Richardson v. Bartlett-Collins Co.

1999 OK CIV APP 105, 990 P.2d 305, 1999 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 95, 1999 WL 1051946
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedMay 11, 1999
Docket92,235
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 1999 OK CIV APP 105 (Richardson v. Bartlett-Collins Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richardson v. Bartlett-Collins Co., 1999 OK CIV APP 105, 990 P.2d 305, 1999 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 95, 1999 WL 1051946 (Okla. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

BOUDREAU, V.C.J.

¶ 1 Claimant, Phyllis J. Richardson, appeals an order of the workers’ compensation trial court determining the number of weeks of compensation due her for permanent partial disability. The issue on appeal is whether the court properly applied the graduated compensation schedule of 85 O.S. Supp.1998 § 22(3)(b). We find it did not and vacate and remand with directions.

¶ 2 Claimant brought this claim seeking compensation benefits for injury to both shoulders, left arm, and both hands. The workers’ compensation trial court determined Claimant sustained 1% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole due to injury to the left shoulder, 6% permanent partial disability to the left arm, 15% permanent partial disability to the right hand, and 15% permanent partial disability to the left hand (for a total of 30% disability to the hands), for which Claimant was entitled to compensation for 76.4 weeks. Claimant seeks review in this court. She does not contest the trial court’s determination of the extent of her disability, but rather asserts the trial court misapplied section 22(3)(b) in determining the amount of compensation to which she is entitled.

¶ 3 The material facts of this case are not in dispute. Where there are no disputed facts, a question of law is presented, which is subject to de novo review. McCarter v. Rainbo Baking Co., 1998 OK CIV APP 78, ¶ 5, 964 P.2d 918, 919, cert. denied.

¶ 4 Section 22(3) (b) provides for a weighted schedule of benefits based on the degree of disability.

[I]n case of disability, partial in character but permanent in quality, the compensa *307 tion shall be seventy percent (70%) of the employee’s average weekly wages, and shall be paid to the employee for the period prescribed by the following schedule:
(1) For each percent of the first nine percent (9%) of disability, eighty percent (80%) of the number of weeks of compensation provided by law prior to November 4,1994;
(2) For each percent of the next eleven percent (11%) of disability, the identical number of weeks of compensation provided by law prior to November 4,1994;
(3) For each percent of the next thirty percent (30%) of disability, one hundred twenty percent (120%) of the number of weeks of compensation provided by law prior to November 4,1994; and
(4) For each remaining percent of disability, the identical number of weeks of compensation provided by law prior to November 4,1994.

The effect of this graduated schedule is to provide somewhat lesser benefits to those who are only slightly injured, while providing greater benefits to those who are more grievously injured. See McCarter, 1998 OK CIV APP 78, ¶ 12, 964 P.2d at 921.

¶ 5 Claimant contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by applying section 22(3)(b) separately to her hand, arm, and shoulder disabilities, rather than considering her disabilities together when calculating the number of weeks of permanent partial disability. The trial court applied section 22(3)(b) as follows:

Both hands — 30% PPD (15% as to each hand):
200 weeks x 9% x 80% = 14.4 weeks
200 weeks x 11% x 100% = 22.0 weeks
200 weeks x 10% x 120% = 24.0 weeks
Subtotal = 60.4 weeks
Left arm — 6% PPD:
250 weeks x = 12.0 weeks
Left shoulder (body as a whole) — 1% PPD:
500 weeks x 1% x 80% = 4.0 weeks
TOTAL = 76.4 weeks

According to Claimant’s argument, had the trial court considered her disabilities together when applying section 22(3)(b), Claimant would only have been subject to the 80% provision once for the first 9% of her total disability, rather than three times for the first 9% of disability to each different body part. Claimant’s argument raises two issues. First, should section 22(3)(b) be applied only once to several individual disabilities if they arise out of the same occurrence? Second, if so, how should the calculation of benefits be carried out?

¶ 6 The answer to the first question is clearly yes: individual disabilities arising out of the same accident or trauma should be considered together so that section 22(3)(b)’s graduated scale of benefits is applied only once. Two divisions of this court have considered this issue in published opinions and have held that the disabilities must be considered together. 1 We adopt their reasoning here. To do otherwise would be to under-compensate Claimant merely because her injuries are not confined to one body part. See generally Garrison v. Bechtel Corp., 1995 OK 2, & 17, 889 P.2d 273, 281 (the Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the workers it is intended to benefit.)

¶ 7 In so holding, we reject Employer’s sole argument that section 22(3)(b) should be applied to each disability separately. We agree with Employer that the obvious purpose of the amendment to section 22(3)(b) was to give less compensation to those suffering only minor injuries while giving more compensation to those suffering greater injuries. See McCarter, 1998 OK CIV APP 78, ¶ 12, 964 P.2d at 921. However, a combination of several minor injuries can leave a claimant substantially impaired. See id. We do not accept the view that the legislature intended to compensate a substantially disabled claimant less merely because her overall disability results from the combination of several smaller injuries. See id.

*308 ¶8 Indeed, the trial court impliedly acknowledged that treating each of the disabilities separately would unfairly under-eompen-sate Claimant when it combined the 15% disability rating to each of her hands into one rating of 30% before it applied section 22(3)(b). Claimant’s hand injuries were easily combined; both were subject to a 200 week basis and could easily be added together. Claimant’s other injuries, however, were subject to a 250 week basis (arm) and 500 week basis (whole body). Because there is no common basis in terms of weeks, the hand, arm, and shoulder disabilities cannot be simply added together and applied to section 22(3)(b). Nevertheless, the fact that this presents a difficult calculation and the disabilities are not readily combined does not compel the legal conclusion that they need not be combined.

¶ 9 This leads us to the second issue: how disabilities to disparate body parts subject to different compensation bases should be organized for the proper application of section 22(3)(b). Neither the supreme court nor this court has considered this precise issue before. 2

¶ 10 There are three ways to organize these injuries for the purposes of applying section 22(3)(b).

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Bluebook (online)
1999 OK CIV APP 105, 990 P.2d 305, 1999 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 95, 1999 WL 1051946, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richardson-v-bartlett-collins-co-oklacivapp-1999.