NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0239n.06
No. 25-5793
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT May 28, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) RICHARD THISTLETHWAITE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PACE AIR FREIGHT, INC., ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION ) )
Before: McKEAGUE, READLER, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Richard Thistlethwaite worked at Pace Air Freight, Inc.
from 1999 until he was terminated in 2021. He claims that Pace interfered with and retaliated
against his use of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. The district court granted
summary judgment to Pace, concluding that even had Thistlethwaite been able to establish a prima
facie case for FMLA interference and retaliation, he could not show that Pace’s legitimate, non-
retaliatory reasons for his termination were pretextual. We agree there is no genuine dispute of
material fact with respect to pretext. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Thistlethwaite began working for Pace, a trucking company that transports
pharmaceuticals across the Midwest, in 1999. He started as a truck driver, but through a series of
promotions, worked his way up to director of operations—the position he held when terminated in
2021. As relevant to this appeal, Thistlethwaite oversaw operations at Pace’s Cincinnati and
Louisville terminals. No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
While at Pace, Thistlethwaite took medical leave on multiple occasions. During the first
half of 2018, Thistlethwaite took four months of leave. At the end of 2018, and stretching through
much of 2019, Thistlethwaite took additional leave for approximately eleven months.
Thistlethwaite took another medical leave in February 2021, the period from which his
claims in this case arise. He was on leave for approximately two months. A few days before
Thistlethwaite was set to return to work, Pace terminated him. Pace provided two reasons for
Thistlethwaite’s termination: (1) his failure to provide company management “access to the
security camera video records” at the locations he oversaw and (2) his falsification of mileage
reports for his trips between the Cincinnati and Louisville terminals. Termination Notice, R. 64-1,
PageID 409.
In response to being terminated while on leave, Thistlethwaite sued Pace for FMLA
interference and retaliation. After the parties conducted discovery, Pace moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Pace, holding that Thistlethwaite could
not show that Pace’s proffered reasons for terminating him were pretextual.
Thistlethwaite timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell
Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 281 (6th Cir. 2012). At the summary judgment stage, the moving
party—here, Pace—must show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could
decide for Thistlethwaite. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th
Cir. 2016). In evaluating Pace’s motion, we construe the evidence and draw all reasonable
-2- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
inferences in Thistlethwaite’s favor. See King v. Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th
551, 559 (6th Cir. 2022).
We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework because Thistlethwaite’s
FMLA interference and retaliation claims rely on circumstantial evidence. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir.
2012). Under this framework, Thistlethwaite bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of interference and retaliation. Donald, 667 F.3d at 761. If he does so, the burden shifts to
Pace to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating him. Id. And if Pace provides
such a reason, the burden shifts back to Thistlethwaite to show that Pace’s stated reasons are
pretextual. Id. at 762.
Because the pretext analysis is dispositive in this case, and applies with equal force to
Thistlethwaite’s interference and retaliation claims, we skip to the third step of McDonnell
Douglas (as the district court did). Even assuming Thistlethwaite can establish a prima facie case
of interference and retaliation, he has not pointed to evidence that creates a genuine dispute of
material fact that Pace’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual. A plaintiff can generally
show pretext by demonstrating that the proffered reasons have “no basis in fact,” “did not actually
motivate the employer’s action,” or “were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v.
Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, pretext is a “commonsense
inquiry” that asks whether Pace terminated Thistlethwaite “for the stated reason or not?” Id. at 400
n.4.
Thistlethwaite argues that neither of Pace’s stated reasons for his termination had a basis
in fact. Recall that Pace’s first reason for termination was Thistlethwaite’s failure to provide the
security camera passwords. The record conclusively establishes that Thistlethwaite did not provide
-3- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
the passwords to management, a fact that Thistlethwaite himself does not deny. Thistlethwaite
argues, however, that this reason is pretextual because Pace knew he could not comply with the
request. He says that he produced “substantial evidence” that the “camera systems were not
operational and that passwords were unavailable or had defaulted,” meaning that any failure to
provide the passwords should not have been treated as insubordination under the circumstances.
Appellant’s Br. at 16–18.
But Thistlethwaite’s inconsistent deposition testimony, and sparse record evidence, is
insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact as to this issue. Thistlethwaite provided several
justifications for why he did not provide the passwords for the camera system: During his
deposition, Thistlethwaite testified that from “2018 to the time that [he] was terminated [the
cameras] did not work,” but that “[b]efore that they worked in Cincinnati” even though “Louisville
did not have the right cameras.” Thistlethwaite Dep., R. 64-2, PageID 467. At another point, when
asked explicitly whether the cameras “work[ed] or [did] not work” at the Cincinnati location, he
answered, “[n]ot 100 percent.” Id. As for the Louisville location, Thistlethwaite testified that the
“cameras worked, but they weren’t at the correct locations.” Id. at 468. Additionally,
Thistlethwaite stated that the Louisville system had a password, but another individual “handled
that one down there.” Id.
