Richard Scott v. Dr. Havens

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 30, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00648
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT TACOMA 6 RICHARD SCOTT, Case No. 2:25-cv-00648-RAJ-TLF 7 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND 8 RECOMMENDATION HAVENS, 9 Noted for November 14, 2025 Defendant. 10

11 This is a civil rights action proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 19831. Plaintiff Richard 12 Scott, proceeding pro se, is confined at the Special Commitment Center (“SCC”). See 13 Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges in this action that he has received inadequate medical care in 14 violation of his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Dkt. 15 1. 16 This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendant Dr. Havens to 17 dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 Dkt. 9. Plaintiff filed a response opposing defendant’s motion. Dkt. 11. In reviewing 19 plaintiff’s response, the Court found some pages to be illegible, and therefore, 20 requested that plaintiff re-file the illegible pages. Dkt. 15. Plaintiff filed another copy of 21 1 Plaintiff has a long history of abusive litigation tactics and is the subject of case management orders in 22 the Western District of Washington. See Scott v. Seling, et al., No. 3:04-cv-05147-RJB, Dkt. 152 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2004) (case management order entered in six total cases on same date); Scott, No. 3:04- 23 cv-05147-RJB, Dkt. 170 (case management order entered in eleven total cases on same date); Scott v. Weinberg, et al., No. 3:06-cv-05172-FDB, Dkt. 95 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2007). Such orders do not apply 24 in this case because plaintiff has paid the full filing fee. See docket. 1 his original motion on September 15, 2025, but did not correct the illegible pages. Dkt. 2 17. 3 The Court, having considered plaintiff’s complaint, defendant’s motion to dismiss, 4 all briefing of the parties, and the governing law, concludes that defendant’s motion

5 should be granted, and plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint. 6 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 7 Plaintiff, a 77-year-old detainee, alleges Dr. Havens, the Medical Department 8 Director at SCC, acted with deliberate indifference when Dr. Havens “asked the physical 9 therapist to take Scott down a flight of stairs,” and his pulse “jumped to 170.” He states 10 he received a “medical HSR” for no more than 6 stairs and suffers from shortness of 11 breath and vertigo. Dkt. 1 at 2-3. 12 Plaintiff further alleges he was diagnosed with diabetes, as having “high ACi,” 13 COPD, dementia and a thyroid condition. Id. at 3. He asserts that X-rays have shown 14 that plaintiff’s neck is arthritic and he has a growth in his lungs. Id. He alleges Dr. 15 Havens has refused to increase plaintiff’s Alzheimer medications “as recommended 16 over time.” Id. He also states he has not received treatment or medication for his high 17 “ACi”, diabetes, or shortness of breath. Id. Plaintiff states he was “recently” seen in the 18 trauma room for shortness of breath and high blood pressure. Id. at 3. 19 Plaintiff also complained of involuntary bowel movements and asked for diapers 20 but was denied that request. Id. at 3, 4. Plaintiff did not identify who he complained to or 21 who denied his request for diapers. 22 Plaintiff states he asked to see an optometrist 10 times over the last 9 months 23 due to eye pain but was not permitted to do so. Plaintiff did not identify the name of 24 1 person(s) responsible and he does not assert that he communicated with a particular 2 person about his request or the official position or job classification of the person. 3 Plaintiff next alleges Dr. Havens refused to allow plaintiff to purchase transitional 4 glasses despite having the appropriate prescription. Id. at 4.

5 He asserts he has experienced episodes of lower back pain when standing and 6 has asked for a walker with a seat, but plaintiff asserts he was “not even seen” despite 7 Dr. Havens allegedly having knowledge that plaintiff “wonders/weaves” when he walks, 8 “often bouncing off walk or other persons.” Id. 9 Plaintiff requests $50,000 in damages and “any other relief the court feels is 10 needed to correct constitutional and ADA violations.” Id. at 5. 11 DISCUSSION 12 A. Legal Standards 13 1. Motion to Dismiss Standard 14 Defendant moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 15 Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that plaintiff fails to adequately state a claim for relief 16 under § 1983. Dkt. 9. A defendant may move for dismissal under this rule when a 17 plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 19 matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 20 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 21 570 (2007)). 22 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 23 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 24 1 misconduct alleged.” Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 2 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ . . . Nor does a complaint 3 suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. at 4 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

5 Dismissal may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 6 absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica 7 Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss, the 8 Court accepts all facts alleged in the complaint as true and makes all inferences in the 9 light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 10 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The Court liberally construes a pro 11 se pleading. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010); Pena v. Gardner, 12 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992). But the Court “may not supply essential elements of 13 the claim that were not initially pled[,]” Pena, 976 F.2d at 471, and “‘conclusory 14 allegations of law and unwarranted inferences’ will not defeat an otherwise proper

15 motion to dismiss,” Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 16 2007) (citations omitted). 17 2. Section 1983 Standard 18 To sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that 19 (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal 20 statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of 21 state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). 22 The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a plaintiff demonstrates 23 that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another’s affirmative act, or

24 1 omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the 2 deprivation complained of. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th 3 Cir. 1981) (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The inquiry 4 into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of

5 each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 6 constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). 7 A supervisor is liable for acts of subordinates when the supervisor either 8 participates in or directs subordinates in committing violations or knows of the violations 9 being committed by subordinates and fails to take action to prevent them. Vasquez v. 10 County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020). 11 Plaintiff must assert sufficient facts to show that a defendant whose individual 12 actions do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, was nevertheless an integral 13 participant in the violation of plaintiff’s federal statutory or constitutional rights, based on 14 facts that establish either: “(1) the defendant knew about and acquiesced in the

15 constitutionally defective conduct as part of a common plan with those whose conduct 16 constituted the violation, or (2) the defendant set in motion a series of acts by others 17 which the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to 18 inflict the constitutional injury.” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2022). 19 Supervisors may not, however, be held liable merely for being present at the scene of a 20 constitutional violation or for being a member of the same operational unit as a 21 wrongdoer. Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 820 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Jones v. 22 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2002)). 23

24 1 Liability cannot be imposed based on a team effort – the plaintiff must allege 2 facts to show more than but-for causation – plaintiff must assert facts regarding each 3 individuals’ knowledge or intent, and each individual’s acts or failure to act. Peck v. 4 Montoya, 51 F.4th at 890-891. A mere bystander cannot be liable under section 1983;

5 “an official whose individual actions do not themselves rise to the level of a 6 constitutional violation may be held liable under section 1983 only if the official is an 7 integral participant in the unlawful act.” Id. at 889 (citations and internal quotation marks 8 omitted). 9 Sweeping conclusory allegations against an official are insufficient to state a 10 claim for relief. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff must set 11 forth the specific factual basis supporting his claim for each defendant's liability. Aldabe 12 v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 13 To prevail on a claim against a defendant that acts, or omits to act, in the role of 14 supervisor, plaintiff would be required prove each of the following elements by a 15 preponderance of the evidence, according to the Ninth Circuit’s Pattern Civil Jury 16 Instructions for civil rights actions under § 1983: 17 1. the supervisory defendant acted under color of state law;

18 2. the [act[s]] [failure to act] of the supervisory defendant’s subordinate[s] [name[s]] deprived the plaintiff of particular rights under [the laws of the 19 United States] [the United States Constitution] as explained in later instructions; 20

3. [the supervisory defendant directed subordinate[s] in the [act[s]] [failure 21 to act] that deprived the plaintiff of these rights;] 22 or

23 [the supervisory defendant set in motion a series of acts by subordinate[s], or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts 24 1 by subordinate[s], that the supervisor knew or reasonably should have known would cause the subordinate[s] to deprive the plaintiff of these 2 rights;] or 3

