NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2887-22
RICHARD T. BERKOSKI, individually and as administrator of the ESTATE OF ANN L. RAMAGE, MD, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, January 2, 2025 LTD. and AMERICAN HONDA APPELLATE DIVISION MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
HONDA OF TURNERSVILLE, and JOHN MACNAMARA, administrator of the ESTATE OF ELIZABETH MACNAMARA,
Defendants. ____________________________
Argued October 22, 2024 – Decided January 2, 2025
Before Judges Gilson, Firko, and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-1463-20. Timothy J. Foley argued the cause for appellant (Foley & Foley, Atlee Hall, LLP, and Anapol Weiss, attorneys; Timothy J. Foley, Jeff Gutkowski, and Emily B. Ashe, of counsel and on the briefs).
Wendy F. Lumish (Bowman and Brooke LLP), argued the cause for respondent, American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis LLP, and Wendy F. Lumish, attorneys; C. Brian Kornbrek, Thomas K. Murphy, III, Wendy F. Lumish, and Paul G. Cereghini (Bowman and Brooke LLP) of the Arizona bar, admitted pro hac vice, on the briefs).
Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, attorneys for amicus curiae The Product Liability Council, Inc. (Christopher Dalton, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GILSON, P.J.A.D.
This appeal presents the question of whether a motor vehicle is defectively
designed because it does not include the latest driver-assistance technologies
even though not mandated by federal or state law. Plaintiff contends that a 2016
Honda CR-V was defectively designed because it was not equipped with a lane
departure warning (LDW) system and a lane keeping assist (LKA) system. We
hold that the absence of those available driver-assistance systems, in a vehicle
that was otherwise safe and fit for driving, did not, as a matter of law, establish
that the 2016 Honda CR-V was defectively designed within the meaning of the
New Jersey Products Liability Act (the PL Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -11.
A-2887-22 2 The undisputed evidence in this matter establishes that the 2016 Honda
CR-V was safe and suitable for driving because it had a functioning steering
system that allowed the driver to maintain the intended lane of travel. The
vehicle did not become unfit or unsafe because it did not include all existing
driver-assistance technologies. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting
summary judgment to defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) and
dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's product liability and negligence claims. We
also affirm the order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
I.
This appeal arises out of a tragic, fatal automobile accident. 1 On August
4, 2018, Elizabeth MacNamara (E. MacNamara) was driving a 2016 Honda CR-
V southbound on County Road (CR) 657 in Cape May County. CR 657 is a two-
lane road, which is divided by a single dotted yellow line, and which has a fifty
miles per hour (mph) speed limit. On the day of the accident, the sky was
overcast, but it was not raining.
1 We discern the facts from the summary-judgment record, viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the party against whom summary judgment was granted. See Rivera v. Cherry Hill Towers, LLC, 474 N.J. Super. 234, 238 (App. Div. 2022). A-2887-22 3 Shortly before noon, the Honda CR-V crossed over the center line and
crashed head-on into a 2011 Ford Escape driven by Dr. Ann Ramage.
Regrettably, E. MacNamara and Ramage both died as a result of the injuries they
sustained in the crash.
The accident occurred on a flat and mostly straight portion of CR 657.
Crash data from the Honda CR-V showed that for the five seconds before the
crash, the steering torque exerted on the CR-V was zero, indicating that there
was no measurable steering input. The crash data also showed that the Honda
CR-V had been traveling at between forty-seven to fifty mph, its turn signals
had not been engaged, and the brake pedal had not been depressed.
In April 2020, plaintiff Richard T. Berkoski, individually and as the
administrator of the Estate of Ann Ramage, his deceased wife, filed a complaint
against Honda, Honda Motor Co., Ltd., Honda of Turnersville, and John
MacNamara, administrator of the Estate of E. MacNamara. Eventually, the
claims against all defendants except Honda were dismissed.
In his complaint, plaintiff asserted claims of strict product liability and
negligence against Honda. Although plaintiff did not identify the PL Act as the
basis for his product liability claims, the PL Act controls those claims. See Sun
Chem. Corp. v. Fike Corp., 243 N.J. 319, 336 (2020) ("If a claim is premised
A-2887-22 4 upon a product's manufacturing, warning, or design defect, that claim must be
brought under the [PL Act] . . . ."). He alleged that the 2016 Honda CR-V driven
by E. MacNamara was defectively designed and therefore unsafe because it was
not equipped with LDW and LKA systems. Plaintiff also asserted that the
accident would have been prevented had the two driver-assistance systems been
installed in the 2016 Honda CR-V and had those systems been in use on the day
of the accident.
When activated, the LDW feature will alert the driver if it detects that the
vehicle has unintentionally crossed over a detected lane marking without a turn
signal in use. In that regard, it alerts the driver by sending an audible beep and
illuminating a lane departure message on the vehicle's information display
screen. The LDW feature does not provide any braking or steering assistance.
In contrast, when activated, an LKA system will apply steering torque to
help the driver keep the vehicle in the center of the lane of travel. Accordingly,
if the vehicle unintentionally crosses a detected lane line, a message will appear
on the vehicle's information display screen, an audio alert will sound, and the
vehicle will apply steering torque to return the vehicle to the center of its
intended lane of travel.
A-2887-22 5 Honda acknowledges that the LDW and the LKA systems were both
available in 2016. Indeed, the record establishes that Honda made those systems
available in the high-end model of its 2016 Honda CR-V, and that those systems
could have been added to other 2016 models for an extra charge if requested.
During discovery, plaintiff produced two expert reports: one from Peter
J. Leiss, a design expert, and another from Shawn Harrington, a causation
expert. Leiss reported that the LDW and LKA systems were available and
economically feasible technologies that could have been added to the 2016
Honda CR-V. He opined that the omission of those driver-assistance systems
rendered the 2016 Honda CR-V unsafe. In that regard, in his expert report, Leiss
stated:
The addition of a LDW and LKA system would have prevented [E.] MacNamara's Honda from entering the oncoming traffic and the collision with Ramage's Ford. These systems, as demonstrated in the [studies] cited previously in this report, have the ability to reliably prevent lane departures, such as occurred in this case, by alerting the driver to an impending lane departure and autonomously redirecting the vehicle into its lane of travel. These systems, as demonstrated in the references cited previously in this report, were technologically and economically feasible for several years prior to [E.] MacNamara's Honda being produced.
Harrington tested the performance of the LDW and LKA systems
available in 2016 and opined "[h]ad the subject Honda been equipped with the
A-2887-22 6 available [LKA system], the subject collision would not have occurred." He
also concluded that the LKA system would have warned E. MacNamara to act
or would have steered the Honda CR-V back into the southbound lane without
driver input.
Plaintiff's experts acknowledged that the 2016 Honda CR-V complied
with all mandatory motor vehicle safety standards. In that regard, Leiss testified
that there is no "federal or state law that requires the inclusion of every possible
technology, even those that may be considered safety systems on every vehicle."
Leiss also testified that he had not identified any "mechanical failure" in the
Honda CR-V. In other words, the only issue was whether the 2016 Honda CR-
V was defectively designed because it did not include the available LDW and
LKA systems.
Following the completion of discovery, Honda moved for summary
judgment on several alternative grounds. It argued that the 2016 Honda CR-V
was not defectively designed, and it had no duty to equip every vehicle with all
available technologies. Honda also contended that, under New Jersey law, a
manufacturer is not liable if the allegedly unsafe characteristic of the product is
known to the ordinary consumer or user. In that regard, Honda asserted that
drivers are aware of the need to keep vehicles within their lane of travel and that
A-2887-22 7 the failure to do so could lead to fatal consequences. Additionally, Honda
moved to exclude plaintiff's expert opinions on causation as improper net
opinions.
In response to Honda's motions, plaintiff did not oppose the dismissal of
his negligence claim. Instead, he opposed Honda's motion to dismiss his claim
of strict product liability under the PL Act. Plaintiff argued that the question of
whether the 2016 Honda CR-V was defectively designed, because it was not
equipped with available LDW and LKA systems, was a question for the jury.
Plaintiff relied on his experts and their testimony that the LDW and LKA
systems were available and feasible alternative designs and that, if the 2016
Honda CR-V had those technologies, the fatal crash that caused Ramage's death
would have been avoided. In making that argument, plaintiff maintained that
Honda should have provided those technologies even though the 2016 Honda
CR-V complied with all other motor vehicle safety standards.
The trial court rejected plaintiff's arguments and held, as a matter of law,
that Honda was entitled to summary judgment. The trial court focused on
whether the omission of the driver-assistance systems rendered the vehicle not
reasonably safe. The trial court reasoned that a manufacturer's duty is to provide
a reasonably fit, suitable, and safe product, and that manufacturers do not have
A-2887-22 8 a duty to install every available technology. The court then held that plaintiff
was required to show that the absence of the available technologies rendered the
vehicle unsafe. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that plaintiff had not shown
that the 2016 Honda CR-V was not reasonably safe for its intended use and that
there was no evidence of a design defect.
