Richardson v. Commissioner
This text of 1984 T.C. Memo. 345 (Richardson v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
DRENNEN,
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
DINAN,
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulations of fact and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.
Petitioner resided in Detroit, Michigan, when he filed the petition in this case.
Petitioner buys and renovates residential property to rent. On his 1980 return, he claimed deductions for depreciation on these rental properties. The bases claimed on his return for the residential properties at issue were as follows:
| Property | Basis |
| 8223 Chalfonte | $12,172.55 |
| 3427 McDougall | 34,000.00 |
| 18066 Lindsay | 20,000.00 |
Respondent initially disallowed the claimed depreciation deductions in their entirety for failure to establish a basis in the properties. By stipulation, respondent agreed that the three rental properties were purchased for $2,000, $16,900, and $6,432, *327 respectively. He reduced each of these costs by $500 for the value of the land to arrive at depreciable basis. Petitioner contends that respondent's figures fail to reflect the substantial amounts expended in remodeling and renovating the rental properties.
The evidence of additional expenditures to the McDougall and Lindsay properties is scanty. No documentation whatsoever, such as invoices, receipts or cancelled checks, was introduced to show the cost of the claimed additional work. Moreover, petitioner failed to testify in more than vague and very general terms what the renovation work consisted of. Thus, petitioner has failed to show that his basis in these two properties is greater than the amount allowed by respondent.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner made substantial capital improvements to the Chalfonte property. Petitioner testified that the building was dilapidated; that a contractor did renovation work on this building, including replacing all plumbing in the bathroom, refurnishing the entire bathroom and kitchen, replastering all walls and ceilings and repairing the roof and porch. We found petitioner's testimony concerning these payments forthright*328 and persuasive. Moreover, he introduced into evidence records to show that he had obtained $9,500 in home improvement loans in order to finance the above repairs. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner has shown that the cost of the Chalfonte property for depreciation purposes was $9,500 greater than the $2,000 allowed by respondent.
On his 1980 return, petitioner claimed deductions for repairs and maintenance of the Chalfonte, McDougall, and Lindsay rental properties in the amounts of $8,108.10, $2,917.50, and $10,261.07, respectively, for a total of $21,286.67. Respondent initially disallowed all of the above amounts for lack of substantiation, but has stipulated to petitioner's entitlement to a total of $2,966.54 in rental expense deductions.
Although we lack documentation for some of the disallowed expenses, we found petitioner's testimony credible, and thus have approximated the additional expenses be incurred.
| Expenses | Chalfonte | McDougall | Lindsay |
| Insurance | $77.12 | ||
| Interest | $471.80 | ||
| Rental Service | 120.50 | ||
| Labor | 4,730.71 | $676.00 | |
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