Richard M. Young, Jr. A/K/A Richard Young v. Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, John Silovsky as Wildlife Division Director of Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, and the State of Texas

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-24-00052-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 6/24/2025 11:38 AM No. 15-24-00052-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS IN THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (AUSTIN ) TEXAS AUSTIN, 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk Richard M. YOUNG, Jr. a/k/a Richard Young, Appellant vs.

TEXAS PARKS & WILDLIFE DEPARTMENT, et al., Appellees.

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PANEL REHEARING

This Court issued its Opinion on April 24, 2025, affirming the trial

court’s dismissal of Appellant’s inverse condemnation claims and

refusing to afford Appellant the opportunity to amend his live petition to

include additional jurisdictional facts. Because this Court’s Opinion

contains numerous errors, this Court should grant Appellant’s request

for a rehearing.

INTRODUCTION

A review of this Court’s Opinion readily proves three errors made

by this Court: (1) assuming jurisdiction over this eminent domain case,

which the Texas Legislature has excluded from this Court’s jurisdiction;

1 (2) relying on (even going so far to quote) the wrong petition (quoting the

original as opposed to the amended, which is substantially different); and

(3) failing to remand to allow Appellant Richard Young, a licensed

breeder of whitetail deer, to amend his live petition to assert additional

jurisdictional facts. This Court should withdraw its current Opinion and

fix these devastating errors that will lead to continued litigation on this

already controversial and embattled issue.

The underlying lawsuit brought by Young contends that the

conduct of Appellees (collectively referred to as “TPWD”) constitutes the

exercise of eminent domain over his ranch land, small business, and

breeder deer, causing him tremendous lost profits and damages. Before

and after taking Young’s personal and real property, TPWD afforded

Young no due process or adequate compensation. Thus, Young’s lawsuit

is not barred by sovereign immunity. Clear black letter law reveals these

claims are not barred by sovereign immunity, but this Court affirmed the

trial court’s plea to the jurisdiction.

TPWD says its conduct (constituting a taking) is authorized to

achieve the “public good” of controlling Chronic Wasting Disease

(“CWD”), which TPWD contends poses an existential threat to Texas’s

2 free-range whitetail deer population. Yet, the test utilized by TPWD –

called “the gold standard” – detects only the presence of a misfolded prion

within the body of the deer, which is not the equivalent of the presence of

CWD. Moreover, TPWD’s narrative, i.e., that untested breeder deer

living in doubly high-fenced pens will spread CWD to free-range deer, are

assumptions by TPWD that have yet to be tested in court or subjected to

a merits-based analysis.

TPWD’s sweeping CWD assumptions are unfounded and

unsupported by scientific data. In fact, TPWD has not performed any

substantial testing of Texas’s free-range population. The majority of

available Texas-based CWD data arises from privately-funded testing of

deer born and raised in breeder pens on the ranch lands of Texas

landowners, one of which is Young. The testing detects only the presence

of a misfolded, which may indicate CWD but could be indicative of other

things, in a deer isolated from others (and free-range deer) by high-

fencing. In fact, Texas’s free-range population has exploded in size since

the first misfolded prion was detected in Texas over a decade ago.

Nevertheless, because a non-evidentiary-based jurisdictional plea was

granted, Young’s eminent domain and due process claims were dismissed

3 -- based purely upon the ipse dixit of a TPWD veterinarian’s opinion that

remains untested. This Court’s insistence on locking Young out of the

courthouse only furthers the continued destruction of the deer breeding

industry in Texas.

REHEARING ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS EMINENT DOMAIN APPEAL

The August 26, 2024 Omnibus Transfer Order explained that

Young’s appeal, and about 60 others, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the Fifteenth Court. The statutory language explaining this Court’s

exclusive jurisdiction is expansive, affording this Court jurisdiction over

most “government” appeals. TEX. GOV’T CODE §22.220(d)(1). But not all

government appeals come to this Court, with the Texas Legislature

excluding appeals arising from:

(F) a condemnation proceeding for the acquisition of land or a proceeding related to eminent domain

Id. § 22.220(d)(1)(F) (emphasis added).

4 A. Eminent domain-related claims fall outside this Court’s appellate jurisdiction – takings cases are mandatorily filed in the county where the land is located.

Excluding proceedings related to eminent domain makes sense

because venue for eminent domain related cases is mandatory in the

county where the land is located. TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.013. Young’s case

alleges TPWD exerted eminent domain over his land, business, and

breeder deer, and so his lawsuit was filed in the county in which his land

is located – Gillespie County. That means any appeal arising therefrom

should go to the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, not this Court.

Significantly, when crafting this exception, the Texas Legislature

included two types of cases: (1) condemnation cases; and (2) “a proceeding

related to eminent domain.” TEX. GOV’T CODE §22.220(d)(1)(F). Clearly,

the exception to this Court’s jurisdiction is much broader than just

condemnation lawsuits initiated by governmental entities to acquire

land. To argue otherwise would be to render the second clause, “a

proceeding related to eminent domain,” meaningless, which is precluded..

Tex. Windstorm Ins. Assoc. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.3d 632, 640 (Tex. App. –

Beaumont 2023, pet. denied); Harris Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. Gas

Transmission Corp., 105 S.W.3d 88, 98 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.]

5 2003, pet. denied).

When “a proceeding related to eminent domain,” it is important to

remember that “[t]here is no statutory definition for ‘eminent domain.’”

JRJ Pusok Holdings, LLC v. State, 693 S.W.3d 679, 684-85 (Tex. App. –

Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, n.p.h.). When addressing what “eminent

domain” means, the JRJ Pusok court stated, “that phrase has a

longstanding meaning at common law, which we can consider in our

interpretation of Chapter 21,” noting the Black’s Dictionary definition

providing: “the inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately

owned property, esp. land, and convert it to public use, subject to

reasonable compensation for the taking.” Id. (citing City of San Antonio

v. Grandjean, 91 Tex. 430, 41 S.W. 477 (1897) (holding no particular

writing or judicial decree is necessary for the issue to fall within litigation

for “eminent domain”).

The Supreme Court of Texas often refers to “eminent domain” when

discussing Young’s type of condemnation claim -- inverse condemnation:

When the government takes private property without first paying for it, the owner may recover damages for inverse condemnation.” The elements of an inverse condemnation or “takings” claim are that (1) an entity with eminent domain power intentionally performed certain acts (2) that

6 resulted in taking, damaging, or destroying the property for, or applying it to, (3) public use.

Tex. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 25-26 (Tex. 2024) (citations

omitted & emphasis added). “The action is ‘inverse’ because an entity

with the power of eminent domain has not filed a statutory

condemnation action to determine adequate compensation before taking

the property, so the owner initiates an action for compensation under the

Constitution.” Id. n.9 (emphasis added); id. at 30 (“The point of a

constitutional action for inverse condemnation is to allow private

property owners to obtain compensation for other intentional

government conduct that takes, damages, destroys, or appropriates their

property for public use without any valid legal basis other than eminent

domain”) (emphasis added).

Looking across the Government Code, there are other situations

where a court’s jurisdiction turns on whether the case involves “eminent

domain”. For example, several provisions detail whether proceedings

shall be heard in a county court at law or a district court. See, e.g., TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.1032(c) (“county civil court at law has exclusive

jurisdiction in Harris County of eminent domain proceedings, both

statutory and inverse, if the amount in controversy . . . “); Villareal v.

7 Harris Cty., 226 S.W.3d 537, 543-44 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,

no pet.) (holding “that improper use of taxing power to accomplish a

taking of real property is a use of eminent domain power, and thus,

jurisdiction over any claim that alleges such rests exclusively in the

Harris County Civil Courts at Law”).

In this case, Young’s live petition states:

The actions of the Defendants amount to a taking or inverse condemnation, in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions. The actions of Defendants amount to an unlawful taking of Mr. Young’s real and personal property in violation of Mr. Young’s constitutional rights under Texas Constitution Article I, Section 19 and also protected under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Texas district and county courts at law have concurrent jurisdiction over eminent domain cases (direct condemnation and inverse condemnation). . . . This type of claim must be filed in a district court in the county in which the private real property owner’s affected property is located.

(CR162); (CR174) (“The requirements imposed by the governmental

action has precluded Mr. Young’s ability to use [his] personal and real

property in a manner allowed under Texas and federal law and has been

restricted by the laws, orders, mandates of the state and federal law. In

addition, the actions of Defendants place a stigma on the value of the

8 personal and real property, which will amount to at a minimum, a taking

of Mr. Young’s land (personal and real) without compensation as required

by the Federal and State constitution.”).

