Richardson v. Posey

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Oklahoma
DecidedAugust 13, 2024
Docket6:24-cv-00261
StatusUnknown

This text of Richardson v. Posey (Richardson v. Posey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson v. Posey, (E.D. Okla. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA KERRY COHEE RICHARDSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. CIV 24-261-RAW-JAR ) ROGER POSEY, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff is a pro se state prisoner who is incarcerated at Oklahoma State Reformatory in Granite, Oklahoma. (Dkt. 1 at 5). He filed this civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations at the Muskogee County Jail and in the state district court in Muskogee, Oklahoma. Id. The defendants are Roger Posey, Muskogee County Jail Administrator; Michelle Collins, Muskogee County Jail Administrator; the Muskogee County Jail; the Muskogee County Sheriff’s Office; Muskogee County Sheriff Andy Simmons; and James E. Moore, Muskogee County Officer. Id. at 2-3. After review of the complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff must file an amended civil rights complaint on the Court’s form, as set forth below. I. Screening/Dismissal Standards Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The pleading standard for all civil actions was articulated in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The complaint also must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. A court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 555-56. “So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558. The Court applies the same standard of review for dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that is employed for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2007). See also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that § 1915A dismissals are reviewed under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard for stating a claim for relief). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be broadly construed under this standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous construction given to the pro se litigant’s allegations, however, “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiff’s various mistakes or misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so . . . .” Id. A reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). II. Improper Defendants Plaintiff has named the Muskogee County Jail as a defendant. He has not, however, made specific factual claims against the Jail and has not demonstrated why this governmental sub-unit is 2 a suable entity. The capacity of an entity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the federal district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). Under Oklahoma law, “any person, corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association [has] capacity to . . . be sued in this state.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2017(B). While the Oklahoma courts have not addressed in a published opinion the issue of whether a jail or prison has capacity to be sued, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held in an unpublished opinion that “the Creek County Criminal Justice Center is not a suable entity under § 1983.” Hinton v. Dennis, 362 F. App’x 904, 907 (10th Cir. Jan. 25, 2010) (citing Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, Defendant Muskogee County Jail is dismissed from this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff also has named the Muskogee County Sheriff’s Office as a defendant. “Courts routinely dismiss § 1983 claims that name and seek to impose liability directly upon municipal and county police departments because police departments are not separate suable entities.” Harper v. City of Cortez, No. 14-2984-KLM, 2015 WL 4720311, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2015) (citing cases) (unpublished). See, e.g., Powell v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Okla. Cty., No. CIV-18-294-D, 2019 WL 2167420, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 17, 2019) (unpublished) (“Because the [Oklahoma County Detention Center] and the Sheriff’s Department do not have legal identities separate from that of Oklahoma County, they are not suable entities and are not proper defendants in a civil rights action.”).

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Gallagher v. Shelton
587 F.3d 1063 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Hinton v. Dennis
362 F. App'x 904 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
People v. Ah Too
3 P. 10 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1884)
Martinez v. Winner
771 F.2d 424 (Tenth Circuit, 1985)
Archuleta v. McShan
897 F.2d 495 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Bryson v. City of Edmond
905 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Gilles v. United States
906 F.2d 1386 (Tenth Circuit, 1990)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Miller v. Glanz
948 F.2d 1562 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Richardson v. Posey, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-posey-oked-2024.