Richardson v. Richardson

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Richardson v. Richardson

58 A.D.2d 861

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 11, 1977

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 58 A.D.2d 861 (Richardson v. Richardson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Richardson v. Richardson, 58 A.D.2d 861 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action, inter alia, to modify a Texas divorce decree, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated September 13, 1976, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the causes of action alleged in the complaint. Order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. New York has no jurisdiction over the first cause of action since the last substantial matrimonial domicile before the separation took place was in Texas (see CPLR 302, subd [b]; Lieb v Lieb, 53 AD2d 67). As [862]*862such, it has the closest continuing relationship with the family (see, generally, Santamaría v Santamaría, 74 Mise 2d 657, 660). Furthermore, New York has no personal jurisdiction over the second and third causes of action because the separation agreement entered into in New York was incorporated into the Texas agreement. Thus, it does not fall within the ambit of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) (see Carmichael v Carmichael, 40 AD2d 514). Latham, J. P., Shapiro, Hawkins and Suozzi, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action, inter alia, to modify a Texas divorce decree, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated September 13, 1976, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the causes of action alleged in the complaint. Order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. New York has no jurisdiction over the first cause of action since the last substantial matrimonial domicile before the separation took place was in Texas (see CPLR 302, subd [b]; Lieb v Lieb, 53 AD2d 67). As [862]*862such, it has the closest continuing relationship with the family (see, generally, Santamaría v Santamaría, 74 Mise 2d 657, 660). Furthermore, New York has no personal jurisdiction over the second and third causes of action because the separation agreement entered into in New York was incorporated into the Texas agreement. Thus, it does not fall within the ambit of CPLR 302 (subd [a], par 1) (see Carmichael v Carmichael, 40 AD2d 514). Latham, J. P., Shapiro, Hawkins and Suozzi, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

58 A.D.2d 861, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-richardson-nyappdiv-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack