Richerson v. Superior Court

264 Cal. App. 2d 729, 70 Cal. Rptr. 350
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 6, 1968
DocketCiv. 11912
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 264 Cal. App. 2d 729 (Richerson v. Superior Court) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richerson v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 729, 70 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

PIERCE, P. J.

Two minors, both junior college students, one, petitioner, Michael David Richerson, age 18 years, and the other Robert Richmond, age 19, participated in the burglary of a department store. One of them, Robert, was also involved in an armed robbery of a store employee. (The record indicates that petitioner, Michael, was not involved in the latter crime.)

The details of the burglary, and so far as Robert is concerned of the other crime, are spelled out in a pretrial report of the Probation Officer of Sacramento County, dated January 16, 1968, and filed in the Municipal Court of Sacramento County in People v. Michael David Richerson. Thereafter Michael was referred to the juvenile court as being fit for processing by that court. A hearing was held in the Juvenile Court of Sacramento County. A second probation officer’s report was filed in which the earlier report was referred to and attached. Except for inconsequential corrections in the latter, the two reports are for all practical purposes identical. Both reports reveal in Michael’s background nothing but favorable material. (This will be summarized below.) Nevertheless, the second report recommends that Michael be remanded to the certifying court and that the juvenile petition *731 be dismissed. The recommendation was upon the expressed grounds: (1) that Michael was “emancipated from his parents’ home”; (2) that he “had the ability to know right from wrong”; and (3) that he had admitted involvement in the commission of an offense punishable as a felony. His “behavioral” background is not mentioned in connection with this recommendation. The hearing was held February 9, 1968. A transcript of that hearing is before us. The hearing was perfunctory and consisted of the admission of the reports referred to above and a brief summary thereof by the deputy probation officer. The court made its findings. Effectually they accepted and repeated the recommendations of the probation officers. The judge stated: “I don’t feel that we could—that he would be amenable to our treatment and training program.” Michael was ordered back to the municipal court for proceedings there. Again, there was no reference to Michael’s behavioral background.

The matter is before us on a petition for a writ of prohibition directed to the Sacramento County District Attorney and a petition for a writ of mandate directed to the Juvenile Court of Sacramento County. Petitioner seeks to compel the latter to vacate its order and to exercise a discretion imposed by a legislative mandate contained in the 1967 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.

Before 1967 that section had empowered the juvenile court to refer minors 16 years old or over to a court for trial under the appropriate criminal statute whenever the court considered the minor not to be amenable to rehabilitation through juvenile court facilities. The 1967 amendment added specific conditions. It provided the offense itself was not sufficient ipso facto to support the finding and order described. The juvenile court was charged with a duty to cause a probation officer to report on ''behavioral patterns.’ 1

The contention of petitioner in support of his petition may be expressed in the terms of the petition itself: “There is nothing in the report submitted to the Juvenile *732 Court by the probation officer or the report siibmitted' to "the Municipal Court by the probation officer to indicate that this defendant has fallen into a behavioral pattern which would' render him unfit as a proper subject under the provisions of the Juvenile Court law. ”

We have concluded the contention is sound. Petitioner asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion. We do not agree. We consider that it failed to exercise a discretion which the statute had enjoined upon it to exercise. Specifically, the court (1) failed to consider anything other than the crime itself; (2) if the report submitted by the probation officer can be said to constitute a report complying with the last sentence of amended section 707, then the court cannot be deemed to have considered “the behavioral patterns” 2 of Michael. Such behavioral patterns disclosed by the report point to a minor who is a “fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Law. ’ ’

We state the facts disclosed by the record in more detail. Michael was a freshman at Sierra College. His I.Q. was 107. 3 His ambition was to become an architect and he was concerned about the low grades (three “D’s” and one “F”) he was getting at the outset of his brief college career. His college counselor indicated he had been in no previous difficulties, that he had very good work habits, that he was honest, and that he possessed an excellent moral character. He had graduated from a Roseville high school in June 1967 with a “strong” “C” average. “His teachers remembered him as a quiet, sincere, and conscientious student who never presented any problems.” The appraisal of his high school counselor was that he was basically honest, shy and lacking in self-confidence. “ [I]t was his [the counselor’s] feeling that the company he kept would be instrumental in determining the path the defendant was to follow in the future. ’ ’

Michael was the second of four children in a low-to-middle *733 income family. The marriage of his parents was intact. Michael’s father had been steadily employed for 25 years by the Division of Forestry, State of California. Due to a serious and expensive illness suffered by the father the family was hard-pressed financially. Still the family, lifelong residents of their community, were buying a home. Michael had enjoyed good relations with his parents and siblings. His closer attachment was to his mother. She mentioned his willingness to help around the home and stated she had probably taken advantage of this. Michael denied using narcotics or intoxicants. He belonged to a church. As a boy he had done yard work and miscellaneous odd jobs, including baby sitting. He had had, and worked steadily at, a newspaper route. All former employers described him as honest, industrious, courteous, respectful, dependable. Character references had all responded, speaking very highly of Michael. One response is significant. It suggests immaturity for a boy of eighteen. The same person emphasized that Michael could be “trusted to tell the truth even when it hurts. ’ ’

The incident upon which the charge is based occurred December 16, 1967. Two weeks before Robert and Michael had rented a duplex and had taken up housekeeping together. 4

The record does not disclose in the mind of which of the two boys the idea to burglarize a market had originated. One stated the expression of the idea had been treated as a joke at first. As a serious burglary plan germinated, the purpose seems to have been to stock the apartment with provisions. (But “alcoholic beverages” were included. Compare Michael’s statements that he did not use intoxicants.) The evolved plan: Robert was to enter the store. Michael was to wait outside and enter after the market closed.

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Bluebook (online)
264 Cal. App. 2d 729, 70 Cal. Rptr. 350, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richerson-v-superior-court-calctapp-1968.