1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RICHARD REED, Case No. 25-cv-04030-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST Re: ECF No. 14 COMPANY, 11 Defendant.
13 Before the Court is Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s motion to 14 dismiss. ECF No. 14. The Court will grant the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 For the purpose of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in 17 the complaint, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff Richard Reed filed this action on May 8, 2025, alleging “an 18 egregious, prolonged, and concealed fraudulent scheme orchestrated by Defendants Deutsche 19 Bank . . . and associated agents, who unlawfully deprived Plaintiff Richard Reed of his property 20 through a wrongful foreclosure.” Id. at 1–2. On or about October 17, 2006, Reed obtained a 21 mortgage loan through Kay-Co Investments. Id. at 3. Unbeknownst to Reed, the load was 22 securitized and transferred into a securitized trust. Id. Deutsche Bank transferred the loan to itself 23 via a fraudulent Assignment of Deed of Trust, then initiated foreclosure proceedings and 24 conducted a foreclosure sale. Id. at 3–4. “Only after commissioning a forensic mortgage audit in 25 2023–2024 was [Reed] able to uncover for the first time that: [t]he loan had been securitized years 26 earlier [and] [t]he Assignment to Deutsche Bank was fabricated.” Id. 27 Reed asserts claims for: (1) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 1 (3) violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq; (4) violation of the 2 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); (5) unjust enrichment; (6) civil conspiracy; (7) 3 violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq; (8) breach 4 of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (9) violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 5 Amendments Due Process and Takings Clauses; (10) declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201; 6 and (11) injunctive relief. 7 On June 9, 2025, Deutsche Bank moved to dismiss. ECF No. 14. Reed opposes the 8 motion, ECF No. 19, and Deutsche Bank has filed a reply, ECF No. 22. The Court took this 9 matter under submission without a hearing on August 25, 2025. ECF No. 35. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 12 “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 13 dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant may raise the defense of lack of subject 14 matter jurisdiction by motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The party 15 asserting subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. Kokkonen v. Guardian 16 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 17 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 18 To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a 19 complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 20 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal “is appropriate only where the complaint 21 lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 22 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint 23 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 24 on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 25 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Factual allegations need not be detailed, but the facts must be “enough to 26 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 558 U.S. at 555. 27 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 1 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard is not “akin to a ‘probability requirement’ . . . it 2 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 3 Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 4 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops shorts of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement 5 to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 558 U.S. at 557). 6 In determining whether a plaintiff has met the plausibility requirement, a court must 7 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 8 favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d at 1072. 9 III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 10 “As a general rule, [the Court] may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 11 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998–99 (9th 12 Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “[t]he [C]ourt may 13 judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known 14 within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from 15 sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court 16 “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary 17 information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 18 Deutsche Bank requests that the Court take judicial notice of three documents. Reed does 19 not respond to the request. The first document is a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, instrument number 20 2010182113, recorded on or about June 30, 2010, with the Alameda County Recorder’s Office. 21 ECF No. 12-1 at 2–5. Courts regularly take judicial notice of deeds of trust and similar public 22 records. See Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 23 (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court grants the request. 24 Deutsche Bank also asks the Court to take judicial notice of two documents filed in 25 Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. 24CV089754: the First Amended Complaint filed on 26 January 6, 2025, ECF No. 12-1 at 7–23, and the Judgment of Dismissal entered on May 22, 2025, 27 ECF No. 12-1 at 25–26. The Court may take judicial notice of court filings such as these. Reyn’s 1 Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (providing that a court “may take notice of 2 proceedings in other courts . . . if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 3 Accordingly, the Court grants the request and takes judicial notice of the documents. 4 IV.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 RICHARD REED, Case No. 25-cv-04030-JST
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS
10 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST Re: ECF No. 14 COMPANY, 11 Defendant.
