Richardson v. United States Department of Education (In Re Richardson)

334 B.R. 316, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2350, 2005 WL 3220230
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedApril 29, 2005
Docket19-00110
StatusPublished

This text of 334 B.R. 316 (Richardson v. United States Department of Education (In Re Richardson)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson v. United States Department of Education (In Re Richardson), 334 B.R. 316, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2350, 2005 WL 3220230 (Mass. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ON DISCHARGE OF STUDENT LOAN OBLIGATIONS

JOEL B. ROSENTHAL, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came before the Court on Mildred Richardson’s (“Debtor”) complaint alleging that a consolidated student loan owed to the United States Department of Education (“USDOE”) is dischargeable insofar as the repayment of such loan constitutes an undue hardship pursuant to § 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court held an evidentiary hearing and took the matter under advisement. Based on the record before the Court, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7052.

FACTS:

On April 11, 2000, the Debtor received a Federal Direct Consolidation Loan, consolidating several smaller student loans. The amount of consolidated debt at that time *318 totaled $33,978.65. The total amount currently owed is substantially in excess of the original balance. The relevant facts are not disputed.

The Debtor is a 56 year-old woman with a history of health problems. She was diagnosed with cervical cancer in November 2002 for which she was treated surgically and with intense radiation therapy. While doctors remain confident they successfully treated the cancer, there exists a risk that the cancer will recur. In addition, the Debtor’s medical treatment has resulted in numerous side effects. 1

The Debtor is employed as a registered nurse through a social service agency. She presently works twenty-four hours per week, earning on average $464.23 per week after taxes. She has attempted to pick up additional shifts, but has been unsuccessful due to a shortage of cases at the agency through which she is employed and other agencies she has contacted. She has approximately $1,000 in savings and an additional $1,000 in an I.R.A.

The Court concludes, after reviewing the Debtor’s testimony, both on direct and cross-examination (as well as her Schedule J, admitted into evidence as part of Defendant’s Exhibit 5), that the Debtor’s monthly expenses are approximately as follows:

Rent $550.00/month
Electricity $15.00/month
Heat $60.00/month (average)
Cable $14.00/month
Telephone $50.00/month
Food, Cleaning Supplies, etc. $250.00/ month
Transportation costs (fuel, maintenance and repairs) $220.00/month 2
Car Payments $273/month 3
Car Insurance $67.00/month
Health Insurance $440/month
Renter’s Insurance $15.00/month
Malpractice Insurance $10.00/month
Continuing Education $6.50/month
Uniforms $8.50/month
Clothing $8.50/month
Laundry/Dry Cleaning $30.00/month
Copays for Doctor visits and deductibles $200.00/month 4
Prescription Drugs $40.00/month 5
Postpetition Loan $93/month (no testimony on how long)
*319 Pet care $20.00/month
Recreation $10.00/month 6
Charitable Contributions $10.00/month
TOTAL: $2,390.50

DISCUSSION

The relevant standard to be applied by this Court is whether an undue hardship exists based upon the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff at the time of trial as to 1) the Plaintiffs past, present, and reasonable future financial resources; 2) the Plaintiffs reasonably necessary living expenses; and 3) other relevant facts or circumstances unique to Plaintiffs case which would prevent the Plaintiff from paying her student loans while maintaining a minimal standard of living even when aided by a Chapter 7 discharge of other pre-petition debts. Dolan v. American Student Assistance, 256 B.R. 230, 238 (Bankr.D.Mass.2000).

Based on the Court’s analysis of the financial affairs and prospects of the Debtor, whether using the “totality of the circumstances” test embraced in the past or reconsidering and adopting the Brunner test 7 , the Court comes to the same conclusion: it would be an undue hardship for the Debtor to satisfy her entire student loan obligation, regardless of which expense figures are used. The consolidated loan is at a fixed interest rate of 8.25%, and there exists no future opportunity for a reduced interest rate. Although the government’s evidence was vague on this point, it appears that the monthly payment required of the Debtor under the consolidated loan arrangement is $369.41. Further, the Debtor’s lifestyle appears to the Court to be modest even using her expense figures. Comparing her expenses to her income, it is clear the Debtor lacks sufficient funds at the end of each month to meet her consolidated student loan obligations without suffering an undue hardship.

Moreover, as described supra, the Debt- or is currently working twenty-four hours per week and takes home $464.23 per week, or approximately $2,011.66 per month, after taxes. At this rate, even if the Debtor were to work four days, or 32 hours per week, her weekly take home pay would be approximately $618.97 per week, or approximately $2,682.20 per month. Based on the expense figures listed supra, after payment of all reasonable monthly expenditures, this would give the Debtor a surplus of $286.70 per month to pay her student loan obligations. Thus, even assuming the Debtor were able to procure and sustain a 32 hour work week, a possibility the Court believes is unlikely given the unavailability of additional hours and the Debtor’s age and health problems, the Court finds that the Debtor would not have sufficient funds at the end of each month to pay her student loan obligation without suffering an undue hardship. If she continues to work 24 hours per week at the same rate of pay, an eventuality the Court believes to be more realistic, she would not even have enough to pay her reasonable monthly expenditures. Addi *320 tionally, as described more fully infra, because her debt is consolidated, this Court lacks the authority under these circumstances to partially discharge her student loan obligation.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dolan v. American Student Assistance (In Re Dolan)
256 B.R. 230 (D. Massachusetts, 2000)
Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In Re Grigas)
2000 BNH 31 (D. New Hampshire, 2000)
Lamanna v. EFS Services, Inc. (In Re Lamanna)
285 B.R. 347 (D. Rhode Island, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
334 B.R. 316, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2350, 2005 WL 3220230, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-united-states-department-of-education-in-re-richardson-mab-2005.