.

The defendant’s blood sample was drawn at the hospital allegedly by a “practical nurse.” In fact, she was already a graduate nurse, was allowed to function as a registered nurse, had received her diploma (an A.S. Degree in Nursing), had already passed her boards and was only waiting to receive her registered license which arrived exactly two days after the blood sample was drawn. As the supreme court noted in State v. Gillman, 390 So.2d 62, 64 (Fla.1980), “the partial purpose of section 322.-261[¹] is to guard the health of those individuals subjected to this analysis. Our holding today in no manner thwarts the section’s purpose_” (emphasis supplied) Based on Gillman, we have no reason not to arrive at the same conclusion in the case before us.

AFFIRMED.

GLICKSTEIN and BARKETT, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

466 So. 2d 10, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 658, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12942, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richwagon-v-state-fladistctapp-1985.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack