NUMBER 13-18-00395-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
RICHARD SMITH, Appellant,
v.
JODIE RAYFORD, ET AL., Appellees.
On appeal from the 156th District Court of Bee County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
This is an inmate litigation case brought under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.001 et al.
By two issues, appellant Richard Smith complains that the trial court abused its discretion
by: (1) dismissing his lawsuit against appellees Jodie Rayford, Corey Furr, Garrett Saxon, Cinthia Guzman, Kathryn Gaitan, Nancy Trevino, and James Thompson, all
employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and (2) allowing an assigned
judge to preside when Smith objected to the assignment prior to his final hearing. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Smith is an inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell Unit in
Beeville, Texas. In his original petition, Smith alleges that Rayford, an officer at the
McConnell Unit, issued a false disciplinary report against him for allegedly threatening
her on July 14, 2017. Smith asserted that Rayford’s fellow employees—Furr, Saxon,
Guzman, Gaitan, Trevino, and Thompson—supported Rayford in her “bogus report” by
making “false representations” and “alter[ing] witness statements.” He further alleged
that they “hid exculpatory evidence” and “alter[ed] the charging instrument.” Smith also
asserted that nepotism was involved in the incident because Rayford’s husband is a
warden at the McConnell Unit.
According to Smith, his “disciplinary case was finally overturned at the Step 2
Grievance level.” On December 19, 2017, Smith sued appellees for threat of bodily
injury, fraud, breach of contract, respondeat superior, conspiracy, and assisting and
encouraging. He cited the grievance decision as proof of his claim. In his original
petition, he “object[ed] to the referral of this case to an associate judge for hearing a trial
on the merits or presiding at a jury trial.” He sought exemplary damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.
2 On December 21, 2017, Judge David Peeples, Presiding Judge of the Fourth
Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, assigned Senior Judge Joel B. Johnson to
preside over this case. Smith then filed “Plaintiff[’]s Objection to Assigned Judge and to
Recuse [sic].” It was dated January 9, 2018 and postmarked January 10, 2018. He
filed another objection on March 21, 2018. The trial court dismissed the case as frivolous
on May 31, 2018. The final judgment does not state whether the dismissal is with
prejudice. Smith appealed.
II. DISMISSAL OF CHAPTER 14 LITIGATION
By his first issue, Smith complains that the trial court dismissed his lawsuit against
appellees “for failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.”
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s dismissal of a claim pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code under an abuse of discretion standard. Wanzer v.
Garcia, 299 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied); see also
McCann v. De Hoyos, No. 13-18-00528-CV, 2019 WL 3820427, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 15, 2019, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The trial court abuses
its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules
and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 238, 241–42 (Tex.
1985). “The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary
authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not
demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Id. at 242.
3 A trial court may dismiss an inmate’s claim as frivolous or malicious under Chapter
14 based on the following factors: the claim’s ultimate chance of success; whether the
claim has an arguable basis in law or fact; whether it is clear that the party cannot prove
facts in support of the claim; or whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous
claim filed by the petitioner because it arises from the same operative facts. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(2). “A claim has no arguable basis in
law if it relies upon an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Fernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Justice, 341 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). Dismissal with
prejudice is improper if the dismissal is based on procedural defects that the inmate can
correct. See id. However, if the claim has no arguable basis in law, then dismissal with
prejudice is proper. Id.
B. Analysis
We note that there is no civil cause of action for “assisting and encouraging,” as
Smith alleges in his original petition. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion for dismissing this cause because it has no arguable basis in law. See id.
Similarly, Smith’s breach of contract claim fails, too, because Smith has not identified any
binding contract between him and the named appellees. See id.; see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b)(3) (providing that trial courts can dismiss cases
when “it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim”).
Regarding Smith’s remaining causes of action—common law fraud, “threat of
bodily injury,” respondeat superior, and conspiracy—we note that all of the appellees
were employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell Unit. Section
4 101.106 of the Texas Tort Claims Act states:
[i]f a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only. On the employee’s motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f). A suit is completely foreclosed against
a government employee in his individual capacity if he is acting within the scope of his
employment. Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 381 (Tex. 2011). The Texas
Supreme Court in Franka held that a case is considered against an employee within his
or her official capacity if: (1) the defendant was an employee of a governmental unit; (2)
the defendant was acting within the general scope of his employment; and (3) the suit
could have been brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act against the agency. See id.
Here, all of the appellees meet the first Franka element: they are all employees
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell facility, a governmental unit.
See Lopez v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NUMBER 13-18-00395-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
RICHARD SMITH, Appellant,
v.
JODIE RAYFORD, ET AL., Appellees.
On appeal from the 156th District Court of Bee County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Hinojosa and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
This is an inmate litigation case brought under Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.001 et al.
By two issues, appellant Richard Smith complains that the trial court abused its discretion
by: (1) dismissing his lawsuit against appellees Jodie Rayford, Corey Furr, Garrett Saxon, Cinthia Guzman, Kathryn Gaitan, Nancy Trevino, and James Thompson, all
employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and (2) allowing an assigned
judge to preside when Smith objected to the assignment prior to his final hearing. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Smith is an inmate at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell Unit in
Beeville, Texas. In his original petition, Smith alleges that Rayford, an officer at the
McConnell Unit, issued a false disciplinary report against him for allegedly threatening
her on July 14, 2017. Smith asserted that Rayford’s fellow employees—Furr, Saxon,
Guzman, Gaitan, Trevino, and Thompson—supported Rayford in her “bogus report” by
making “false representations” and “alter[ing] witness statements.” He further alleged
that they “hid exculpatory evidence” and “alter[ed] the charging instrument.” Smith also
asserted that nepotism was involved in the incident because Rayford’s husband is a
warden at the McConnell Unit.
According to Smith, his “disciplinary case was finally overturned at the Step 2
Grievance level.” On December 19, 2017, Smith sued appellees for threat of bodily
injury, fraud, breach of contract, respondeat superior, conspiracy, and assisting and
encouraging. He cited the grievance decision as proof of his claim. In his original
petition, he “object[ed] to the referral of this case to an associate judge for hearing a trial
on the merits or presiding at a jury trial.” He sought exemplary damages, declaratory
relief, and injunctive relief.
2 On December 21, 2017, Judge David Peeples, Presiding Judge of the Fourth
Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, assigned Senior Judge Joel B. Johnson to
preside over this case. Smith then filed “Plaintiff[’]s Objection to Assigned Judge and to
Recuse [sic].” It was dated January 9, 2018 and postmarked January 10, 2018. He
filed another objection on March 21, 2018. The trial court dismissed the case as frivolous
on May 31, 2018. The final judgment does not state whether the dismissal is with
prejudice. Smith appealed.
II. DISMISSAL OF CHAPTER 14 LITIGATION
By his first issue, Smith complains that the trial court dismissed his lawsuit against
appellees “for failure to comply with Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.”
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s dismissal of a claim pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code under an abuse of discretion standard. Wanzer v.
Garcia, 299 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, pet. denied); see also
McCann v. De Hoyos, No. 13-18-00528-CV, 2019 WL 3820427, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 15, 2019, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). The trial court abuses
its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules
and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.3d 238, 241–42 (Tex.
1985). “The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary
authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not
demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Id. at 242.
3 A trial court may dismiss an inmate’s claim as frivolous or malicious under Chapter
14 based on the following factors: the claim’s ultimate chance of success; whether the
claim has an arguable basis in law or fact; whether it is clear that the party cannot prove
facts in support of the claim; or whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous
claim filed by the petitioner because it arises from the same operative facts. See TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(2), (b)(2). “A claim has no arguable basis in
law if it relies upon an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Fernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Justice, 341 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). Dismissal with
prejudice is improper if the dismissal is based on procedural defects that the inmate can
correct. See id. However, if the claim has no arguable basis in law, then dismissal with
prejudice is proper. Id.
B. Analysis
We note that there is no civil cause of action for “assisting and encouraging,” as
Smith alleges in his original petition. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion for dismissing this cause because it has no arguable basis in law. See id.
Similarly, Smith’s breach of contract claim fails, too, because Smith has not identified any
binding contract between him and the named appellees. See id.; see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b)(3) (providing that trial courts can dismiss cases
when “it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim”).
Regarding Smith’s remaining causes of action—common law fraud, “threat of
bodily injury,” respondeat superior, and conspiracy—we note that all of the appellees
were employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell Unit. Section
4 101.106 of the Texas Tort Claims Act states:
[i]f a suit is filed against an employee of a governmental unit based on conduct within the general scope of that employee’s employment and if it could have been brought under this chapter against the governmental unit, the suit is considered to be against the employee in the employee’s official capacity only. On the employee’s motion, the suit against the employee shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff files amended pleadings dismissing the employee and naming the governmental unit as defendant on or before the 30th day after the date the motion is filed.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.106(f). A suit is completely foreclosed against
a government employee in his individual capacity if he is acting within the scope of his
employment. Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 381 (Tex. 2011). The Texas
Supreme Court in Franka held that a case is considered against an employee within his
or her official capacity if: (1) the defendant was an employee of a governmental unit; (2)
the defendant was acting within the general scope of his employment; and (3) the suit
could have been brought under the Texas Tort Claims Act against the agency. See id.
Here, all of the appellees meet the first Franka element: they are all employees
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice McConnell facility, a governmental unit.
See Lopez v. Serna, 414 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). As
to the second Franka requirement, the Texas Tort Claims Act defines scope of
employment as “the performance for a governmental unit of the duties of an employee’s
office or employment and includes being in and about the performance of a task lawfully
assigned to an employee by a competent authority.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.001(5). Because it is within appellees’ job description to cooperate with all internal
investigations regarding alleged threats made by inmates, we conclude that appellees
were acting within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the actions
5 complained of in Smith’s petition. See Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 894.
Finally, we hold that the third Franka prong is satisfied, too. “[I]f a state employee
is alleged to have committed . . . ‘wrongful conduct’ in the general scope of employment,
then the suit is subject to section 101.106(f) because it could have been brought against
the state agency.” Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 895 (citing Franka, 332 S.W.3d at 381). This
tenet applies to both unintentional and intentional torts. See id. Accordingly, Smith’s
suit is subject to § 101.106(f) of the civil practice and remedies code. His lawsuit is
against the appellees in their official, not individual, capacities, and the appellees were
entitled to have the case dismissed against them and have Smith name the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) as the sole defendant. See id. Smith’s claim
against the Department, however, is barred by sovereign immunity because the Texas
Tort Claims Act does not expressly waive immunity for intentional torts. See id. at 896.
In sum, because the appellees were acting in the scope of their employment, any
suit brought against them in their individual capacities is barred. See Franka, 332
S.W.3d at 381. And if Smith named the TDCJ as the sole defendant in his claim, that
claim would be barred by sovereign immunity. See Lopez, 414 S.W.3d at 896.
The trial court did not err in dismissing Smith’s claims because they have no basis
in law. See Fernandez, 341 S.W.3d at 13. We cannot say the trial court’s decision to
dismiss was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Downer, 701 S.W.3d at 241–42. We
overrule Smith’s first issue.
III. OBJECTION TO ASSOCIATE JUDGE
By his second issue, Smith asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it
6 allowed an assigned judge to rule on the final judgment when he had objected to the
judge prior to any hearing.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
Harris County v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018). Assigned judges are active,
retired or senior judges. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.054. An assigned judge may
not hear a case if a party submits a timely objection no later than seven days after the
party receives actual notice of the assignment or before the first hearing of the trial,
whichever is sooner. See id. § 74.053. A timely objection to a judge “assigned” under
Chapter 74 of the Texas Government Code is automatically effective and any subsequent
order rendered by the assigned judge is void. In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.
2001) (orig. proceeding).
Smith claims that he preemptively objected to the judge in his original petition.
Specifically, his initial filing “object[ed] to the referral of this case to an associate judge for
hearing a trial on the merits or presiding at a jury trial.” However, Judge Johnson is an
assigned judge, not an associate judge. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.054. The
order appointing him set forth that Judge Johnson was the “Senior Judge of the 156th
District Court of the State of Texas.” See id.
We also find that Smith’s objection was premature. See Discovery Operating, Inc.
v. Baskin, 855 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ); see also In re
Carnera, No. 05-16-00055-CV, 2016 WL 323654, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 27, 2016,
7 no pet.) (mem. op.). “A party does not possess the right to object to the assignment of
a visiting judge before the assignment takes place.” Discovery Operating, Inc., 855
S.W.2d at 887. “Section 74.053 clearly contemplates that assigned judge objections will
be filed after the assignment of a judge to whom a party objects, not that parties can file
pro forma blanket objections to assigned judges at the time they file their initial pleadings.”
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.054; see also In re Carnera, 2016 WL 323654, at *2.
Here, Smith filed his original petition and objection on December 19, 2017, but the
Presiding Judge of the Fourth Administrative Judicial Region did not appoint Judge
Johnson until December 21, 2017. Accordingly, the objection in Smith’s original petition
did not preserve this issue.
Smith later filed “Plaintiff[’]s Objection to Assigned Judge and to Recuse” on
January 9, 2018. However, because the deadline for filing an objection to an assigned
judge is seven days after the notice of appointment or the case’s first hearing, whichever
is sooner, Smith missed the deadline. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053. To be
timely, Smith must have filed his objection by December 28, 2017—seven days after the
appointment of Judge Johnson.
We overrule Smith’s second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
LETICIA HINOJOSA Justice
Delivered and filed the 24th day of October, 2019.