Richard L. Brown v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 18, 2020
• Docket: 20A-CR-711
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 18 2020, 9:17 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Alexander L. Hoover Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Law Office of Christopher G. Walter, Attorney General of Indiana P.C. Nappanee, Indiana Megan M. Smith Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard L. Brown, August 18, 2020 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-711 v. Appeal from the Marshall Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert O. Bowen, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 50D01-1611-F4-38

Najam, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-711 | August 18, 2020 Page 1 of 5 Statement of the Case [1] Richard L. Brown appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for discharge

under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On November 14, 2016, the State charged Brown with dealing in a narcotic

drug, as a Level 4 felony, and dealing in a controlled substance, as a Level 5

felony. That same day, the trial court issued an arrest warrant for Brown.

[3] Eleven months later, in October of 2017, Brown wrote a letter to the court.

That letter stated in relevant part as follows:

My name is Richard Brown S[r.] and I’m writting [sic] in regardes [sic] of my court date. I’m asking if you can file a motion to transport to establish a court date to get this started so I can get the holds they have on me lifted, and so I can enter a plea of not guilty . . . .

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 38. However, Brown’s letter did not include a

facility name or location of his apparent incarceration or an inmate number that

the State or court might have used to locate him.

[4] In March of 2019, Brown, pro se, filed his motion for discharge pursuant to

Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). In that motion, Brown stated that he was entitled

to be discharged from the pending Level 4 and Level 5 felony charges because

more than 800 days had passed since he had been “arrested.” Id. at 42. In the

signature block for his motion, Brown, for the first time, informed the court that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-711 | August 18, 2020 Page 2 of 5 he was presently incarcerated at the Westville Correctional Facility and

included his Department of Correction identification number. Less than one

week later, the court set Brown’s pending charges for an initial hearing.

[5] Thereafter, the court denied Brown’s motion for discharge and found him guilty

of the Level 4 and Level 5 offenses following a bench trial. The court entered

its judgment of conviction and sentenced Brown accordingly. This appeal

ensued.

Discussion and Decision [6] Brown appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for discharge under

Criminal Rule 4(C). As our Supreme Court has stated:

Criminal Rule 4(C) “provides that a defendant may not be held to answer a criminal charge for greater than one year unless the delay is caused by the defendant, emergency, or court congestion.” Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ind. 2009). We review a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 4(C) motion for abuse of discretion. Bowman v. State, 884 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148-49 (Ind. 2011) (footnote omitted).

[7] We have held that a defendant who is incarcerated in one county and charged

with “unrelated,” new offenses in a second county “must provide formal

written notice of his incarceration to the court” in the second county “and the

State to avoid the tolling of the Rule 4(C) clock.” Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d

26, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. As we explained:

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-711 | August 18, 2020 Page 3 of 5 Our judicial system has traditionally required a significant degree of formality from its participants, and with good reason. Trial courts have substantial case loads and complicated dockets to manage, and, if we did not require that litigants communicate with each other and the court formally and in writing, the system would soon devolve into chaos.

Id.

[8] There is no question that Brown’s October 2017 letter to the court did not

provide the court with “formal written notice of his incarceration.” Id. Rather,

Brown’s October 2017 letter merely alluded to some apparent incarceration

somewhere. It did not identify where, or even that it was in Indiana, and it did

not inform the court of an identification number that might have given the court

and the State a clear basis for locating him. It was not until Brown’s March

2019 motion for discharge that he provided that information to the court.

Accordingly, the Rule 4(C) clock was tolled until the court located Brown,

which happened contemporaneously with his motion for discharge.

[9] Indeed, Brown does not suggest otherwise on appeal. Rather, he asserts that

the charges for which he was incarcerated at the Westville Correctional Facility

were not “unrelated” to the Level 4 and Level 5 charges here. Brown’s

convictions underlying his incarceration at the Westville Correctional Facility

were based on controlled drug buys in Pulaski County in April and May of

2016. The facts underlying his convictions for the Level 4 and Level 5 felonies

here were based on controlled drug buys in Marshall County in July of 2016.

The narcotics involved in each county were different narcotics, though the same

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-711 | August 18, 2020 Page 4 of 5 confidential informant was used for the several drug buys, and Brown notes on

appeal that Pulaski County and Marshall County “share a common border.”

Appellant’s Br. at 9. We are not persuaded by Brown’s assertions on appeal.

We hold that the offenses that led to Brown’s placement at the Westville

Correctional Facility and the offenses underlying his instant convictions were

“unrelated” and, as such, the trial court did not err when it denied Brown’s

motion for discharge.

[10] Affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-711 | August 18, 2020 Page 5 of 5