B. The majority of this Court’s Opinion addresses matters (eminent domain) outside this Court’s jurisdiction.

This Court’s Opinion makes it even more clear that this case is

“related eminent domain.” The Opinion spends over half of its content on

Young’s inverse condemnation claims as to his breeder deer, breeding

business, breeding permit, and ranch land. Young v. Tex. Parks &

Wildlife Dept., et. al, No. 15-24-00052-CV, 2025 WL 1200947 (Tex. App.

– Austin April 24, 2025, n.p.h.). Section II of the Opinion is entitled

“Takings or Inverse Condemnation.” Id. at *3. Section II(A) of the

Opinion addresses Young’s eminent domain claim about his breeder deer

(remember, this Court mistakenly quoted language from Young’s original

petition in an effort to state his position, but that pleading was no longer

live after the amended petition, which claimed full ownership of the

breeder deer, was filed).1 Then, Section II(B) of the Opinion addresses

Young’s eminent domain claim as to his ranch land. Id. at *5. Also, the

Young addresses this error within the Opinion in Section II of this Rehearing 1

Motion. 9 Opinion’s Section II(C) addresses Young’s eminent domain claim as to his

deer breeding permit and business. Id. at *6. Clearly, the majority of the

Opinion cites and analysis eminent domain law! This Court lacks

jurisdiction over this appeal. Simply put, the Opinion reveals this appeal

was a proceeding related to eminent domain, which falls outside the

jurisdiction of this Court.

C. This Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction on matters expressly excluded by the Texas Legislature unconstitutionally imposes a retroactive law.

The general rule is that “[a] statute is presumed to be prospective

in its operation unless expressly made retrospective”). TEX. GOVT. CODE

ANN. § 311.022. Here, the provision vesting the Fifteenth Court with

jurisdiction over certain types of appeals contains no language indicating

retroactive application. TEX. GOV’T CODE §22.220(d)(1). In fact, the Rule

of Appellate Procedure adopted to operate parallel to the statute

explicitly states it applies to appeals perfected after September 1, 2024.

Supra n.1 (discussing Rule 27A). Young’s appeal was perfected on July 3,

2024. (CR270).

The transfer of Young’s appeal from the Fourth Court, which holds

jurisdiction over the county where Young’s land is located, to the

10 Fifteenth Court violates the constitutional right against the imposition

of retroactive laws. Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution

provides that no “bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or

any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.” TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 16. “Constitutional retroactivity bars exist to ‘protect the

people’s reasonable, settled expectations.” Hogan v. Southern Methodist

University, 688 S.W.3d 852, 860 (Tex. 2024). Young had a reasonable and

settled expectation that when he prepared and filed his appeal, paying

the filing fee to the Fourth Court, which presides over the county where

his land, business, and breeder deer are located, that his appeal would be

heard by the Fourth Court.

Young understands that the Texas Legislature vested the Supreme

Court of Texas with authority to “order cases transferred from one court

of appeals to another at any time that, in the opinion of the supreme

court, there is good cause for the transfer.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §

73.001(a). The Order transferring Young’s appeal cites the legislation

creating the Fifteenth Court, demonstrating the transfer is based on the

exclusive jurisdiction provision, not docket equalization or any other

purpose. That motivation for the transfer, i.e., a belief that the appeal

11 falls within this Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, is acknowledged by the

transfer order language providing the transferred appeals (including

Young’s) are ones “that those Courts have determined are within the

exclusive intermediate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the

Fifteenth Court of Appeals District.”2

However, a comparison of Young’s live petition and this Opinion,

against the statutory exceptions to this Court’s jurisdiction, reveal that

Young’s appeal falls outside this Court’s jurisdiction. Despite the

Supreme Court of Texas’s Omnibus Transfer Order claiming “good

cause,” it simply does not exist. “Appellate jurisdiction cannot be created

by consent, stipulation of the parties, or waiver, either by the court or by

litigants.” Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania v. Am. Nat'l Fire

Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, no writ).

