Richard v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 57

296 F. Supp. 3d 274
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedNovember 7, 2017
Docket2:16–cv–00265–JAW
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 296 F. Supp. 3d 274 (Richard v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 57) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 57, 296 F. Supp. 3d 274 (D. Me. 2017).

Opinion

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Finding that a teacher at a school district made out a prima facie case of retaliation against the school district for her advocacy on behalf of disabled students, that the district sustained its burden of production to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse actions, and that the teacher proved that the district's proffered reason was pretextual, the Court rules in favor of the district in this retaliation claim because it concludes that the teacher failed to demonstrate that the true reason for the district's adverse actions was related to her advocacy.

*277I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2016, Charlene Richard, a teacher at Regional School District Unit 57 (RSU 57), filed suit against RSU 57 claiming that RSU 57 retaliated against her in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. , section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 79, section 4633 of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), 5 M.R.S. § 4633, and that it violated the Maine Whistleblower's Protection Act (MWPA). 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A). Compl. (ECF No. 1). RSU 57 answered the Complaint on August 1, 2016, denying its essential allegations and raising nine affirmative defenses. Answer of Def. Regional Sch. Unit 57 (ECF No. 5). The original discovery period ended on December 20, 2016, Scheduling Order (ECF No. 7); it was extended once by agreement of the parties to January 20, 2017. Pl.'s Unopposed Mot. to Extend Disc. Deadline (ECF No. 10); Order (ECF No. 13). The Court held a final pretrial conference on April 10, 2017. Report of Final Pretrial Conf. and Order (ECF No. 26).

The Court held a five-day bench trial from May 22, 2017 through May 26, 2017. Min. Entries (ECF No. 33-38). Ms. Richard and RSU 57 filed simultaneous post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact on June 9, 2017. Pl.'s Post-Tr. Br. (ECF No. 45); Post Tr. Br. of Def. Regional Sch. Unit 57 (ECF No. 43); Def.'s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF No. 44) (DPFOF). The parties simultaneously filed responsive briefs on June 16, 2017. Pl.'s Post-Tr. Reply Br. (ECF No. 48); Post Tr. Reply Br. of Def. Regional Sch. Unit 57 (ECF No. 47) (RSU 57 Post Tr. Reply ).

II. SUMMARY OF LEGAL STANDARDS

Ms. Richard has brought claims under four different statutes; however, for each statute, the courts typically employ the same burden-shifting analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Delgado Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP , 856 F.3d 119, 133-34 (1st Cir. 2017) ; Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs. , 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2013) ("A retaliation claim under the ADA is analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework drawn from cases arising under Title VII"); Pippin v. Blvd. Motel Corp. , 835 F.3d 180, 183 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Walsh v. Town of Millinocket , 2011 ME 99, 28 A.3d 610, 616 ) (MWPA).1

There is some question as to whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial as opposed to summary judgment. Palmquist v. Shinseki , 689 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (At trial, "the McDonnell Douglas framework, with its intricate web of presumptions and burdens, becomes an anachronism. The jury, unaided by any presumptions, must simply answer the question of whether the employee has carried the ultimate burden of proving retaliation") (internal citations omitted); Brady v. Cumberland Cnty. , 2015 ME 143, 126 A.3d 1145 ("Because this case reaches us on summary judgment, it does not present us with occasion to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting structure should still be *278treated as a useful analytic device at trial"). Even so, as the case has been tried before the Court and as the parties analyzed the case under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the Court applied that analysis to this case.

Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Ms. Richard bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. To do so, she must prove that "(1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action." D.B. v. Esposito , 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). If Ms. Richard makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to RSU 57 to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for doing what it did. Delgado Echevarria , 856 F.3d at 134. If RSU 57 meets its burden of production, the burden shifts back to Ms. Richard "to show that the [articulated] reason was mere pretext." Id.

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296 F. Supp. 3d 274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-v-regl-sch-unit-57-med-2017.