Richards v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources/Office of Management Information Services

582 S.E.2d 751, 213 W. Va. 304, 2003 W. Va. LEXIS 7
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 27, 2003
DocketNo. 30788
StatusPublished

This text of 582 S.E.2d 751 (Richards v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources/Office of Management Information Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richards v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources/Office of Management Information Services, 582 S.E.2d 751, 213 W. Va. 304, 2003 W. Va. LEXIS 7 (W. Va. 2003).

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

James Richards, appellant/petitioner below (hereinafter referred to as “Mr. Richards”), appeals an order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County affirming a decision of the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board (hereinafter referred to as “Grievance Board”). The Grievance [306]*306Board denied Mr. Richards’ request for reallocation of his position as an Information Systems Manager II (hereinafter referred to as “ISM II”) to that of Information Systems Manager III (hereinafter referred to as “ISM III”). Here, Mr. Richards seeks to have this Court determine that he was erroneously denied reallocation from ISM II to ISM III. Based the parties’ arguments on appeal, the record designated for appellate review, and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January of 1999, Mr. Richards was hired by the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (hereinafter referred to as “DHHR”) to fill the vacant position of ISM II within the Office of Management Information Systems.1 In a letter dated April 30, 1999, Mr. Richards’ supervisor, Phil Weikle, requested the West Virginia Division of Personnel (hereinafter referred to as “DOP”) to reallocate the positions of four of his staff members from ISM II to ISM III.2 One of the staff members was Mr. Richards. By letter dated May 13, 1999, DOP indicated that two staff members should be reallocated to ISM III. However, the other two, which included Mr. Richards, should not be reallocated to ISM III.3

Mi-. Richards filed a grievance on September 13, 1999, seeking to challenge the DOP’s refusal to reallocate him to ISM III. At each level of the grievance procedure, the decision of the DOP was affirmed. After the Grievance Board issued its written decision denying relief, Mr. Richards appealed the decision to the circuit court. The circuit court ultimately affirmed the Grievance Board decision by order entered December 5, 2001. From this ruling, Mr. Richards now appeals.

II.

STANDARD OP REVIEW

In syllabus point 1 of Randolph County Board of Education v. Scalia, 182 W.Va. 289, 387 S.E.2d 524 (1989), this Court indicated that “[a] final order of the hearing examiner for the [West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board], made pursuant to W. Va.Code, 18-29-1, et seq. [1999], and based upon findings of fact, should not be reversed unless clearly wrong.” Accord Syl. pt. 1, Keatley v. Mercer County Bd. of Educ., 200 W.Va. 487, 490 S.E.2d 306 (1997). This Court elaborated more fully on the standard of review of Grievance Board determinations in syllabus point 1 of Cahill v. Mercer County Board of Education, 208 W.Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000), as follows:

Grievance rulings involve a combination of both deferential and plenary review. Since a reviewing court is obligated to give deference to factual findings rendered by an administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner with regard to factual determinations. Credibility determinations made by an administrative law judge are similarly entitled to deference. Plenary review is conducted as to the conclusions of law and application of law to the facts, which are reviewed de novo.

Within the confines of this standard, we will analyze the issue raised by Mr. Richards.

III.

DISCUSSION

Mr. Richards contends that the work he performs as an ISM II employee is indistinguishable from the description of the work assigned to an ISM III employee. Mr. Richards does not contend that his job duties changed after he was hired. Instead, Mr. Richards simply argues that he should be reclassified as an ISM III employee because of his misclassification at the time of hiring.4 We disagree.

[307]*307We find that the Nature of Work requirements for the ISM II and ISM III positions are similar, but not identical.5 The actual differences between the two positions are set out in the Distinguishing Characteristics specifications for the respective positions.6 [308]*308The ALJ documented the differences in the ISM II and ISM III positions by relying specifically on the descriptions as the same are set forth by the Distinguishing Characteristics section of the respective job specifications. One of the critical differences found by the ALJ is as follows:

The Information Systems Manager II is responsible for “overseeing a staff involved in programming, or system development in addition to distribution, coordination, and/or support services ... the staff encompasses several units involved in separate agency functions!/]”
The Information Systems Manager III position is “distinguished from the other levels [of Information Systems Manager] by the oversight of several units of professional, para/professional, technical and supervisory staffi-T

In the final analysis the ALJ found that the ISM II position requires supervision of non-supervisory staff. In contrast, the ISM III position requires supervision of supervisory staff. In this ease, the record is clear in establishing that Mr. Richards does not supervise supervisors. In fact, it appears that Mr. Richards directly performs much of the work assigned to him.

Mr. Richards suggests that the DOP’s denial of his efforts to be reclassified was based merely upon a comparison of the number of people he supervised, verses the number of people supervised by the two employees who were reclassified as ISM III.7 The record does not support his assertion. In the DOP’s denial of Mr. Richards’ reallocation, the DOP took into consideration the overall greater managerial responsibilities assigned to the two reclassified employees.8 In doing so, the DOP determined that all of the work performed by those two employees met the standard for ISM III. The same could not be found for Mr. Richards.9

Although the ALJ found that some of the technical work performed by Mr. Richards is set out in ISM III, Mr. Richards simply does not perform the higher level managerial tasks set out in ISM III. This conclusion was [309]*309reached by the DOP and affirmed by the ALJ as well as the circuit court. We see no basis for disturbing this well-founded conclusion.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The circuit court’s order of December 5, 2001, is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Justice McGRAW dissents and files a dissenting opinion.

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Related

Randolph County Board of Education v. Scalia
387 S.E.2d 524 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1989)
Keatley v. Mercer County Board of Education
490 S.E.2d 306 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1997)
Cahill v. Mercer County Board of Education
539 S.E.2d 437 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2000)

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582 S.E.2d 751, 213 W. Va. 304, 2003 W. Va. LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richards-v-west-virginia-department-of-health-human-resourcesoffice-of-wva-2003.