[(a) the supervisory defendant knew that the subordinate[s] were 4 engaging in these act[s] and knew or reasonably should have known that the subordinate[’s][s’] conduct would deprive the plaintiff 5 of these rights; and

6 (b) the supervisory defendant failed to act to prevent the subordinate[s] from engaging in such conduct;] 7 or 8 [(a) the supervisory defendant disregarded the known or obvious 9 consequence that a particular training deficiency or omission would cause [his][her] subordinate[s] to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional 10 rights; and

11 (b) that deficiency or omission actually caused the subordinates to deprive the plaintiff of plaintiff’s constitutional rights;] 12 or

13 [the supervisory defendant engaged in conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the deprivation by the subordinate of the rights of 14 others;] 15 and

16 4. The supervisory defendant’s conduct was so closely related to the 17 deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights as to be the moving force that caused the ultimate 18 injury. 19 Ninth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 9.4 (updated March 2025). 20 Though plaintiff’s pleading is not entirely clear, he appears to assert an 21 independent claim of denial of adequate medical care against defendant Havens. 22 Plaintiff’s medical care claim implicates his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 Such claims are governed by the standard set forth in Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 24 1 307, 321-22 (1982). “Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to 2 more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose 3 conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Id. Because of this, the court 4 evaluates a civilly committed detainee’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment,

5 rather than the Eighth Amendment, and determines whether the plaintiff’s allegations 6 fall into the “professional judgment” articulated in Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321–324. 7 See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 443 (9th Cir. 2016); Samuels v. Ahlin, 2017 8 WL 6594635 at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2017). 9 A plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s “‘conduct diverge[d] from that of a 10 reasonable professional.’” Mitchell, 818 F.3d at 443 (quoting Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of 11 Soc. & Health Serv., 648 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2011)). “[L]iability may be imposed 12 only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from 13 accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 14 person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg,

15 457 U.S. at 323. Mere negligence or medical malpractice is not sufficient to 16 demonstrate a constitutional violation. See Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 842–43 (4th 17 Cir. 2001) (applying Youngberg to a denial of medical care for a civilly committed 18 psychiatric patient and holding more than negligence is required to state a constitutional 19 violation). 20 Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim 21 against defendant Havens relating to the adequacy of the medical care he is receiving 22 at SCC. In his pleading, plaintiff lists medical issues and notes the reasons he believes 23 the responses to at least some of the identified issues have been unsatisfactory. That

24 1 plaintiff was dissatisfied with the responses he received to his medical issues does not 2 give rise to an inference that Dr. Havens did not exercise reasonable professional 3 judgment in relation to his care. 4 Plaintiff alleges only one instance where Dr. Havens personally participated in a

5 medical decision affecting plaintiff’s treatment – plaintiff alleges Dr. Havens declined to 6 increase his medication. At most plaintiff claims that Dr. Havens was aware that plaintiff 7 “wonders/weaves” but “refuses to give him a walker.” Dkt. 1 at ¶ 3.25. This allegation 8 potentially may state a claim for state law negligence or medical malpractice but is 9 insufficient to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation. “[L]iability may be 10 imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from 11 accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the 12 person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Youngberg, 13 457 U.S. at 323. Mere negligence or medical malpractice is not sufficient to 14 demonstrate a constitutional violation. See Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d at 842–43.

15 Plaintiff does not explicitly name Dr. Havens as a defendant in her supervisory 16 role. But even if the Court construes plaintiff’s complaint liberally and infers plaintiff 17 intended to name Dr. Havens as a defendant in her supervisory role, he fails to show 18 either personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or that Dr. Havens was 19 involved less directly -- by supervising others as described in the other factual scenarios 20 (see Ninth Circuit Civil Pattern Instruction 9.4, above) that would show a sufficient 21 causal connection between Dr. Havens’ alleged wrongful conduct and the constitutional 22 violation. See Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2022). 23

24 1 In the remainder of the complaint, plaintiff either relies on vague references to 2 “medical staff” or does not identify an individual responsible for the alleged constitutional 3 violations at all. For example, plaintiff states he was seen in the trauma room for 4 shortness of breath and high blood pressure and complained about involuntary bowel