13 Before the Court is Defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s motion to 14 dismiss. ECF No. 14. The Court will grant the motion. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 For the purpose of deciding this motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations in 17 the complaint, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff Richard Reed filed this action on May 8, 2025, alleging “an 18 egregious, prolonged, and concealed fraudulent scheme orchestrated by Defendants Deutsche 19 Bank . . . and associated agents, who unlawfully deprived Plaintiff Richard Reed of his property 20 through a wrongful foreclosure.” Id. at 1–2. On or about October 17, 2006, Reed obtained a 21 mortgage loan through Kay-Co Investments. Id. at 3. Unbeknownst to Reed, the load was 22 securitized and transferred into a securitized trust. Id. Deutsche Bank transferred the loan to itself 23 via a fraudulent Assignment of Deed of Trust, then initiated foreclosure proceedings and 24 conducted a foreclosure sale. Id. at 3–4. “Only after commissioning a forensic mortgage audit in 25 2023–2024 was [Reed] able to uncover for the first time that: [t]he loan had been securitized years 26 earlier [and] [t]he Assignment to Deutsche Bank was fabricated.” Id. 27 Reed asserts claims for: (1) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 1 (3) violation of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq; (4) violation of the 2 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); (5) unjust enrichment; (6) civil conspiracy; (7) 3 violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq; (8) breach 4 of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (9) violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 5 Amendments Due Process and Takings Clauses; (10) declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201; 6 and (11) injunctive relief. 7 On June 9, 2025, Deutsche Bank moved to dismiss. ECF No. 14. Reed opposes the 8 motion, ECF No. 19, and Deutsche Bank has filed a reply, ECF No. 22. The Court took this 9 matter under submission without a hearing on August 25, 2025. ECF No. 35. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 12 “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 13 dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant may raise the defense of lack of subject 14 matter jurisdiction by motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The party 15 asserting subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. Kokkonen v. Guardian 16 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 17 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 18 To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a 19 complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 20 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal “is appropriate only where the complaint 21 lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 22 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint 23 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 24 on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 25 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Factual allegations need not be detailed, but the facts must be “enough to 26 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 558 U.S. at 555. 27 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 1 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. While this standard is not “akin to a ‘probability requirement’ . . . it 2 asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 3 Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a 4 defendant’s liability, it ‘stops shorts of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement 5 to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 558 U.S. at 557). 6 In determining whether a plaintiff has met the plausibility requirement, a court must 7 “accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 8 favorable” to the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d at 1072. 9 III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 10 “As a general rule, [the Court] may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 11 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 998–99 (9th 12 Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, “[t]he [C]ourt may 13 judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known 14 within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from 15 sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court 16 “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary 17 information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). 18 Deutsche Bank requests that the Court take judicial notice of three documents. Reed does 19 not respond to the request. The first document is a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, instrument number 20 2010182113, recorded on or about June 30, 2010, with the Alameda County Recorder’s Office. 21 ECF No. 12-1 at 2–5. Courts regularly take judicial notice of deeds of trust and similar public 22 records. See Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 23 (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court grants the request. 24 Deutsche Bank also asks the Court to take judicial notice of two documents filed in 25 Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. 24CV089754: the First Amended Complaint filed on 26 January 6, 2025, ECF No. 12-1 at 7–23, and the Judgment of Dismissal entered on May 22, 2025, 27 ECF No. 12-1 at 25–26. The Court may take judicial notice of court filings such as these. Reyn’s 1 Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (providing that a court “may take notice of 2 proceedings in other courts . . . if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 3 Accordingly, the Court grants the request and takes judicial notice of the documents. 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 Deutsche Bank argues that Reed’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, fall 6 outside the applicable statutes of limitations, and are insufficiently supported by factual 7 allegations. The Court concludes that res judicata bars Reed’s claims and that his claims must 8 therefore be dismissed with prejudice. 9 A. Res Judicata 10 Reed filed a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank in the Superior Court of California, County of 11 Alameda that was dismissed in March 2025. ECF No. 12-1 at 25–26. Deutsche Bank contends 12 that res judicata thus bars Reed’s claims. ECF No. 14 at 4. 13 “Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation.” 