Richmond v. Richmond

2 N.J. Eq. 90
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedJuly 15, 1838
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2 N.J. Eq. 90 (Richmond v. Richmond) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richmond v. Richmond, 2 N.J. Eq. 90 (N.J. Ct. App. 1838).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

I have looked carefully into the books to see if there was any fixed, general rule for allowances of this character, and had I found one, would cheerfully have followed it. I can find no such rule, none has been furnished me, and indeed it would be impossible to frame one which would work justly in all cases. Certain rules have, indeed, been laid down from time to time, so as to form some guide; still, every case must depend very much on its own peculiar circumstances.

It is .urged, that the actual rents and profits of the defendant’s estate at the time, are the only matters to be looked at, and the allowance must be graduated by them. This would be a most .uncertain guide, with the changes to which we are continually exposed. The rents of property like that owned b}r the defendant, will vary much in the course of a single year. This year they may be, and probably are in fact, much lower than they were last year, and the year before ; and in the course of a year they may again rise. A party, too, might from design suffer his property to go untenanted, or in so negligent a condition as to render it an undesirable occupation, and thereby discourage applications to hire. This rule is, however, especially insisted on, as the statute on the subject of alimony, (Rev. Laws, 668,) it is said, does not authorize any further process to enforce a decree in this case than a sequestration of the defendant’s personal es[93]*93iate, and the rents and profits of his real estate. If this were undeniably true, it would be mere matter of inference, and by no means conclusive. But I think it may be well questioned, whether the power of the court is limited to such sequestration for enforcing the decree; for the statute, after giving this power of sequestration, adds these words : “ or to enforce the performance of the said decree or order by such other lawful ways and means as is usual, aud according to the course and practice of the court of chancery.” In the case of Bedell v. Bedell, in 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 604, no general rule is laid down, but an allowance is made of the full amount of the defendant’s annual income, for the support of the complainant and one child six years of age. In Miller v. Miller, 6 Johns. Ch. Rep. 91, while it is stated that the ecclesiastical courts allow for alimony the third, or at least the fourth, of the annual income of the real estate, yet it is very evident that the chancellor fixes a sum on the ground of its reasonableness in the given case.

The defendant’s property must be estimated at the time of the report of the master ; for in case of a long-contested suit, to go back to the timo of filing .the hill, might load the court into great error. Nor will it answer to he guided by the actual wants of the complainant. They may exceed the amount which the claims of equal justice to both the parties may warrant, and in fad might work an injury to the true interests of the whole fam ily, by consuming the estate, aud breaking down all incentives to exertion on the part of the defendant.

Whatever rules may obtain as to the allowance for the wife, the children should be fully maintained in a manner corresponding with the condition, in life of the defendant. The court, in placing them under the charge of their mother, meant to impose no burthens upon her of a pecuniary character.

I shall, therefore, exercise the best discretion on the whole case of which T am capable, and make such allowances as appear right in view of the circumstances and condition of this family.

it must bo borne in mind, that additional light has been thrown on this case since the master made his report, by new [94]*94evidence, and the statement in writing of the parties themselves, received by consent, and which varies and considerably reduces the estimate of the defendant’s property. The Smiley property, which is estimated by a brother of the defendant, doctor Richmond, (on whose evidence, from the relation in which he stands to the parties, and the means of his information, I place great confidence,) at three thousand five hundred dollars, and by another witness, Mr. Zabriskie, at five thousand dollars, has since been sold under execution at the reduced price of one thousand eight hundred dollars. This is, no doubt, owing to the peculiar embarrassment of the present times, and forms no safe criterion. Yet it all shows how uncertain must be the estimates of real estate in the fluctuating state of the times. The debts of the defendant are also considerably larger than the master had supposed, as appears by the admissions of the parties themselves. The old homestead, as- it is called, cannot for the present yield any benefit to the defendant, as his mother has a life interest in it, although now an aged woman.

In view of all these circumstances, there is good reason for reducing the allowances made by the master. I am quite willing, and consider it my duty, to allow this complainant and her children all that the case will warrant. I shall allow the complainant, for her alimony and maintenance, the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars annually, and to each of the children, for their support and education, the sum of one hundred and thirty dollars annually, making in all the sum of six hundred and forty dollars, payable in half-yearly payments, from the date of the final decree.

My impression, from looking at the statute, is, that this court has the power at any time, on a change of circumstances, to vary this allowance, by increasing or diminishing it; as the act speaks of “ such maintenance and allowance as to the said court shall, from time to time, seem reasonable and just.” And in the case before referred to, in 6 Johns. Ch. Rep. 92, I find such was the impression of chancellor Kent, on the words of the statute of the state of New-York, which in that respect is the same as [95]*95ours. I shall embrace in the order for the allowances here made, therefore, that either party be at liberty to apply, upon a future change of circumstances in the parties, or either of them, for such variation or modification of this order touching said allowances, as those future circumstances may dictate to be just.

The following decree was accordingly entered :~—

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the defendant, Walter M, Richmond, pay to the complainant, Jane Richmond, or to her order, during her natural life, or until the future order of this court to the contrary, the annual sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, payable half-yearly ; that is to say, the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars on the thirtieth day of October, and one hundred and twenty-five dollars on the thirtieth day of April, in each and every year, commencing with the day of the date hereof, the same being considered and deemed a suitable allowance, having regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively, for her support and maintenance; and that the defendant, Walter M. Richmond, do within thirty days after service upon him or bis solicitor, of a copy of this decree, give such reasonable security for the payment of said annual sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, as shall be approved of by George P.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 N.J. Eq. 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richmond-v-richmond-njch-1838.