Richard v. Internal Revenue Service

N.D. Illinois

Richard v. Internal Revenue Service

519 F. Supp. 924, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7809

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois

DecidedDecember 21, 1979

Docket78 C 3992

StatusPublished

This text of 519 F. Supp. 924 (Richard v. Internal Revenue Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Richard v. Internal Revenue Service, 519 F. Supp. 924, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7809 (N.D. Ill. 1979).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM

LEIGHTON, District Judge.

In this Freedom of Information Act case, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), a pleading has been filed stating that it is “Plaintiffs’ Petition for the Award of Attorney’s Fees.” Despite its caption, the petition is for relief which ordinarily would benefit Shelly Wax-man, the lawyer for the plaintiffs who appeared in court. Compare Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (1978). This fact has been recognized in those FOIA cases where attorney fees, when awarded, are ordered paid directly to the plaintiff’s counsel. See American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Rosen, 418 F.Supp. 205, 209 (N.D.Ill.1976).

In any event, there is no presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees in an FOIA case; and, such an award is left to the sound discretion of the district judge. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 842 (5th Cir. 1979). In exercising this discretion, the court is to be guided principally by the four criteria contained in the Senate Report on the FOIA and, in addition, by any applicable criteria from the older body of equitable decisions on attorney’s fees. Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978); see Annot., Freedom of Information Act — Costs, 36 ALR 3d 530.

From this body of equitable decisions, it is fundamental that when a lawyer appears before a court, he should never act in a manner that demeans his profession. Canon number 1 of Canons of Professional Ethics, EC 1-5, Am.Jur.2d Desk Book, Document § 91. However, on December 21, 1979, as the report of proceedings of the Motion Call of this court discloses, when Shelly Waxman presented the petition for fees, he purposely, in the presence of a large number of his fellow lawyers, made a statement to the court which he intended to be insulting, disrespectful, and contemptuous. This was unprofessional conduct. 7 *925 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law § 28; Annot., 68 ALR 3d 273. In this court’s judgment, a lawyer who addresses a district judge in a manner which he intends to be insulting, disrespectful, and contemptuous, forfeits his right, and that of his client, to have considered a petition which may result in monies out of which attorney’s fees will be paid. Therefore, without awaiting an answer from the defendant agency, the petition for fees is denied.

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MEMORANDUM

LEIGHTON, District Judge.

In this Freedom of Information Act case, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), a pleading has been filed stating that it is “Plaintiffs’ Petition for the Award of Attorney’s Fees.” Despite its caption, the petition is for relief which ordinarily would benefit Shelly Wax-man, the lawyer for the plaintiffs who appeared in court. Compare Regalado v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447, 451 (1978). This fact has been recognized in those FOIA cases where attorney fees, when awarded, are ordered paid directly to the plaintiff’s counsel. See American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Rosen, 418 F.Supp. 205, 209 (N.D.Ill.1976).

In any event, there is no presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees in an FOIA case; and, such an award is left to the sound discretion of the district judge. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 842 (5th Cir. 1979). In exercising this discretion, the court is to be guided principally by the four criteria contained in the Senate Report on the FOIA and, in addition, by any applicable criteria from the older body of equitable decisions on attorney’s fees. Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978); see Annot., Freedom of Information Act — Costs, 36 ALR 3d 530.

From this body of equitable decisions, it is fundamental that when a lawyer appears before a court, he should never act in a manner that demeans his profession. Canon number 1 of Canons of Professional Ethics, EC 1-5, Am.Jur.2d Desk Book, Document § 91. However, on December 21, 1979, as the report of proceedings of the Motion Call of this court discloses, when Shelly Waxman presented the petition for fees, he purposely, in the presence of a large number of his fellow lawyers, made a statement to the court which he intended to be insulting, disrespectful, and contemptuous. This was unprofessional conduct. 7 *925 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law § 28; Annot., 68 ALR 3d 273. In this court’s judgment, a lawyer who addresses a district judge in a manner which he intends to be insulting, disrespectful, and contemptuous, forfeits his right, and that of his client, to have considered a petition which may result in monies out of which attorney’s fees will be paid. Therefore, without awaiting an answer from the defendant agency, the petition for fees is denied.

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519 F. Supp. 924, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7809, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-v-internal-revenue-service-ilnd-1979.

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