Richardson, S. v. Ezzo, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 23, 2025
• Docket: 178 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A27017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

SHANICE RICHARDSON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : CARMEN EZZO AND DANIEL E. : No. 178 EDA 2024 DUFFY

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 3, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 221001740

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 23, 2025

Shanice Richardson (Appellant) appeals from the judgment entered

following the trial court’s non-jury determination in favor of Carmen Ezzo and

Daniel E. Duffy (Landlords), in this action filed pursuant to the Philadelphia

Lead Disclosure and Certification Ordinance (the ordinance). 1 Because we

conclude Appellant lacked statutory standing to file an action under the

ordinance, we affirm.

On September 15, 2016, Appellant and Landlords executed a residential

lease agreement for a rental property located on Cottman Avenue in

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the premises). The lease agreement specified a

start date of September 1, 2016, and an end date of August 31, 2017.

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1 Phila. Code, Chapter 6-800. J-A27017-25

Complaint, 10/20/22, Exhibit A (lease agreement), ¶ 4. The lease agreement

also contained a renewal provision whereby the lease would automatically

renew on a month-to-month basis unless either Appellant or Landlords

provided 30 days’ written notice. Id., ¶ 5. Shortly after executing the lease

agreement, Appellant and her one-year-old son moved into the premises.

Landlords initiated eviction proceedings against Appellant in August

2018, December 2019, and August 2022. Most recently, in August 2022,

Landlords initiated eviction proceedings against Appellant, citing Appellant’s

failure to pay rent beginning in November 2021. See Landlords’ Preliminary

Objections, 12/1/22, Exhibit D (municipal court landlord-tenant complaint).

Ultimately, in the eviction action, the parties entered into a judgment by

agreement on October 11, 2022, whereby Appellant was required to vacate

the premises before November 10, 2022; Landlords would withdraw their

claim for rent; and Landlords were entitled to keep Appellant’s security

deposit. See id., Exhibit E (judgment by agreement).

On October 20, 2022, after having received the benefit of the judgment

by agreement, Appellant initiated the underlying action by filing a complaint

alleging Landlords’ violation of the ordinance under Section 6-803. Id., ¶¶ 7,

18; see also id., ¶ 8 (asserting Landlords knew Appellant’s son would be

residing at the premises, as he was present during the walk-through).

Appellant alleged Landlords never provided her with the requisite lead-free or

lead-safe certification under Section 6-803, and Landlord never asked her to

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sign a certification. Id., ¶¶ 12-13, 20. But see id., ¶ 15 (acknowledging a

lead certification for the premises dated February 21, 2022, which does not

contain Appellant’s signature). Appellant sought the return of all rent she had

paid to Landlords (totaling $50,616.47), plus attorneys’ fees and $2,000.00

in exemplary damages. Id., ¶¶ 26-28.

On December 1, 2022, Landlords filed preliminary objections to

Appellant’s complaint, seeking dismissal of the action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Landlords argued that Appellant failed to provide a 10-

day written notice of the defect to Landlords, as required by Section 6-

809(2)(a)2 the ordinance. Additionally, Landlords argued the ordinance does

not govern lease renewals.

Appellant subsequently filed preliminary objections to Landlords’

preliminary objections, asserting Landlords’ preliminary objections were

2 We observe that Landlords cite Section 6-809(2), which pertains to remedies

for violations under Section 6-804 (Right to Conduct Independent Inspection or Risk Assessment and Right to Rescind) of the ordinance. See Phila. Code § 809(2) (2012 Edition); see also id. § 809(2)(a) (providing that a lessee who has not received disclosure under Section 6-804 must notify the lessor of the non-compliance in writing, and the “lessor shall have ten (10) days to remedy the non-compliance after which his/her failure to comply shall entitle the lessee to bring a court action for all appropriate relief.”). As Appellant did not allege a violation of Section 6-804, the remedies provision under Section 6-809(2)(a) is not applicable in this matter.

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untimely filed.3 Separately, Appellant filed an answer to Landlords’

preliminary objections.

On March 21, 2023, the trial court entered an order overruling

Appellant’s preliminary objections. The trial court issued a second order on

the same date, sustaining Landlords’ preliminary objections and dismissing

Appellant’s complaint.

Appellant promptly filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial

court granted in part and denied in part. The trial court granted

reconsideration of—and vacated—the order sustaining Landlords’ preliminary

objections; the court denied reconsideration of the order overruling

Appellant’s preliminary objections.