The depositions reveal that, by Thistlethwaite’s own admission, at least some of the
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0239n.06
No. 25-5793
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT May 28, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) RICHARD THISTLETHWAITE, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY PACE AIR FREIGHT, INC., ) Defendant-Appellee. ) OPINION ) )
Before: McKEAGUE, READLER, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Richard Thistlethwaite worked at Pace Air Freight, Inc.
from 1999 until he was terminated in 2021. He claims that Pace interfered with and retaliated
against his use of Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave. The district court granted
summary judgment to Pace, concluding that even had Thistlethwaite been able to establish a prima
facie case for FMLA interference and retaliation, he could not show that Pace’s legitimate, non-
retaliatory reasons for his termination were pretextual. We agree there is no genuine dispute of
material fact with respect to pretext. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Thistlethwaite began working for Pace, a trucking company that transports
pharmaceuticals across the Midwest, in 1999. He started as a truck driver, but through a series of
promotions, worked his way up to director of operations—the position he held when terminated in
2021. As relevant to this appeal, Thistlethwaite oversaw operations at Pace’s Cincinnati and
Louisville terminals. No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
While at Pace, Thistlethwaite took medical leave on multiple occasions. During the first
half of 2018, Thistlethwaite took four months of leave. At the end of 2018, and stretching through
much of 2019, Thistlethwaite took additional leave for approximately eleven months.
Thistlethwaite took another medical leave in February 2021, the period from which his
claims in this case arise. He was on leave for approximately two months. A few days before
Thistlethwaite was set to return to work, Pace terminated him. Pace provided two reasons for
Thistlethwaite’s termination: (1) his failure to provide company management “access to the
security camera video records” at the locations he oversaw and (2) his falsification of mileage
reports for his trips between the Cincinnati and Louisville terminals. Termination Notice, R. 64-1,
PageID 409.
In response to being terminated while on leave, Thistlethwaite sued Pace for FMLA
interference and retaliation. After the parties conducted discovery, Pace moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Pace, holding that Thistlethwaite could
not show that Pace’s proffered reasons for terminating him were pretextual.
Thistlethwaite timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell
Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 281 (6th Cir. 2012). At the summary judgment stage, the moving
party—here, Pace—must show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A dispute of material fact is genuine if, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could
decide for Thistlethwaite. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th
Cir. 2016). In evaluating Pace’s motion, we construe the evidence and draw all reasonable
-2- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
inferences in Thistlethwaite’s favor. See King v. Steward Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th
551, 559 (6th Cir. 2022).
We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework because Thistlethwaite’s
FMLA interference and retaliation claims rely on circumstantial evidence. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir.
2012). Under this framework, Thistlethwaite bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of interference and retaliation. Donald, 667 F.3d at 761. If he does so, the burden shifts to
Pace to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating him. Id. And if Pace provides
such a reason, the burden shifts back to Thistlethwaite to show that Pace’s stated reasons are
pretextual. Id. at 762.
Because the pretext analysis is dispositive in this case, and applies with equal force to
Thistlethwaite’s interference and retaliation claims, we skip to the third step of McDonnell
Douglas (as the district court did). Even assuming Thistlethwaite can establish a prima facie case
of interference and retaliation, he has not pointed to evidence that creates a genuine dispute of
material fact that Pace’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual. A plaintiff can generally
show pretext by demonstrating that the proffered reasons have “no basis in fact,” “did not actually
motivate the employer’s action,” or “were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v.
Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, pretext is a “commonsense
inquiry” that asks whether Pace terminated Thistlethwaite “for the stated reason or not?” Id. at 400
n.4.
Thistlethwaite argues that neither of Pace’s stated reasons for his termination had a basis
in fact. Recall that Pace’s first reason for termination was Thistlethwaite’s failure to provide the
security camera passwords. The record conclusively establishes that Thistlethwaite did not provide
-3- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
the passwords to management, a fact that Thistlethwaite himself does not deny. Thistlethwaite
argues, however, that this reason is pretextual because Pace knew he could not comply with the
request. He says that he produced “substantial evidence” that the “camera systems were not
operational and that passwords were unavailable or had defaulted,” meaning that any failure to
provide the passwords should not have been treated as insubordination under the circumstances.
Appellant’s Br. at 16–18.
But Thistlethwaite’s inconsistent deposition testimony, and sparse record evidence, is
insufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact as to this issue. Thistlethwaite provided several
justifications for why he did not provide the passwords for the camera system: During his
deposition, Thistlethwaite testified that from “2018 to the time that [he] was terminated [the
cameras] did not work,” but that “[b]efore that they worked in Cincinnati” even though “Louisville
did not have the right cameras.” Thistlethwaite Dep., R. 64-2, PageID 467. At another point, when
asked explicitly whether the cameras “work[ed] or [did] not work” at the Cincinnati location, he
answered, “[n]ot 100 percent.” Id. As for the Louisville location, Thistlethwaite testified that the
“cameras worked, but they weren’t at the correct locations.” Id. at 468. Additionally,
Thistlethwaite stated that the Louisville system had a password, but another individual “handled
that one down there.” Id.
