Richard Leanar Whytus v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 27, 2009
Docket06-08-00170-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Richard Leanar Whytus v. State (Richard Leanar Whytus v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard Leanar Whytus v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion



In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana



______________________________



No. 06-08-00170-CR



RICHARD LEONAR WHYTUS, Appellant



V.



THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee





On Appeal from the 196th Judicial District Court

Hunt County, Texas

Trial Court No. 23,585





Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley



MEMORANDUM OPINION



Richard Leonar Whytus appeals from his conviction by a jury on seven charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. (1) See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The evidence shows that while quite intoxicated, he drove his car into a daycare full of napping children. Two workers and several of the children were injured.

Whytus has filed a single brief, in which he raises a single issue which is common to all of his appeals. He argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to submit his requested charge on the lesser-included offense of assault causing bodily injury.

We addressed this issue in detail in our opinion of this date on Whytus's appeal in cause number 06-08-00167-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude that error has not been shown in this case.

We affirm the judgment.



Bailey C. Moseley

Justice



Date Submitted: February 26, 2009

Date Decided: February 27, 2009



Do Not Publish

1. Whytus appeals from seven convictions, all for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, cause numbers 06-08-00167-CR through 06-08-00173-CR.

le differences. "Evidence may be factually insufficient if: '1) it is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or 2) the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence.'" Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). "Such a factual sufficiency review requires the reviewing court to consider all of the evidence." Id. (citing Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). "A clearly wrong and unjust verdict occurs where the jury's finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias." Id. (citing Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). As in a legal sufficiency review, the hypothetically correct jury charge construct is employed in assessing the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Vega v. State, 267 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

One way in which the crime of aggravated sexual assault can be committed is if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means and the victim is younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Another way the crime of aggravated sexual assault can be committed is if the actor intentionally or knowingly "causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor" and the victim is younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B). These two methods of committing aggravated sexual assault were alleged as alternative paragraphs in Count I of the grand jury's indictment, the count alleging that offenses occurred April 1, 2006. The named victim for both alternative paragraphs was the same: John Doe 08201999. (1)

Count II of the grand jury's indictment also contained two alternative allegations. These alternative allegations mirrored the allegations contained in Count I of the indictment, except that these offenses were alleged to have occurred April 15, 2006. The named victim for both paragraphs of Count II was the same as Count I: John Doe 08201999.

With respect to the first paragraph of either count of the indictment, the applicable hypothetically correct jury charge would require the State to bring forth proof of the following elements: that Henderson (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the penetration of the victim's anus, (3) by any means, and (4) the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B). To satisfy its burden of proof under the second paragraph of either count of the indictment, the applicable hypothetically correct jury charge would require the State to bring forth proof that Henderson (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the victim's sexual organ to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of any person; and (3) the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B). With this framework in mind, we turn now to a review of the evidence admitted at trial.

The State called four witnesses during its case-in-chief: Doe (the victim), Nakiesta Myles, Bunny Terrell, and David Cheatham. Henderson called six witnesses to testify on his behalf: Cherelle Garrett, Chere Turner Kabeta, Janice Mary Coger, Kim Robison, Stacey Lee Myers, and Henderson himself. The jury also viewed a recorded interview of Doe conducted at the Child Advocacy Center and a recorded interview of Henderson conducted at the Longview Police Department. What follows is a summary of each witness' testimony and the contents of those recorded interviews.



(a) Nakiesta Myles

Nakiesta Myles is the mother of Doe, whose date of birth is October 20, 1999. Myles and Doe lived in a Longview apartment complex in 2005. (2) While living at the complex, Myles met Robison, Henderson (who was Robison's son), and Cherelle Garrett (who was Robison's daughter). Robison and Henderson would alternately babysit Doe when Myles had to work.

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Richard Leanar Whytus v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-leanar-whytus-v-state-texapp-2009.