Richmond v. Blake

132 U.S. 592, 10 S. Ct. 204, 33 L. Ed. 481, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 1875
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 6, 1890
Docket171
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 132 U.S. 592 (Richmond v. Blake) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richmond v. Blake, 132 U.S. 592, 10 S. Ct. 204, 33 L. Ed. 481, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 1875 (1890).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered th'e opinion of the court.

This action was brought to recover certain sums of money paid under protest by the plaintiff in error to the United States in the years 1881, 1882 and 1883, -and which he alleged were exacted from him' under an illegal assessment made upon capital employed in his business.

If within the meaning of the statutes under which the assess *593 ment was made the plaintiff was a hanker, and if the capital assessed was employed in the business of banking, the judgment must be affirmed.

' By section 3407 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it is provided that “ every incorporated or other bank, and every person, firm or company having a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted upon draft, check, or order, or where money is advanced or loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes or where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes are received for discount or .for sale, shall be regarded as a bank or a banker.” 13 Stat. 251, c. 173 § 79; 14 Stat. 115, c. 184, § 9.

Section 3408 provides that there shall be levied, collected and paid a tax of one twenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the average amount'of the deposits of money, subject to payment by check or draft, or represented by certificates of deposit or otherwise, whether payable on demand or at some future day, with any person, bank, association, company or corporation, engaged in the business of banking; also “ a tax of one twenty-fourth of one per centum each month upon the capital of any bank, association, company, corporation, and on the capital employed by any person in the business of banking beyond the average amount invested in United States bonds : Provided, That the words ‘capital' employed’ shall not include money borrowed or received from day to day, in the usual course of business, from any person not a partner of, or interested in the said bank, assoc’ ation or firm.” 13 Stat. 277, c. 173, § 110; 14 Stat. 137, 146, c. 184, § 9; 17 Stat. 256, c. 315, § 37; 18 Stat. 311, c. 36, § 19.

That the plaintiff, during the period covered by the assessment against him, employed a capital in his business is beyond dispute; for he distinctly states that the capital used by him in his business ranged from $30,000 to $50,00Q. Upon that basis he made his returns for taxation. But did he, during that period, have a place of business where stocks were received for sale? If he did, then, by the Very terms of the *594 statute, be was a banker' under the definition given in section 3407.

It is contended by him that he was' only a stock broker, and, within the true meaning of .section 3407, did not have “ a place of business,” nor “ receive ” stocks for sale. That he had a room or place, indicated by a sign over the door, where his mail matter was received, and where he was, or could be, met by his’ clients, and where the latter could deliver'stocks to be sold by him, or finder his supervision, and that he bought and sold stocks for his customers, is abundantly shown by his own testimony. 1 Still, he insists that when stocks were delivered *595 to him at this place of business for sale they were .not “ received ” by him “ for sale,” within the meaning of the statute. ¥e cannot assent to this view.

*596 In support of this position the plaintiff cites Warren v. Shook, 91 U. S. 704, and Selden v. Equitable Trust Co., 94 U. S. 419. In the first of those cases the question was whether a firm, holding a special license as bankers, was liable to the tax imposed by section 99 of the act of June 30, 1864. 13 Stat. 273. That statute imposed a tax of one twentieth of one per centum upon the par value of stock and bonds sold by “ brokers and bankers doing business as brokers.” It *597 was held that Congress intended to impose the' duty prescribed by section 99 upon bankers doing business as brokers, although a person, firm or companjq having a license as a banker, might be exempted by subdivision. nine of section 79 of the act of 1864, as amended by the act of March 3, 1865,13 Stat. 472, from paying the special tax imposed upon brokers. Nothing more is decided in that case.

In Selden v. Equitable Trust Co., the question was whether corporations whose business was to invest their own capital — not that of others — in bonds secured by mortgage upon real estate, and to negotiate, sell and guarantee such bonds, were banks or bankers within the meaning of section 3407 of the Revised Statutes. It was held that they were not; that Congress did not intend that a person or corporation selling its own property, not that received from other owners for sale, should be classed as a banker or bank for the purposes of taxation. The court, in that case, referred to section 3407 as describing three distinct classes of artificial and natural persons, distinguished by the nature of their business; first, those who have a place of business where credits are opened by the deposit or collection of money or currency, subject to be paid or remitted upon draft, check or order; second, those having a- place of business where money is advanced or. loaned on stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange or promissory notes; third, those having a.place of business where stocks, bonds, bullion, bills of exchange, or promissory notes are received for discount or for sale. In respect to the third class it was.said: “ The language of the statute is, where ’ such property is ‘received’ ‘for discount or for sale.’ The use of the word ‘ received ’ is significant. In no proper .sense can it be understood that one receives his own stocks and bonds, or bills or notes, for discount or for sale. He receives the bonds, bills, or notes belonging to him as evidences of debt, though he may sell them afterwards. Nobody would understand that to-be banking business. But when a corporation or natural person receives from another person, for discount, bills of exchange or promissory, notes belonging to that other, he is acting as a banker; and when a .customer brings bonds, bullion or stocks *598 for sale, and they are received for the purpose for which they are brought, that is, to be sold, the, case is presented which we think was contemplated .by the statute. In common understanding, he who receives goods for sale is one who receives them as agent for a principal who is the owner. He is not one who buys and sells on his own account.”

This language embraces the present case. The plaintiff was not a ■ broker who,, without employing capital of his own, simply negotiated purchases and sales of stocks for others, receiving, only the usual commissions for services of that character. In his business of buying and selling stocks for others, he regularly employed capital, by the .

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Bluebook (online)
132 U.S. 592, 10 S. Ct. 204, 33 L. Ed. 481, 1890 U.S. LEXIS 1875, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richmond-v-blake-scotus-1890.