Richards v. O'Brien Bros.

57 S.E. 907, 1 Ga. App. 107, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 158
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedJanuary 31, 1907
Docket34
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 57 S.E. 907 (Richards v. O'Brien Bros.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richards v. O'Brien Bros., 57 S.E. 907, 1 Ga. App. 107, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).

Opinion

Hill, C. J.

The plaintiff brought suit in the city court of Atlanta against the defendants for damages resulting from personal injuries received by him on the 7th day of June, 1904. That part of his petition illustrating the assignments of error to be considered is as follows: (2) That on the 7th day of June, 1904, petitioner was in the employ of the Candler. Investment Company, and was engaged at his work as a brick-mason, laying the foundation of an area wall in the bottom of an excavation of certain premises, on which was being erected what is known as the Candler Building, on Houston street, between Peachtree and Pryor streets, city of Atlanta, said county. (3) That said excavation was thirty feet deep-at the point where petitioner was at work, which was against the-[108]*108wall orí the north or Houston street side; that while petitioner was at work laying brick on said area wall, a portion oí the side or wall of said excavation immediately above him caved and sloughed oil and fell upon him, a distance of thirty feet as aforesaid, whereby he sustained the following severe and permanent injuries (describing them). (8) That on the 27th day of January, 1904, the ■Candler Investment Company, petitioner’s employer, made a contract with the Morrow Transfer Company, by which, for certain named considerations therein, said Morrow Transfer Company was to excavate said lot and have charge of the work of excavation, and was to complete said work and turn the property over to the Candler Investment Company ninety days from said date, providing a penalty of twenty dollars a day for each day there being delay thereafter. (9) That on • the day that petitioner was injured, which was more than ninety days 'from the date of contract between Candler Investment Company and the Morrow Transfer Company, said work of excavating had not been completed, and was then being conducted and carried on; that it was agreed between Candler Investment Company and Morrow Transfer Company that the Candler -Investment Company would waive their •claim of twenty dollars per day forfeiture, provided said Morrow Transfer Company would turn over to Candler Investment Company a portion of said premises, not as a completed job, but only to carry on the work of constructing said area wall upon which petitioner was at work, and such other work as was then agreed upon. (10) That said Morrow Transfer Company, under the terms of said contract heretofore referred to, between them and the Candler Investment Company, were to be responsible for any accident or injuries sustained by any one, occasioned in any way through or by reason of said excavation, or anything done in eonmection therewith, and said contract was a valid and subsisting contract at the time of said injuries, and was for petitioner’s benefit. (11) That at the time of said injury the active work of said excavating was being done by O’Brien Brothers. That there was .an arrangement between Morrow Transfer Company and O’Brien Brothers, by which O’Brien Brothers were to do said work; that Morrow Transfer Company were still held by the Candler Investment Company as the person doing said work, and said Candler Investment Company refused to recognize said O’Brien Brothers [109]*109as principals in lieu of Morrow Transfer Company. (12) That all of the dealings of Candler Investment Compaq, with reference to said work of excavation, were with the Morrow Transfer Company, and said Candler Investment Company had notified defendants that the overhanging edge of said wall should be pushed in and that said wall should be braced and shored up. (13) That the said Houston street was near the center of a large city; that there was heavy traffic of people, vehicles, and streetcars along the side of said excavation; and all this tended to shake and jar and destroy the consistency and holding and adhesive qualities of the material of said wall; that there had been for some time heavy blasting in said excavation with like effect on said wall. (14) That said work of excavating was, according to previous knowledge and experience, in its nature dangerous to others, however carefully performed. (15) That said defendants, in digging down said excavation, negligently left said wall on the north or Houston street side jutting out and overhanging where petitioner was at work. (16) That said defendants, in digging down said excavation, negligently failed to push off the loose upper edges of said wall, and negligently failed to brace up and shore up •said wall so as to prevent it from sloughing and caving in. (18) That at the time of said injury, petitioner did not know of the condition of said wall as alleged, and did not know of defendants* negligence, and, by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, could not and did not discover the' said condition of said wall. (19) That at the time of said injury defendants had entire control of said wall, and owed him the duty of not allowing said wall to fall^down on and injure him as aforesaid. Defendants knew that petitioner was at work where the injury occurred.

To this petition the defendants each filed a general demurrer. We will first consider the ease made by the petition as admitted by the general demurrer. We hold that the .petition is good in substance, the test of this being whether the defendants could admit all that is alleged and escape liability. Pullman Car Co. v. Marlin, 92 Ga. 164; Georgia Railroad Co. v. Rayford, 115 Ga. 937. That the allegations.in the petition are sufficient is shown by reference thereto. These allegations in substance are as follows: At the time of hi's injury, plaintiff was at work as a brick-mason, laying the foundation of an area wall in the bottom of an excavation, be[110]*110ing prepared for the erection of what is known as the Candler Building. Said excavation was thirty feet deep at the point where plaintiff was at work, and a portion of the side or wall of said •excavation, immediately above him, caved and sloughed off, and fell upon him, a distance of thirty feet. The said defendants, in •digging down said excavation, negligently left said wall jutting •out and overhanging where the plaintiff was at work. Said defendants, in digging down said excavation, negligently failed to push off the loose upper edges of said wall, and negligently failed to brace up and shore up said wall, so as to prevent it from sloughing and caving in. It is further alleged, that the Candler Investment Company for whom the plaintiff was working at the time of his injuries, had notified the Morrow Transfer Company that the ■overhanging edge of said wall should be pushed in, and that said wall should be braced and shored up. It is also alleged, that at -the time of the said injury the plaintiff did not know of the unsafe •condition of said wall, did not know of defendants’ negligence, and by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence could not and did not discover the said condition of said wall; that the defendants knew that the' plaintiff was at work where the injury occurred, having entire control of the said wall, and owed him the duty of not allowing said wall to fall down on and injure him. We hold that the foregoing allegations in the petition, in connection with •others therein, not quoted, set forth a sufficient cause of action .against the defendants. It is not entirely clear that the allegations •of negligence in the petition apply to the defendants O’Brien Brothers, and we think that these defendants are entitled to be •distinctly informed as to the acts of negligence connecting them with the injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff.

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Bluebook (online)
57 S.E. 907, 1 Ga. App. 107, 1907 Ga. App. LEXIS 158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richards-v-obrien-bros-gactapp-1907.