2 In Simmons v. State, an appellant challenged the constitutionality of the transfer of appeals for docket equalization purposes. 2009 WL 2341921 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d). The Simmons appellant based his challenge on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at *3 (“Observing that voters in the Fourth District elect justices to the Fourth Court of Appeals and transfer of his appeal to the Seventh Court of Appeals means it will be decided instead by justices elected by voters living in the Seventh District, appellant reasons that transfer of appeals of cases arising in the Fourth District deprives voters of the right to elect the appellate judges who will decide cases arising in their district.”). However, the appellate court rejected the challenge because the appellant failed to prove that “he has standing to litigate the Equal Protection rights of Fourth District voters.” Id. Young challenges the retroactive application of this statute in violation of constitution. 12 “Jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored by this court or

waived by the parties.” Id. “When jurisdiction does not lie in an appellate

court, it normally has only the power to recognize that fact and dismiss

the appeal for want of jurisdiction, regardless of any agreement or waiver

by the parties.” Id.

While a statute authorizes the Supreme Court of Texas to transfer

cases among intermediate appellate courts for “good cause,” the cause

cited for this transfer is invalid. Although Young knows the Supreme

Court of Texas has transferred other appeals for docket equalization to

low volume appellate courts, that did not occur here. The Supreme Court

of Texas outlined the reason for the transfer – exclusive jurisdiction -- but

a close review of the live pleading (and now this Court’s Opinion) reveals

Young’s claims fall outside the purported exclusive jurisdiction.

Furthermore, Young contends this Court’s issuance of an Opinion

constitutes the unconstitutional application of a retroactive law. Young

had a settled expectation that his appeal, when filed in one appellate

court, would be disposed of in that appellate court, other than for docket

equalization (which also involves intermediate appellate courts who are

vested with likewise civil and criminal jurisdiction and where the justices

13 presiding are duly elected as opposed to appointed). Young’s settled

expectation is especially true when the case was filed to the appellate

court with jurisdiction over the county where his land, business, and deer

are located. This Court’s Opinion should be withdrawn and the case

remanded to the Fourth Court of Appeals for disposition.

II. THIS COURT’S OPINION QUOTES THE ORIGINAL, NOT AMENDED, PETITION WHEN DECIDING NO WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY EXISTS

This Court quoted Young when describing Young’s claims. Young,

2025 WL , *1 (“Young acknowledged that he had only a ‘possessory’ right

in his breeder deer, ‘as opposed to the ownership of title to the deer’”).

The quoted language comes from Plaintiff’s Original Petition. (CR12).

However, when the plea to the jurisdiction was granted, the trial court

considered Plaintiff’s First Amended Original Petition, which contains

language directly to the contrary – Young pleaded he had ownership of

title. (CR165-68) (describing the 174 deer owned by Young and their

value to him of $705,000). This Court’s belief that Young did not claim

ownership of the deer (but only a possessory right) is pivotal to this

Court’s analysis of Young’s taking claim about the deer. Specifically,

Young contends he is owed just compensation for the taking of his deer

14 (“including but not limited to Mr. Young’s animals, ranch equipment,

ranch land, permit, and other personal and real property”). This Court’s

Opinion should be withdrawn and an analysis conducted based on

Young’s live petition.

III. THIS COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REMAND FOR A PLEADING AMENDMENT

When Young filed suit, the defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction.

(CR144). The day before the jurisdictional plea hearing was held, Young

expanded upon his Original Petition, (CR6), by filing his Amended

Original Petition. (CR162). This caused Co-Defendant TAHC, not a party

to this appeal, to seek and receive a continuance of its jurisdictional plea.

(RR6-7). TPWD took a different approach, abandoning the right to file

Special Exceptions,3 despite Young’s far-reaching Amended Petition, and

demanding to be heard immediately. TPWD’s decision to pursue a non-

evidentiary jurisdictional plea (and to have the newly-pleaded and broad

claims heard immediately) required the trial court (and now this Court)

to take as true all of Young’s allegations.4 The record shows TPWD,

3 When special exceptions are not filed, courts must construe the live petition liberally in favor of the pleader. Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982). 4 In non-evidentiary jurisdictional pleas, this Court must accept as true all pleaded factual allegations and then determine if the allegations confer jurisdiction. Dallas 15 represented by “opposing attorneys of reasonable competence,” were put

on notice of Young’s claims of the taking of his breeder deer, ranch land,

improvements, small business, and permit rights without due process or

just compensation.5

The Supreme Court of Texas has made clear that appeals should be

decided based on substance as opposed to form. Thus, courts generally

allow parties to replead during immunity-based jurisdictional challenges

unless their pleadings demonstrate incurable defects. Tex. Dep't of

Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2011) (“When this Court

upholds a plea to the jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, we

allow the plaintiff the opportunity to replead if the defect can be cured”);