14 Hatchitt v. U.S., 158 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1946). Res judicata, or “claim preclusion,” 15 effectuates this need by preventing a plaintiff from relitigating the same cause of action against the 16 same parties. Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits bars further 17 claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Headwaters Inc. v. U.S. 18 Forest Serv., 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 881 19 (9th Cir. 1997)). When determining whether a judgment by a California court has a res judicata 20 effect, the Full Faith and Credit Act requires a federal court to apply the res judicata law of 21 California to that judgment. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988) 22 (holding that the Full Faith and Credit Act “requires federal courts to apply the res judicata rules 23 of a particular state to judgments issued by courts of that state”). 24 In California, “[c]laim preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of 25 action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.” DKN 26 Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 824 (2015). “If claim preclusion is established, it 27 operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” Id. 1 1. Identical Claims 2 In determining whether a claim or issue is the same, California courts look to the primary 3 rights theory, in which “the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of 4 action.” San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Employees’ Retirement, 568 F.3d 5 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “What is critical to the 6 [primary rights] analysis is the harm suffered; that the same facts are involved in both suits is not 7 conclusive.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the primary rights theory, 8 claim preclusion will apply regardless of whether a particular cause of action was actually 9 litigated, so long as the party against whom claim preclusion is asserted “had the opportunity” to 10 litigate the claim in the prior action. Weikel v. TCW Realty Fund II Holding Co., 55 Cal. App. 4th 11 1234, 1245 (1997). 12 Here, all claims involve the violation of the same primary right that was litigated in the 13 state court action: the right to be free from an unlawful foreclosure. Both complaints are premised 14 on the notion that Deutsche Bank lacked the legal authority to foreclose on the property because 15 the instruments based on which the foreclosure was executed were invalid. ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2; 16 ECF No. 12-1 at 8–9. For that reason, Reed had the opportunity to assert in the state court action 17 the same claims he has asserted here. See Carollo v. Vericrest Fin., Inc., Case No. 11-cv-4767 18 YGR, 2012 WL 4343816, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012) (holding that first element of the res 19 judicata test was satisfied in an action for claims arising out of a foreclosure because the right “not 20 to be wrongfully foreclosed upon” was the primary right at issue both in that action and the prior 21 action). 22 Reed argues that “res judicata does not apply because the federal claims differ from those 23 in the state action” and “involve distinct legal theories and remedies . . . that were not available in 24 the state action.” ECF No. 19 at 2. But when a court issues a prior final judgment on the merits, it 25 “not only settles issues that were not actually litigated but also every issue that might have been 26 raised and litigated in the first action. It also precludes litigation of the same cause of action on a 27 different legal theory or for different relief.” Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa, 106 Cal. App. 3d 1 primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on 2 a different theory or seeks a different remedy.” Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666, 682 (1994) 3 (citations omitted). 4 Accordingly, the first element is satisfied. 5 2. Privity 6 Res judicata applies “to the relitigation of the same cause of action between the same 7 parties or those in privity with them.” DKN Holdings LLC, 61 Cal. 4th at 825 (emphasis in 8 original). Here, the privity requirement is satisfied because the actions involved the same parties, 9 since Reed sued Deutsche Bank in both the state court action and the instant action. ECF No. 1-1 10 at 1; ECF No. 12-1 at 7. 11 3. Final Judgment 12 The third element requires a showing that the prior case was finally decided on the merits. 13 DKN Holdings LLC, 61 Cal. 4th at 824 (2015). On March 4, 2025, in Reed’s state court action, 14 the court sustained Deutsche Bank’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action 15 with prejudice. ECF No. 12-2 at 25–26. “Dismissal with prejudice is determinative of the issues 16 in the action” and constitutes a final judgment on the merits, precluding the litigation of those 17 issues again. Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 214 Cal. App. 4th 1520, 18 1527 (2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The third element is accordingly 19 satisfied. 20 B. Leave to Amend 21 After a court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then determine whether to grant leave to 22 amend. Leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires” and should be granted 23 even absent an explicit request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th 24 Cir. 2000) (en banc). “Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the 25 discretion of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Proper reasons 26 for denying leave to amend, include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 27 movant, ... [and] futility of amendment.” Id. 1 would be futile and grants the motion to dismiss with prejudice. See, e.g., Factory Direct 2 Wholesale, LLC v. iTouchless Housewares & Prods., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 905, 918 (N.D. Cal. 3 2019) (dismissing a claim barred by claim preclusion with prejudice because amendment would be 4 futile); Herrera v. Countrywide KB Home Loans, No. 5:11-cv-03591-LHK, 2012 WL 901340, at 5 *5 (N.D. Cal. March 15, 2012) (same). 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Deutsche Bank’s motion to dismiss.! The 8 || action is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 Dated: October 27, 2025 11 JON S. TIGA 12 nited States District Judge
15 16
= 17
Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ' Tn light of this conclusion, the Court declines to address Deutsche Bank’s remaining arguments.