Richardson v. Brown

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. Illinois
DecidedDecember 1, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-01285
StatusUnknown

This text of Richardson v. Brown (Richardson v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson v. Brown, (C.D. Ill. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JOSHUA RICHARDSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) No.: 20-cv-1285-JBM ) ROB JEFFREYS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), files a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and violations of due process at the Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the amended complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed. Appx. 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). FACTS Plaintiff pleads that on August 4, 2019, he was in the Pontiac East House General Population Yard (“Big Yard.”), apparently with at least 45 other inmates. Plaintiff heard an inmate crying for help and saw that he was being stabbed by another. Plaintiff intervened and was hit by a third inmate and knocked unconscious. Plaintiff asserts that he was thereafter severely beaten by multiple inmates. Plaintiff has provided an August 4, 2019 Adjustment Committee Final Report which documents the event, indicating that multiple offenders were fighting and that a warning shot had to be fired to quell the disturbance. [ECF 1 at 25]. Plaintiff alleges that he went in and out of consciousness at least five times after the

beating. During one period of lucidity, he claims that he was maced in the face by an unidentified female guard even though he was in an “unmistakable and undeniable state of unconsciousness.” Plaintiff alleges that the Jane Doe officer jumped on his back and punched the right side of his face and head. The officer extended Plaintiff’s arms and upward while attempting to handcuff him. Plaintiff began screaming that his arms would break and felt both of his arms snap at the elbows. Plaintiff lost consciousness and when he came to, he was on his knees with his face slammed against a chain link fence. Plaintiff claims that in addition to fracturing his elbows, the Jane Doe Officer dislocated his right elbow and both of his shoulders. Plaintiff lost and gained consciousness again, finding that he was lying on a medical

exam table in the Pontiac healthcare unit. A nurse there told him that they had to set both of his shoulders as they had been dislocated. Plaintiff claims, however, that the records from the hospital to which he was taken did not document the dislocation so, “I don’t know.” Plaintiff asked to have the handcuffs removed and, while the Tact Team officers initially refused, they did so, based on the nurses’ recommendation. Plaintiff was thereafter taken by ambulance to the Saint James Hospital emergency room. Diagnose diagnostic tests were done which documented a fracture to the left elbow with a fracture and dislocation of the right elbow. Plaintiff claims to have suffered residual nerve damage in his right arm as a result. On August 5, 2019 , Plaintiff was transferred to the OSF Saint Francis Medical Center in Peoria. There, he was diagnosed as having suffered a concussion. On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff was transferred to Menard, where he spent three weeks in the infirmary. Plaintiff alleges that he was thereafter unjustly placed in three months segregation due to the August 4, 2019 incident. As noted, Plaintiff has provided the August 4, 2019

Adjustment Committee Report which documents that Plaintiff was found guilty of 105- Dangerous Disturbances; 214- Fighting; and 313-Disobeying a Direct Order. He was sentenced to 3 months demotion to C Grade, 3 months in segregation and 3 months of commissary restrictions. Plaintiff admits that he is unable to identify the Jane Doe Officer but claims that video evidence and the testimony of inmate eyewitnesses, currently unidentified, will substantiate his claim. Plaintiff names Rob Jeffreys, the Acting Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Warden Teri Kennedy, Security Warden Melvin French and John and Jane Doe Officers. Plaintiff alleges claims of excessive force and violations of due process. He

requests injunctive relief, the expungement of the disciplinary conviction; and compensatory and punitive damages. ANALYSIS In claims of excessive force, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). This is so, as prison officials considering the use of force must balance the threat presented to inmates and prison officials against the possible harm to the inmate against whom the force is to be used. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Jane Doe Officer maced and severely injured him even though he was only semi- conscious and incapacitated. As Plaintiff pleads that the Defendant Officer used force which was not necessary to restore or maintain discipline, he may proceed in an excessive force claim against the Jane Doe Defendant. Plaintiff names other unidentified John and Jane Doe officers but only pleads against the single Jane Doe officer who maced and injured him. As a result, the remaining Doe Defendants

are dismissed. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (merely naming a defendant in the caption is insufficient to state a claim). Plaintiff names IDOC Director Jeffreys, Warden Kennedy, and Security Warden French but does not plead any claims against them. See id. at 334. “[T]o be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to proceed against them due to their supervisory role over others, the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 USC §1983. Pacelli v. DeVito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992). Defendants Jeffreys and

French are DISMISSED. Defendant Kennedy will remain for the sole purpose of aiding in identifying the Jane Doe Defendant. See Donald v Cook Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 557 (7th Cir. 1996) (district courts are to aid pro se litigants in identifying Doe defendants). After the Jane Doe is identified, Defendant Kennedy may move to be dismissed.

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Related

Whitley v. Albers
475 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
James T. Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Department
95 F.3d 548 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Clyde Piggie v. Daniel McBride Superintendent
277 F.3d 922 (Seventh Circuit, 2002)
Pruitt v. Mote
503 F.3d 647 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour
729 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Michael Alexander v. United States
721 F.3d 418 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Wilson v. Ryker
451 F. App'x 588 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
Richardson v. Brown, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-brown-ilcd-2020.