On April 24, 2023, Landlords filed an answer to Appellant’s complaint

and new matter. In their new matter, Landlords averred, in part, that the

parties executed the lease agreement in September 2016, and the lease

contained an automatic renewal provision. See Answer and New Matter,

4/24/23, ¶¶ 35-36. Landlords asserted Appellant failed to comply with the

10-day notice requirement of Section 809(2)(a). Id., ¶ 43. In support of its

3 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1026(a) provides that “every pleading

subsequent to the complaint shall be filed within twenty days after service of the preceding pleading….” Pa.R.C.P. 1026(a). Here, despite Appellant filing her complaint in October, the record reflects that Landlords were not served with the complaint until November 22, 2022. See Sheriff’s Return of Service, 11/22/22. Landlords therefore promptly filed their preliminary objections within twenty days after service of the complaint.

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assertions, Landlords cited this Court’s decision in Hand v. Fuller, 294 A.3d

468 (Pa. Super. 2023) (addressing the applicability of the ordinance to

renewal leases and the 10-day notice requirement for tenants alleging

violations).4 Appellant filed a reply.

Landlords later filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the

trial court denied. The matter was scheduled for a non-jury trial, to begin on

November 14, 2023. According to Appellant,

[o]n the evening of November 13, 2023, [Appellant’s] counsel received an email communication from counsel for Landlord[s,] stating that due to a medical emergency, the trial scheduled for the next day would need to be continued. [Appellant’s] counsel promptly indicated to Landlord[s’] counsel that there was “no objection to a continuance based upon the circumstances.”

On November 14, 2023, both counsel appeared. [Appellant] did not appear based upon Landlord[s’] prior notice that they would seek a continuance of the trial. …

After a brief colloquy with the [c]ourt (which colloquy does not appear in the transcript), counsel were instructed to go into the hallway and see what stipulations could be made[,] as the [c]ourt was inclined to decide the case on trial briefs to be submitted.

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (citations to reproduced record omitted). 5

The parties stipulated to the following facts:

4 We will address the Hand decision more fully infra.

5 As Appellant points out, the transcripts from the November 14, 2023, hearing

do not include the described colloquy or the stipulations entered by the parties. Landlords do not dispute Appellant’s characterization of events at the hearing. See Landlords’ Brief at 13 (acknowledging medical emergency and intention to seek continuance).

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 The residential lease was entered into between [Appellant] and [Landlords] on or about September 15, 2016[,] for the [premises];

 [Appellant] moved into the premises with her then 1[-]year[- ]old son;

 [Landlords] were aware there was a child under the age of seven (7) living in the premises with [Appellant];

 The premises was built before March 1978;

….

 The lead-safe certification form for the premises is dated February 21, 2022;

 The lead-safe certification was never given to [Appellant] by [Landlords];

 [Appellant] did not give a 10-day notice to [Landlords];

 The 2012 Amendments to the [ordinance] … apply to [Appellant’s] lease;

 [Appellant’s] complaint … is brought under Section 6-803(3) and 6-809(3) of the Philadelphia Code, as amended in 2012;

 [Appellant] entered into judgments by agreement [] in Philadelphia Municipal Court;

 The amount of rent paid to [Landlords] by [Appellant] or on her behalf from September 2016 to the present is $50,687.22 …; [and]

 The portion of the $50,687.22 paid to [Landlords] by third parties is $10,080.00.

Appellant’s Trial Brief, 11/24/23, at 1-2 (footnote omitted; some capitalization

modified); see also Landlords’ Brief at 14-17 (largely confirming the

stipulations as set forth by Appellant, and adding that a 2021 inspection

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produced a negative test for lead in the premises). But see Landlords’ Brief

at 15 (stating the lease agreement does not list the names or ages of the

occupants, but acknowledging Landlords “eventually became aware that a

child resided” in the premises).

On November 29, 2023, the trial court entered a “finding for

[Landlords,] as [Appellant] did not have statutory standing at the time the

claim was asserted.” Trial Work Sheet, 11/29/23 (citing Hand, supra).

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration 6 on December 5, 2023,

challenging, in part, the trial court’s application of Hand. By an order dated

December 18, 2023,7 the trial court denied reconsideration and set forth the

following findings:

1. [Appellant] did not seek a continuation of the trial due to her inability to attend;

6 Following a civil non-jury trial, a party must file post-trial motions within

10 days of the entry of the trial court’s decision. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(2). On April 8, 2024, this Court issued an order directing Appellant to show cause why her issues should not be deemed waived, as a result of filing a motion for reconsideration rather than a post-trial motion. In response, Appellant argued that notwithstanding the title she ascribed to her filing, she intended the motion to function as a post-trial motion. This Court subsequently discharged the show-cause order. On review, we conclude Appellant’s motion for reconsideration (which alleged an erroneous application of the Hand decision) was intended to perform the same function as a post-trial motion. See De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rozentsvit, 939 A.2d 915, 923 (Pa. Super. 2007) (declining to quash or dismiss appeal where party’s post-trial “petition to assess collection and legal costs” was intended to perform the same function as a post-trial motion under Rule 227.1).