Accordingly, on November 15, 2022, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment to Honda and dismissing with prejudice all claims
against Honda. The court also ruled that Honda's motion to bar expert testimony
was moot given its decision on the summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but on January 6, 2023, the trial court
denied that motion. Plaintiff now appeals from the orders granting summary
judgment to Honda and denying his motion for reconsideration.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting Honda
summary judgment on the design defect claim because there was sufficient
evidence to present that issue to a jury. Plaintiff also argues that although the
trial court did not reach the causation issue, he presented sufficient evidence to
show that if the 2016 Honda CR-V had included the LDW and LKA systems,
those systems would have prevented the collision.
A-2887-22 9 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, "applying the same
standard used by the trial court." Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022)
(citing Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019)).
That standard requires us to "determine whether 'the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.'"
Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (quoting R. 4:46-
2(c)). "Summary judgment should be granted . . . 'against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'"
Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). We do not defer to the trial court's legal
analysis or statutory interpretation. RSI Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018); Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 218 N.J. 202, 209 (2014).
A. Plaintiff's Design Defect Claim.
Plaintiff's claims are governed by the PL Act. See Sun Chem. Corp., 243
N.J. at 336 ; Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super. 507, 517 (App. Div.
1998) (explaining that "[u]nder the [PL Act] . . . , the causes of action for
A-2887-22 10 negligence, strict liability and implied warranty have been consolidated into a
single product liability cause of action, the essence of which is strict liability").
See also N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1(b)(3) ("'Product liability action' means any claim or
action brought by a claimant for harm caused by a product, irrespective of the
theory underlying the claim, except actions for harm caused by breach of an
express warranty.").
"The Legislature passed the [PL] Act as 'remedial legislation to establish
clear rules [in] . . . actions for damages for harm caused by products, including
certain principles under which liability is imposed.'" Roberts v. Rich Foods,
Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 374 (1995) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1). The PL Act "does
not 'codify all issues relating to product liability'; rather, the Legislature
intended it to address 'matters that require clarification.'" Ibid.
The PL Act recognizes three types of claims: manufacturing defect,
failure to warn, and design defect. N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2; Rich Foods, 139 N.J. at
375; Dziewiecki v. Bakula, 361 N.J. Super. 90, 97 (App. Div. 2003). In this
action, plaintiff asserts only a design defect claim. He claims that the 2016
Honda CR-V was unsafe because it did not include available LDW and LKA
systems. He does not claim that the 2016 Honda CR-V had a defective steering
system or that there was a failure to warn of the obvious risk of allowing a car
A-2887-22 11 to cross over into another lane where vehicles are traveling in the opposite
direction.
To prove a design defect under the PL Act, a plaintiff must establish that
the product was "designed in a defective manner." N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2(c).
Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product "was not reasonably fit,
suitable[,] or safe for its intended purpose." Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 121 N.J. 69, 95 (1990) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-2) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, "[a] plaintiff must prove either that the product's
risks outweighed its utility or that the product could have been designed in an
alternative manner so as to minimize or eliminate the risk of harm." Lewis v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 570 (1998).
Section 3(a)(2) of the PL Act, however, "provides an absolute, affirmative
defense for defendants in suits for design defect, if 'the harm was caused by an
unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and
that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes the
product.'" Rich Foods, 139 N.J. at 369-70 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3(a)(2)).
"Section 3(a)(2) also provides two exceptions that preclude use of the defense:
when the product is 'industrial machinery or other equipment [that] is used in
the workplace'; and when the danger 'can feasibly be eliminated without
A-2887-22 12 impairing the usefulness of the product.'" Id. at 370 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-
3(a)(2)) (citations reformatted).
In that regard, Section 3(a)(2) states:
a. In any product liability action against a manufacturer or seller for harm allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective manner, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:
....
(2) The characteristics of the product are known to the ordinary consumer or user, and the harm was caused by an unsafe aspect of the product that is an inherent characteristic of the product and that would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the class of persons for whom the product is intended, except that this paragraph shall not apply to industrial machinery or other equipment used in the workplace and it is not intended to apply to dangers posed by products such as machinery or equipment that can feasibly be eliminated without impairing the usefulness of the product . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3(a)(2).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained "that [S]ection 3(a)(2)
adopts the 'consumer expectations' test . . . [and] that the test is really a 'hybrid'
provision [that] combines the 'consumer expectations' doctrine for determining
whether a product is defective with the obvious-danger factor of the risk-utility
A-2887-22 13 analysis to create a defense to a design-defect claim.'" Rich Foods, 139 N.J. at
376 (quoting Dewey, 121 N.J. at 96) (citations reformatted).