City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 621, 622 (Tex. 2009) (“The allegations

Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). Additionally, reviewing courts must construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor and look to the plaintiff's intent. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). 5 A pleading should contain “a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved ....” TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(a). “We will uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged.” The Huff Energy Fund, LP v. Longview Energy Co., 482 S.W.3d 184, 195 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015), aff'd sub nom. Longview Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. 2017). “In determining whether a pleading is adequate, we examine whether an opposing attorney of reasonable competence, on review of the pleadings, can ascertain the nature and the basic issues of the controversy.” Id. (emphasis added). 16 found in the pleadings may either affirmatively demonstrate or negate

the court's jurisdiction. If the pleadings do neither, it is an issue of

pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to

amend the pleadings.” (citations omitted)); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–

27 (“If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively

demonstrate the trial court[‘]s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively

demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading

sufficiency and the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to

amend.”). This Court’s jurisdiction is, at best, on shaky ground, so to then

disallow Young the privilege afforded nearly all other similarly-situated

litigants facing a dismissal causes great pause. This Court erred in

denying Young a remand for a right to amend his live pleading.

CONCLUSION & PRAYER

This Court should grant the rehearing, withdraw the Opinion, issue

an Order stating this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, and

asking the Supreme Court of Texas to re-transfer this case to the Fourth

Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction over the county mandatorily

required to address Young’s eminent domain claim. Alternatively, this

Court should, after withdrawing the Opinion, remand the case to the trial

17 court for further proceedings or to allow Young the opportunity to amend

his live petition. Young also requests any relief to which he is entitled

under law and equity.

Respectfully submitted,

Kimberly S. Keller KELLER STOLARCZYK PLLC 215 W. Bandera Road No. 114-PMB 800 Boerne, Texas 78006 Tele: 830.981.5000 /s/Kimberly S. Keller Kimberly S. Keller SBN: 24014182 Email: kim@kellsto.com

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL

18 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE & SERVICE

I certify this Motion for Panel Rehearing contains 3,815 words. On

June 24, 2025, I served, through this Court’s e-filing server, a copy of this

Motion on those listed below:

Counsel for Appellees:

KEN PAXTON, Attorney General of Texas; BRENT WEBSTER, First Asst. Attorney General; JAMES LLOYD, Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation; KELLIE E. BILLINGS-RAY, Chief, Environmental Protection Division, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Environmental Protection Division, P.O. Box 12548, MC066, Austin, Texas 78711-2548

IAN LANCASTER, Asst. Attorney General, Email: ian.lancaster@oag.texas.gov

H. CARL MYERS, Asst. Attorney General, Email: carl.myers@oag.texas.gov

HEATHER COFFEE, Asst. Attorney General, Email: heather.coffee@oag.texas.gov

Counsel for Texas Animal Health Commission:

KAREN L. WATKINS, Asst. Attorney General, Administrative Law Division, Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, Texas 78711, Email: karen.watkins@oag.texas.gov

/s/Kimberly S. Keller Kimberly S. Keller

19 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Kimberly Keller on behalf of Kimberly Keller Bar No. 24014182 kim@kellsto.com Envelope ID: 102351808 Filing Code Description: Motion for Rehearing Filing Description: Appellant's Motion for Panel Rehearing Status as of 6/24/2025 11:54 AM CST

Associated Case Party: State Of Texas

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Kellie E.Billings-Ray Kellie.Billings-Ray@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Ian Lancaster ian.lancaster@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Laura Courtney laura.courtney@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

H. CarlMyers Carl.Myers@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

James ScottMcCarley scott.mccarley@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Associated Case Party: Maurice E. "Pete" Moore, III, d/b/a Cypress Ranches

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Kevin Dubose kdubose@adjtlaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Paul W.Green pgreen@adjtlaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Latonya McPherson lmcpherson@adjtlaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

James T.Drakeley jdrakeley@spencerfane.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Karen LWatkins karen.watkins@oag.texas.gov 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

C DixonMosty cdmosty@mostylaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Richard Mosty rmosty@mostylaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Jennifer SRiggs jriggs@r-alaw.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Kimberly SKeller kim@kellsto.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT

Clayton CUtkov cutkov@andrewsmyers.com 6/24/2025 11:38:28 AM SENT