7 The order was docketed on December 19, 2023.

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2. [Appellant’s] extra-record submissions in her post-trial motion seeking to excuse her failing to attend relate to a trial date earlier than the date upon which the trial was held and were not entered into the record at trial;

3. The record does not establish as a matter of fact that [Landlords] “knew” that [Appellant] was residing in the [premises] with a child;

4. In fact, the lease does not list any additional residents other than [Appellant];

5. [Appellant] was not a lessee at the time of filing this lawsuit:

a. [Appellant] had resolved a landlord tenant action with [Landlords] prior to filing suit, pursuant to which the court ordered possession returned to [Landlords] as of the date of the settlement—October 11, 2022;

b. While [Appellant] was given an additional 30 days to vacate the premises, she no longer had any legal rights under the lease and the accommodation was a matter of the settlement, not a right under a lease;

c. [Appellant] did not raise any issue related to lead during the landlord tenant proceeding, but, rather, waited until she had obtained a settlement resolving certain matters of unpaid rent and obtaining a release from her obligations to [Landlords];

d. Once released from those obligations and agreeing that [Landlords were] entitled to possession, [Appellant] lacked standing to pursue a lead paint disclosure claim;

e. [Appellant] “retaining” a right to pursue a monetary claim does not alter her status or specifically endorse or preserve a lead paint disclosure claim and cannot revive her terminated lease or her agreement to grant legal possession to [Landlords].

Order, 12/18/23.

Thereafter, on January 3, 2024, Appellant filed a praecipe for entry of

judgment. Judgment was entered on the same date. Appellant filed a notice

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of appeal on January 10, 2024.8 Appellant and the trial court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for review:

1. Did the trial court err in not continuing the trial based upon [Landlords’] last minute notice that they would not be able to go forward with the trial and that they would be requesting a continuance due to a medical emergency, where, but for the assertion that a continuance would be requested by [Landlords], [Appellant] would have been ready and able to appear?

2. Did the trial court err in not continuing this matter for trial based upon a dispute of a material fact required under the [ordinance] (which [Appellant] was led to believe was undisputed)?

3. Did the trial court err in applying the 1995 version of the [ordinance,] which has a notice requirement (which version was applicable to the initial 2002 lease in Hand …), instead of the 2012 version of the [ordinance], which has no 10-day notice requirement for cases proceeding under Section 6-809(3) for violations of Section 6-803?

4. Did the trial court err in finding for [Landlords] based upon [Landlords’] continuous erroneous argument throughout this case that [Appellant] was proceeding under Section 6-809(2), when [Appellant] was actually proceeding under the separate and independent Section 6-809(3)?

5. Did the trial [c]ourt err in not recognizing that the Hand decision is distinguishable from [Appellant’s] case[,] where the initial lease in Hand was entered into in 2002 and the 1995 version of the [ordinance] applied thereto?

8 Appellant purported to appeal from the December 18, 2023, order denying

her motion for reconsideration. However, an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment. See Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 325 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2005). As judgment was ultimately entered, there are no jurisdictional impediments to our review.

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6. Did the trial court err in failing to recognize that Appellant was the tenant of the premises after the 2020 Amendments to the [ordinance] took effect, and had a claim thereunder?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-6.

Preliminarily, we review the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant lacked

standing to bring an action under the ordinance. Standing is a threshold issue

which we must resolve before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims.

See Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 147 A.3d 897, 901 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“The

core concept of standing is that a person who is not adversely affected in any

way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not ‘aggrieved’ thereby and has

no standing to obtain a judicial resolution to his challenge.”) (citation and

brackets omitted). As standing concerns raise questions of law, our standard

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id.

Our review requires interpretation of the ordinance. “An ordinance, like

a statute, must be construed, if possible[,] to give effect to all of its

provisions.” Hand, 294 A.3d at 473 (citation and some brackets omitted).

Appellant seeks relief under the ordinance, which “was enacted in 1995

to assist the Department of Health in identifying, reducing, and combating

lead poisoning in Philadelphia children.” Phila. Code § 6-801(8) (Current

Edition);9 accord Hand, 294 A.3d at 472. The ordinance pertains to

9 Bill No. 180936-A modified portions of the ordinance, and became effective

on October 1, 2020.

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residential housing constructed prior to 1978, which often contains lead-based

paints, and comprises the “most significant remaining source of environmental

lead….” Phila. Code § 6-801(5).10

The parties stipulated that the 2012 Edition 11 of the ordinance controls.

