Richland Bank v. Winters

2012 Ohio 1799
Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided April 23, 2012·No. 11 CA 66·Published

Opinion

[Cite as Richland Bank v. Winters, 2012-Ohio-1799.]

COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

RICHLAND BANK JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J. -vs- Case No. 11 CA 66 MICHAEL R. WINTERS, et al.

Defendants-Appellants OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 09 CV 1703H

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 23, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant Mechanics

ERIC S. MILLER BENJAMIN D. KITZLER 13 Park Avenue West 3 North Main Street Suite 608 Suite 803 Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Mansfield, Ohio 44902

For Appellee BAC For Defendant Key Bank

ERIC T. DEIGHTON THOMAS J.KELLEY WILLIAM T. TINI 300 Madison Avenue 24755 Chagrin Blvd. Suite 200 Suite 110 Cleveland, Ohio 44122-5690 Mansfield, Ohio 44902 Richland County, Case No. 11 CA 66 2

Wise, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Mechanics Savings Bank appeals the May 11, 2011,

decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio, granting Appellee

BAC Home Loans Services, L.P.’s Civ.R. 60(B) Motion to Partially Vacate Judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On November 20, 2009, Plaintiff-Appellee Richland Bank filed its

Complaint for Foreclosure in the instant matter against the real estate commonly known

as 690 Walnut Drive South, Lexington, Ohio 44904.

{¶3} On or about November 30, 2009, certified mail service was made on

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"). At that time, MERS was the

nominee for Key Bank pursuant to the Preliminary Evidence of Title filed

contemporaneously with the Complaint in this matter.

{¶4} Defendant-Appellant BAC Home Loans Servicing L.P., fka Countrywide

Home Loans Servicing L.P. ("BAC") as successor in interest to MERS admits valid

service of the Complaint. (T. at 15).

{¶5} Neither MERS nor BAC filed a timely Answer. (T. at 24).

{¶6} On or about January 5, 2010, Plaintiff-Appellee moved for Default

Judgment against some Defendants, including MERS. Neither MERS nor BAC were

aware of the Motion for Default Judgment and, as such, neither responded to the Motion

for Default Judgment.

{¶7} On April 19, 2010, and again on June 21, 2010, the trial court issued

judgment(s) finding MERS in default and ultimately Ordering the sale of the subject real

estate. Richland County, Case No. 11 CA 66 3

{¶8} On or about August 4, 2010, BAC moved to Partially Vacate the Judgment

Entry of Foreclosure and Order of Sale.

{¶9} On April 28, 2011, an oral hearing was held on BAC's Motion to Partially

Vacate the Judgment Entry of Foreclosure and Order of Sale. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the trial court held that BAC was entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to

Civ.R. 60(B) finding its failure to appear in the instant matter to be the result of

excusable neglect.

{¶10} By Judgment Entry filed May 11, 2011, the trial court issued specific

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

{¶11} Appellant Mechanics Savings Bank now appeals, assigning the following

sole assignment of error.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED

BAC’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 60(B)

WHEN BAC DEMONSTRATED THAT FOR UNKNOWN REASONS IT FAILED TO

RESPOND AFTER PROPER SERVICE.”

I.

{¶13} In its sole assignment, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

granting Appellee BAC’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. We agree.

{¶14} The decision to grant or deny a motion for relief from judgment pursuant

to Civ.R. 60(B) lies in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of the discretion. Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174, 637

N.E.2d 914. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the Richland County, Case No. 11 CA 66 4

trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v.

Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. An abuse of discretion

demonstrates “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.”

Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748. When

applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment for

that of the trial court. Id.

{¶15} Therefore, the only issue before this Court is whether the trial court

abused its discretion in denying Appellant's motion for relief from judgment under the

dictates of Civ.R. 60(B).

{¶16} Civ.R. 60(B) states, in relevant part:

{¶17} “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party

or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a

new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or

extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment

has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based

has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment

should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the

judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2)

and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or

taken.” Richland County, Case No. 11 CA 66 5

{¶18} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, the moving

party must demonstrate that:

{¶19} “(1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is

granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated

in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and,

where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after

the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v.

ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113, paragraph two of the

syllabus.

{¶20} Generally, the moving party's failure to satisfy any of the three

requirements will result in the motion being overruled. Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v.

Adams (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 520 N.E.2d 564.

{¶21} In the instant case, Appellee argued that it was entitled to relief pursuant

to Civ.R. 60(B)(1). Upon review, however, this Court finds the reasons offered by

Appellee failed to justify relief from the trial court's judgment.

{¶22} As set forth above, under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), the trial court may “relieve a

party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the

following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.”

{¶23} Here, in its motion for relief, Appellee BAC argued that its failure to

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Related

GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc.
351 N.E.2d 113 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1976)
Blakemore v. Blakemore
450 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
Rose Chevrolet, Inc. v. Adams
520 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1988)
Pons v. Ohio State Medical Board
614 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1993)
Strack v. Pelton
637 N.E.2d 914 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)