5 movements. Dkt. 1 at 3. He also separately alleges he asked to see the optometrist 6 several times but was unable to and asked for diapers to help with his involuntary bowel 7 movements but was denied that request. 8 Plaintiff failed to connect these allegations to Dr. Havens or any other individual. 9 He does not identify what Dr. Havens knew, when she knew it, whether she acted or 10 failed to act, or any facts that would show causation. And, plaintiff’s Fourteenth 11 Amendment claim against Dr. Havens is insufficient because he fails to assert any facts 12 directly connecting defendant Havens to the medical care decisions at issue. See Ivey 13 v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Vague and 14 conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

15 withstand a motion to dismiss.”). 16 Thus, plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against Dr. Havens should be 17 DISMISSED. 18 3. Americans with Disabilities Act 19 Defendant also argues that plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a 20 claim for a violation of the ADA. Title II of the ADA provides in pertinent part that “no 21 qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 22 participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a 23 public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

24 1 In order to state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, 2 plaintiff must allege four elements: “(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is 3 otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's 4 services, programs, or activities; (3) he was either excluded from participation in or

5 denied the benefits of the public entity's services ... or was otherwise discriminated 6 against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial ... or discrimination was by 7 reason of his disability.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 8 2004). Title II applies to confinement facilities like prisons and jails. Pennsylvania Dept. 9 of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (the “plain text of Title II of the ADA 10 unambiguously extends to state prison inmates”). The Ninth Circuit has explained that 11 “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for 12 disability.” Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 13 Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996)). 14 Here, plaintiff does not explicitly state he has a disability under the ADA, but the

15 complaint describes several impairments, including Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, and 16 diabetes. Even if the Court assumes for purposes of this analysis that plaintiff has 17 alleged a disability under the ADA , plaintiff does not allege that he was prevented from 18 participating in or benefitting from SCC programs or services because of a disability. 19 The complaint claims that he has not been provided the treatment required for his 20 conditions; he does not assert anywhere in his complaint that he was discriminated 21 against because of his disabilities. A claim asserted under the ADA is not the 22 appropriate mechanism for challenging the lack of treatment for a medical condition. 23 Plaintiff's ADA claim should therefore be dismissed.

24 1 4. Leave to Amend 2 The Ninth Circuit has “established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit 3 must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is 4 clear that they cannot be overcome by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132,

5 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). In dismissing for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 6 district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was 7 made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 8 allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal 9 citations and quotation marks omitted). 10 The plaintiff would potentially be able to overcome the deficiencies in his 11 complaint with respect to his § 1983 claim and ADA claim against defendant Havens, if 12 there are additional facts and contentions that he could allege and support his claims. 13 Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against defendant Havens should be dismissed without 14 prejudice and with leave to amend within thirty (30) days of the order adopting this

15 report and recommendation. If plaintiff files an amended complaint, he is required to file 16 a new document identified as the amended complaint. The Court will not recognize an 17 addendum to the current complaint, or separate brief to add claims to the current 18 complaint; the amended complaint would be a complete substitute for the current 19 proposed complaint and may not be filed an attachment or supplement. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons set forth above, this Court concludes that plaintiff has not 22 adequately stated any claim for relief against defendant Havens and therefore 23 recommends that defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) be GRANTED.

24 1 The Court further recommends that plaintiff’s claims against defendant Havens should 2 be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend within thirty (30) days of the 3 order adopting this report and recommendation. 4 A proposed Order accompanies this Report and Recommendation.

5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties shall 6 have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for 8 purposes of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can 9 result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 10 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations 11 omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the Clerk is 12 directed to set the matter for consideration on November 14, 2025, as noted in the 13 caption. 14

15 Dated this 30th day of October, 2025. 16 17

18 A

19 Theresa L. Fricke United States Magistrate Judge 20

21 22 23 24