The 2012 Edition defines “Targeted Housing” as follows:

For purposes of this Chapter relating to lease agreements, residential property built before March 1978, but excluding: … (d) dwelling units in which children aged six (6) and under do not and will not reside during the lease term.

Phila. Code § 6-802(12) (2012 Edition).

Section 6-803 details a lessor’s lead disclosure obligation for rental

properties:

(a) No lessor shall enter into a lease agreement with a lessee, other than a renewal lease, to rent any Targeted Housing, or a unit in such Targeted Housing, unless (.1) he or she provides the lessee with a valid certification prepared by a certified lead inspector stating that the property is either lead free or lead safe; and (.2) the lessee acknowledges receipt of the certification by signing a copy.

(b) A valid certification that a property is lead safe under this section shall state that the certified lead inspector determined that the property or unit was free of any Deteriorated Paint, and that interior dust samples were collected in compliance with EPA regulations …, were tested and were found not to contain Lead- Contaminated Dust as defined in this Chapter. … ____________________________________________

10 The ordinance has been amended several times. However, there has been no substantial change to these particular provisions as cited.

11The 2012 amendments are contained in the February 2014 Cumulative Supplement, which Landlords attached to their preliminary objections as Exhibit F. For simplicity, we will refer to this version of the ordinance as the 2012 Edition.

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Id. § 6-803(3)(a), (b).

When a lessor does not comply with Section 6-803, the ordinance

permits lessees to seek remedies including, inter alia, exemplary damages up

to $2,000; “abatement and refund of rent for any period in which the lessee

occupies the property without a certification having been provided;” and

attorney’s fees and costs. Id. § 6-809(3).

Significantly, this Court has held that “the ordinance does not provide a

remedy for a former lessee to retroactively sue a former lessor who did

not provide the required disclosure at the time the lease was signed.” Hand,

294 A.3d at 479 (emphasis in original); see also Cooper v. SGYS St. Ives,

LLC, 333 A.3d 1046, 1052 (Pa. Super. 2025) (reiterating that this Court in

Hand found the ordinance applies only to current tenants).12 This Court

indicated its agreement with Judge Rau’s interpretation, and her statement

that “the ordinance was not intended to permit former lessees to retroactively

recoup rent after a lease agreement has been satisfactorily completed when

12 In concluding the ordinance applies to current leases, the Hand Court cited

with approval the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas decision in Houston v. Analaris Homes, LLC, 3523 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 419489 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 30, 2019). In Houston, the Honorable Lisa M. Rau analyzed the text of the ordinance, emphasizing the repeated references to “lessor” and “lessee.” Hand, 294 A.3d at 478 (citing Houston, 2019 WL 419489 at *7). Judge Rau concluded “the technical and ordinary usages of these terms preclude a claim when there is no existing lessor-lessee relationship.” Id. (citing Houston, 2019 WL 419489 at *7).

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no issues were raised during the existence of the lease.” Hand, 294 A.3d at

479 (citing Houston, 2019 WL 419489 at *9).

Based upon the foregoing interpretation of the ordinance, we agree with

the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant lacked statutory standing to bring a

claim under Section 6-803(3). It is undisputed that Landlords initiated

eviction proceedings against Appellant on three separate occasions. It is also

undisputed that the parties entered a judgment by agreement on October 11,

2022. Landlords’ Preliminary Objections, 12/1/22, Exhibit E (judgment by

agreement). The judgment by agreement specified Landlords would accept

“Judgment for Possession only as of: 10-11-2022.” Id. Though the

agreement permitted Appellant an additional month to vacate and remove her

property from the premises, any rights Appellant enjoyed as a “tenant”

concluded upon the entry of judgment for possession. Cf. Cooper, 333 A.3d

at 1053-54 (concluding that the appellants were “tenants” under the

ordinance, despite being in breach of their lease, because the lease contained

an automatic renewal provision requiring 60 days’ written notice of non-

renewal, and appellee-landlord did not take action to terminate the lease, evict

the appellants, or sue appellants for unpaid rent). Despite the renewal term

in Appellant’s lease, Landlords took actions to evict Appellant, and agreed to

forego their claim for unpaid rent. When Appellant filed the underlying

complaint just nine days later, she was no longer a tenant, as required by the

ordinance.

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Based upon the foregoing, the trial court properly concluded Appellant

lacked standing to commence the instant action. We therefore affirm the

judgment in favor of Landlords.

Judgment affirmed.

Judge Beck joins the memorandum.

Judge Bowes concurs in the result.

Date: 12/23/2025

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