In short, under the PL Act "a product that satisfies the 3(a)(2) standard is,
by statutory definition, not defectively designed. If the harm caused by a
product 'would be recognized by the ordinary person who uses or consumes the
product,' and if the harm stems from an 'inherent characteristic of the product,'
N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3(a)(2), then the harm is not actionable." Id. at 378 (citations
reformatted).
Plaintiff does not dispute that the ordinary user of an automobile
recognizes that a vehicle needs to maintain its lane of travel and that crossing
into a lane where other vehicles are traveling in the opposite direction is unsafe.
Plaintiff's experts also do not dispute that an automobile must have a steering
system that allows the vehicle to make turns and to cross into or through other
lanes when the driver intends to take those actions. Thus, the question in this
matter is whether the 2016 Honda CR-V was not reasonably fit, suitable, or safe
because it did not have the LDW and LKA systems.
Plaintiff's experts acknowledged that both the LDW and LKA systems
were aids designed to help a driver stay within their intended lane of travel. It
is undisputable, however, that the driver could not rely exclusively on those aids.
A-2887-22 14 The 2016 Honda CR-V owner's manual expressly stated that "[l]ike all
assistance systems, LDW has limitations . . . [o]ver-reliance on LDW may result
in a collision," and that "[LKA] is not a substitute for your vehicle control . . .
[it] does not work if you take your hands off the steering wheel or fail to steer
the vehicle." Indeed, there is no claim that the 2016 Honda CR-V was a self-
driving vehicle. More to the point, the undisputed facts established that E.
McNamara was controlling or responsible for controlling the steering of the
2016 Honda CR-V at the time of the accident. Therefore, applying N.J.S.A.
2A:58C-3(a)(2), the inherent risks of driving the 2016 Honda CR-V could not
"feasibly be eliminated" through the inclusion of these features .
We recognize that in many situations if a plaintiff has experts who will
testify that the product could have been made safer without impairing the
usefulness of the product, the question of whether there is a design defect is an
issue of fact for the jury. Am. Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. at 568 ("if the proofs
supporting the position of the non-moving party and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom reveal a contested issue of fact regarding the practicality and
feasibility of a proposed alternative design, the issue should be resolved by the
jury"); Gen. Motors Corp., 310 N.J. Super. at 517-18. Moreover, we recognize
that car manufacturers "may have a duty to install safety devices regardless of
A-2887-22 15 whether it was the custom of the trade." Michalko v. Cooke Color and Chem.
Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 397 (1982) (citing Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402,
406-11 (1972)).
Nevertheless, we do not read the PL Act as allowing plaintiff to claim a
design defect merely because there were available driver-assistance
technologies. See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (Law Div.
1976) ("[a] manufacturer is not under a duty to provide every 'known safety
device'"), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1977); Huddell v. Levin, 537
F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that "[an automobile] manufacturer is not
required to produce an accident-proof vehicle" under New Jersey law). Plaintiff
has made no showing that the 2016 Honda CR-V was unsafe because it did not
have either or both the LDW and LKA systems. Those systems might have aided
E. McNamara, but they did not replace the obvious expectation among
consumers that a 2016 motor vehicle required steering.
Given the specific facts of this case, we hold that Honda was not under a
duty to provide the LDW and LKA systems, which were not uniformly installed
in all 2016 passenger vehicles. Indeed, to accept plaintiff's design defect
argument would be to impose on all purchasers and users of passenger vehicles
the requirement and cost of having the LDW and LKA systems installed and
A-2887-22 16 activated in their vehicles. In short, we do not read Section 3(a)(2) of the PL
Act to allow plaintiff's claim because doing so would broadly expand the
potential liability of manufactures when "the Legislature's policy [was] to limit
the liability of manufacturers so as to 'balance[] the interests of the public and
the individual with a view towards economic reality.'" Rich Foods, 139 N.J. at
374 (quoting Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 116 N.J. 155, 188 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The PL Act "has not appreciably altered the common law interpretation of
risk/utility analysis outside of the . . . absolute defenses." Cavanaugh v. Skil
Corp., 164 N.J. 1, 8 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Fabian v. Minster
Mach. Co., 258 N.J. Super. 261, 271-72 (App. Div. 1992)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the rare case "when the risk-utility analysis points to the
appropriate result as a matter of law," the court, not the jury, "resolves factual
issues arising from a risk-utility analysis." Am. Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. at 568
(citing Dreier et al., N.J. Prod. Liab. & Toxic Torts L., § 5.2 at 29 (1998)). See
also Model Jury Charges (Civil), 5.40D-3 n.12, "Design Defect – Legal Tests of
Product Defect" (approved Apr. 1999) ("Initially, the Risk-utility analysis is for
the court, not the jury. It is the trial court which decides whether a product is so
A-2887-22 17 clearly more useful than dangerous that a decision in favor of the defendant is
to be made as a matter of law.").
