Richmond v. Union Steamboat Co.

8 Abb. N. Cas. 66
Superior Court of Buffalo·Decided March 15, 1880·Published

Opinion

By the Court.&emdSmith, J.*

The issues of fact in this cause having been tried by the court without a jury, and the appeal being taken from the judgment entered on the decision of the court, it becomes our duty to determine whether any error of law or of fact [68] has been committed to the prejudice of the appellant. The defendant insists that it proved on the trial a custom which made the delivery of the wheat in question at the Niagara elevator a fulfillment of its contract of affreightment, and that the freight was therefore earned. The custom claimed to have been proven is, that where a cargo of grain carried by a vessel from a port in another State, to the port of Buffalo, consists of two or more parcels consigned to different persons, under bills of lading containing no other provisions as to delivery than that the grain shall be delivered to the consignee or his assigns, the person who is the consignee of the major part of the cargo may appoint and direct at what elevator his part shall be delivered; and that the discharge of the whole cargo into the elevator so designated is a good delivery as to each of the several parcels, though the consignee of the minor parcel may have given express and timely directions that his parcel be delivered at another elevator. A custom such as the defendant sought to prove, has the force of law. To establish it, the usage must be shown to have been uniform, long settled and well-known, so that the parties shall be presumed to contract with reference to it. And it has been wisely said that “ a custom which, quoad hoc, is to supersede the law of the land, should be clearly proved, and the interested encroachments of persons engaged in a particular trade watched with great jealousy” (Per Cowen, J., in Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend. 305, 308).

Without reviewing the evidence in detail, I concent myself with saying that after a careful examination of all the testimony, I fully concur in the conclusion of the court which tried this cause, that the defendant failed to establish the existence of the alleged custom. Upon this head, I will only refer to the very significant testimony of Mr. Richmond, one of the plaintiffs, as to [69] the interview between him and Mr. Bullard, the defendant’s general manager, touching the delivery of the grain in question in this case. Mr. Richmond says he ‘ ‘ called on Mr. Bullard, and asked him what he meant by saying he would not take the grain to the Richmond elevator. He spoke about the prices paid for carrying grain, and that he had been found fault with by other carriers for carrying grain around town in this way, and that he had decided that morning not to do so any longer, and that he would take the grain where the majority of the cargo was consigned.” The accuracy of this testimony was not called in question. Mr. Bullard, though called as a witness in the cause and after Mr. Richmond had testified, did not in any manner contradict his statement.

But the defendant claims that, irrespective of any usage or custom, the delivery of the wheat at the Niagara elevator was a good delivery, under the rules of the law merchant that govern the case. The claim is, in effect,' that a vessel arriving at this port, laden with grain, may discharge its cargo into such elevator as may best suit the convenience of the vessel owner, who may wholly disregard the direction of the consignee in respect to its delivery. I say this is the defendant’s claim in effect, because the rule which the defendant asserts must of course apply in all cases, as well to a whole cargo as to one-third of the whole, for it is asserted as a rule of law based upon settled principles, controlling in its force, and wholly independent of the usage or custom of any particular port or trade. There can be no such legal rule applicable to a part of a cargo which does not govern every part and the whole.

There are, no doubt, decisions of high authority which hold that where the contract is to carry goods upon a general ship in the ocean trade, from port to port, an actual or manual tradition of [70] the goods into the possession of the consignee, or at his warehouse, is not necessary in order to discharge the carrier from his liability. A delivery with proper care at a proper time, upon the usual wharf, with due notice to the consignee, will in ordinary cases be deemed a good delivery. This rule has grown out of the long established usages of the ocean trade, and is a modification of the general rule of the common law, which required the carrier to deliver the goods to the consignee personally, or at his residence or place of business. The parties contemplating the carriage of the goods upon a vessel which could go only to the wharf, it was reasonable that she should be unladen there. And the cargoes of such vessels, being usually carried, not in bulk, but packed in boxes, barrels, bags or otherwise, and often consisting of many parcels for numerous different consignees, a delivery, of the whole cargo at one common and accustomed wharf was-almost a necessity for the proper unlading and dispatch of the vessel, and not at all onerous or inconvenient for the merchant or consignees, especially when the regulations of the government in respect to duties upon imported goods are taken into consideration.

A custom has thus been established, which is conveniently adapted to the business wants of all parties ^engaged in that particular branch of commerce, and has prevailed so long and so extensively, and is so widely known, that it may be fairly said to have become a rule of law for that trade, and, quoad hoc, to have taken the place of the old common law rule.

But rules of this character, growing out of the usages of a particular trade, are necessarily limited in their application, and may not prescribe the duty of the carrier in other branches of the same trade to the incidents and conditions of which they are not adapted. The growth of commerce, the march of enterprise, and [71] the achievements of mechanical science (at once their outgrowth and stimulus), open new channels and develop new means and appliances for the lading, carriage and delivery of goods, and in their turn they create new usages and laws which govern these new conditions and agencies in the business of the carrier. Goods transported upon railroads are delivered at the terminus or station, upon the track, in yards, sheds, or warehouses, as the convenience of parties and the exigencies of business demand. The proper mode of delivery depends largely upon the kind and character of the goods. Grain, coal, ores and oil, carried in bulk, cattle and other live freight, must each have their different and appropriate means of delivery. No other will subserve the wants of the trade, or discharge the duty of the carrier.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Richmond v. Union Steamboat Co., 8 Abb. N. Cas. 66 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1880).

8 Abb. N. Cas. 66 (Richmond v. Union Steamboat Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Gibson v. Culver
17 Wend. 305 (New York Supreme Court, 1837)