The depositions reveal that, by Thistlethwaite’s own admission, at least some of the
cameras at the Louisville location functioned. However, Thistlethwaite does not explain why, at a
minimum, he did not provide the password for that system. Nor does he state with any consistency
which cameras at each location did or did not function, the period of time during which the cameras
did not function, when the manufacturer’s default for the Cincinnati password occurred, or why
he did not have access to the Louisville password.
-4- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
Thistlethwaite’s additional evidence is similarly insufficient to create a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether at least some of the cameras were operational. Thistlethwaite points to
an email thread from January 25, 2021, several weeks after he was first asked for the passwords,
in which he explained to the company’s owners that people would be “back to replace the 3 broking
[sic] cameras and setup the rest,” Email, R. 73-7, PageID 1156, and a quote from September 2018,
in which a company provided an estimate for installing a video surveillance system, Quote, R. 73-
9, PageID 1165. But Thistlethwaite does not explain how the email referring to 3 broken cameras
and the installation quote create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the approximately 12 to 16
cameras at the Cincinnati location and the approximately 5 or 6 cameras at the Louisville location
were all either nonfunctional or otherwise inaccessible. Therefore, on this record, there is no
evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Pace’s first stated reason had no basis in
fact.
Next, recall that Pace’s second stated reason for termination was Thistlethwaite’s falsified
mileage reports. Thistlethwaite argues that this reason is pretextual because his reports were not
fraudulent. He contends that there was an innocent explanation for why no employee remembered
seeing him on particular days: that, on multiple occasions, he “followed a truck (as the security
rider) to the terminal and then returned to the terminal he came from without going inside.”
Appellant’s Br. at 9. Tellingly, Thistlethwaite provides no evidence to corroborate this
explanation, and his testimony does not state with any specificity how many times he followed a
truck without entering the terminal nor the dates on which he did so. Though a plaintiff’s testimony
may “lack precision,” it must be sufficiently “coherent[]” to, on its own, create a dispute of fact.
See Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 205 (6th Cir. 2015). Without more, Thistlethwaite’s
general explanation that on some occasions he did not enter the terminal is not enough to create a
-5- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
jury question as to whether Pace’s stated reason had no basis in fact. And, even assuming
Thistlethwaite’s proffered justification is true, Pace would still be entitled to summary judgment
because Thistlethwaite’s refusal to provide the camera passwords was an independent reason for
his termination.
Thistlethwaite also argues that Pace’s investigation into his mileage was actually motivated
by his use of medical leave. But the timing of when Pace commenced its investigation undercuts
that. The undisputed record evidence demonstrates that Pace began its investigation in late
December 2020 or early January 2021 after Pace grew suspicious of Thistlethwaite’s refusal to
provide the camera passwords. Thistlethwaite does not contest these facts, which establish the
investigation began before he requested, and started, leave in February 2021. Thus, the
investigation could not have been motivated by Thistlethwaite’s subsequent leave.
Additionally, Thistlethwaite makes arguments about the nature of Pace’s investigation, its
less harsh treatment of another employee, and a statement from the company’s owner in 2018—
all of which, he contends, prove Pace’s animus towards his taking medical leave. But none of these
arguments are availing. With respect to the investigation itself, Pace interviewed three employees,
including the Louisville terminal’s manager, asking whether Thistlethwaite was at the location on
“specific dates, like holidays that would have been memorable” “[w]ithin the last three months,”
and confirmed that he was “never there.” Abner Dep., R. 64-9, PageID 893. Given that each
location is small, and Thistlethwaite would have interacted with other employees, Pace found those
responses sufficient to conclude Thistlethwaite was not present at the location on the days he
claimed. This investigation, which, again, commenced before Thistlethwaite’s February leave
request, does not evince hostility toward FMLA leave. With respect to the comparator employee,
Thistlethwaite points to Joe Voigt. Voigt was investigated for time theft but the accusations were
-6- No. 25-5793, Thistlethwaite v. Pace Air Freight, Inc.
“not validated,” so Voigt was ultimately not let go. Id. at PageID 863. The investigation into
Thistlethwaite, by contrast, corroborated Pace’s concerns about his mileage, so Voigt is not a
viable comparator. With respect to the company owner’s statement in 2018—that Thistlethwaite
“f---ed up”—Pace explains that the statement was not made in connection with Thistlethwaite
taking leave, but was made after the company discovered Thistlethwaite had committed insurance
fraud during his prior leave. Thistlethwaite does not dispute Pace’s explanation, so the owner’s
statement does not provide evidence of pretext.
In sum, Thistlethwaite has not put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that Pace terminated him for taking FMLA leave.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Pace.
-7-