In this case, we hold that the 2016 Honda CR-V was "reasonably safe" as
a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the
foreseeability of the risk of harm and consumer expectations. It is undisputable
that currently it is understood that the safe operation of a motor vehicle is
dependent on the driver's diligence in steering the vehicle and using the vehicle's
systems to control speed and braking. What future technologies may bring are
not before us. Instead, our ruling is based on the record in this matter and the
technologies available in 2016.
We point out that our holding is consistent with the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (Am. L. Inst. 1998) (hereinafter Restatement).
The Restatement explains that "[a] product . . . is defective in design when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission
of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe." Id. § 2(b). A
court may consider a broad range of factors in determining "whether an
alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not
reasonably safe." Id. § 2 cmt. f. These factors include "the magnitude and
A-2887-22 18 probability of the foreseeable risks of harm . . . and the nature and strength of
consumer expectations regarding the product." Ibid. Additionally, "the likely
effects of the alternative design on production costs . . . and the range of
consumer choice among products are factors that may be taken into account."
Ibid.
Further, the likely effects of the driver-assistance systems on production
costs and the range of consumer choice support our determination. Restatement
§ 2 cmt. f. As previously discussed, the record establishes that the LKA and
LDW systems were available in the high-end model of the 2016 Honda CR-V
and could have been added to other 2016 models for an extra charge if requested.
Considering these increased costs, many consumers chose not to purchase
vehicles with these features or to include them in their vehicles. Moreover,
drivers with those systems could choose not to use them. Thus, the 2016 Honda
CR-V was "reasonably safe" under the principles identified in the Restatement
as a matter of law.
In reaching our conclusion, we have also considered the points raised by
the Product Liability Council, Inc. (the PL Council), which filed an amicus
curiae brief in support of Honda's position. The PL Council pointed out that
technologies like driver-assistance systems are generally phased in over time
A-2887-22 19 and to require their installation all at once would lead to performance problems.
In support of this argument, the PL Council cited to Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 862-63 (2000), where the United States Supreme Court
favorably discussed a federal motor vehicle safety standard which "deliberately
sought to gradually phase in passive restraints" to "help develop data on
comparative effectiveness, allow the industry time to overcome safety problems
and high production costs[,] . . . and facilitate the development of alternative,
cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems." We find merit in a phased-in
approach to new technologies and that the approach is consistent with the PL
Act. Accordingly, we believe that if there is to be a change in product liability
law, it should be made by the Legislature, which can consider the broad
implications of that change.
B. Causation.
"Causation is a fundamental requisite for establishing any product-
liability action. The plaintiff must demonstrate so-called product-defect
causation - - that the defect in the product was a proximate cause of the injury."
Coffman v. Keene Corp., 133 N.J. 581, 594 (1993) (citing Michalko, 91 N.J. at
394).
A-2887-22 20 The trial court in this matter did not reach the issue of causation. Honda
urges us not to address that alternative ground for granting summary judgment,
reasoning that the record on causation was not fully developed. Because we
agree that the causation issue is not fully developed in the current record, we do
not make a ruling on that issue.
Nevertheless, we do point out that plaintiff's experts did not appear to have
established that the installation of LDW and LKA systems in the 2016 Honda
CR-V would have prevented this fatal accident. Nowhere in the current record
is there proof as to E. McNamara's condition at the time of the fatal accident.
Nor is there any proof that she would have activated the LDW and LKA systems
or that she would have responded to their warnings. In other words, even if we
did not affirm on the issue of design defect, this matter would require further
analysis by a judge on the causation issue before it could proceed to a jury trial.
Affirmed.
A-2887-22 21