Richard Kinzel v. Bank of America

850 F.3d 275, 2017 FED App. 0049P, 92 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 24, 2017 WL 816881, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3775
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMarch 2, 2017
Docket16-3355
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 850 F.3d 275 (Richard Kinzel v. Bank of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richard Kinzel v. Bank of America, 850 F.3d 275, 2017 FED App. 0049P, 92 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 24, 2017 WL 816881, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3775 (6th Cir. 2017).

Opinion

OPINION

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

The ticker symbol for Cedar Fair Entertainment Company — operator of Cedar Point and other amusement parks — is, fittingly, “FUN,” and it thus reveals littlé about, the nature of the collateral-liquidation dispute presently before us.

In April 2008, Richard Kinzel, then CEO of Cedar Fair, borrowed nearly $8,000,000 from Merrill Lynch to finance his exercise of FUN stock options and to pay the estimated income and payroll taxes that would be due immediately upon exercise. To secure the loan, Kinzel pledged as collateral various assets, including the shares of FUN that he would be acquiring, and Kinzel entered into a *278 Loan Management Account (LMA) agreement that allowed Merrill Lynch, “in its sole discretion and without prior notice,” to “liquidate” the collateral upon any of twelve events, including “if the value of the ... collateral is in the sole judgment of [Merrill Lynch] insufficient.”

The stock market then crashed. Along the way, the market value of FUN tumbled from the exercise price of $23.19 per share in April 2008 to $6.99 per share on March 2, 2009. Having set a $7.00-per-share “trigger” to liquidate shares of FUN, the Merrill Lynch account managers responsible for Kinzel’s account began selling off shares on March 3, 2009, without advance notice to Kinzel and without first making demand upon Kinzel for repayment of the loan.

Upset that his long-time bank would sell his shares of FUN even though he was “doing everything right,” Kinzel (and his wife, both individually and as trustees of trusts in their names) sued Merrill Lynch (and Bank of America, which acquired Merrill Lynch in 2009) on various theories, including breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Kinzels now appeal two district-court decisions: the court’s denial of leave to file a third amended complaint to reassert a breach-of-contract claim that did not survive a previous motion to dismiss, and the court’s final judgment in favor of Merrill Lynch on the breach-of-good-faith claim, which the court entered following a bench trial on that claim only. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I

Kinzel’s Loan Management Account

When Kinzel exercised his stock options on' April 15, 2008, he purchased 640,000 shares of FUN at the option price of $6.03 per share and 10,000 shares at the option price of $20.60 per share, for a total of 650,000 shares at a purchase price of $4,065,200. Because the market value of FUN at the time of exercise was $23.19 per share, Kinzel’s purchase was worth $15,073,500 — meaning that Kinzel immediately realized a gain of • $11,008,300. Because the difference between option price and market value is treated as income rather than capital gains and is thus taxable immediately upon exercise, Kinzel also had to pay the estimated income and payroll taxes on his $11,008,300 gain, which amounted to $4,893,189.35. Kinzel thus had to pony up $8,958,389.35 (the stock-option purchase price plus the tax liability) in order to exercise his options. And for that, Kinzel needed a loan.

Rather than exercising his stock options on margin, Kinzel opened an $8,000,000 line of credit with Merrill Lynch and executed the LMA agreement. (Kinzel borrowed $7,681,482.84 against the line of credit and paid the remainder of the purchase price out of other funds.) The LMA is a flexible lending product that allows the borrower to draw against a line of credit with no payment schedule or due dates and at low interest rates — Kinzel’s rate hovered around 2.6% per annum, for example — but allows the bank to require repayment in full at any time, on the bank’s demand. For reasons not germane to this appeal, Kinzel arranged for two trusts to be the borrowers (one trust bearing his name and the other bearing his wife’s name, of which Kinzel and his wife were trustees, respectively), but for Kinzel and his wife in their individual capacities to be “pledgors” of the collateral.

The LMA agreement required Kinzel to pledge collateral by depositing it into a “Securities Account,” and the agreement granted Merrill Lynch “a continuing, first priority lien and security interest” in that account as well as “ultimate control over *279 all instructions made with respect to” that account. The agreement further required Kinzel to maintain financial assets in the Securities Account of a value at least equal .to a “maintenance requirement” set by Merrill Lynch “in its sole discretion.” Because of the volatility of stock prices and the potential illiquidity of the pledged collateral, the maintenance requirement was substantially greater than the outstanding balance on the loan: from April to December 2008, for example, Merrill Lynch varied the maintenance requirement so that the outstanding loan balance always fell between fifty-five and fifty-eight percent of the requirement, meaning that Kinzel had to pledge collateral worth nearly double his loan balance — but Kinzel did so, all the while paying off nearly $2,000,000 of the loan balance by the end of 2008. At any time, Kinzel could deposit cash into the LMA to pay down the loan balance or to act as collateral, and Kinzel could pledge additional collateral, although Merrill Lynch imposed a cap of 540,000 on the number of shares of. FUN that would count towards the maintenance requirement because of the difficulty of selling such a large volume of shares at market value if liquidation were to become necessary. (Internal Merrill Lynch correspondence indicates that in early 2009, there were approximately 55,000,000 shares of FUN outstanding, with a weekly trading volume of approximately 172,000 shares.)

As mentioned above, the LMA agreement is effectively a demand instrument: even if Kinzel did nothing at all to breach or default, the agreement’s demand clause (Clause 5) gave Merrill Lynch the right at all times to “require the immediate payment of all or any portion of the balance of the LMA ... upon demand.” Wholly separate from the demand clause, the agreement also includes a remedy-events clause (Clause 7), which sets forth twelve conditions, the occurrence of any of which was independently sufficient to permit Merrill Lynch, “in its sole discretion and without prior notice,” to “liquidate the Securities Accouiit and/or other collateral ... and apply the proceeds to the LMA.” These remedy events include, among others not applicable here, (1) the insufficiency, “in the sole judgment” of Merrill Lynch, of the value of the financial assets in the Securities Account; (2) Merrill Lynch’s “belie[f] in good faith that the value of the collateral or the Bank’s security interest therein is impaired”; and (3) Merrill Lynch’s determination “that there is a material adverse change in any Loan Party’s financial condition or prospects or collateral” (emphasis added).

Nothing in the LMA agreement states or implies that Kinzel’s satisfaction of the maintenance requirement was sufficient to avoid liquidation following a remedy event. Nothing in the demand clause or elsewhere states or implies that Merrill Lynch was required to make a demand for repayment prior to exercising its contractual right to liquidate Kinzel’s collateral upon the occurrence of a remedy event.

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850 F.3d 275, 2017 FED App. 0049P, 92 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 24, 2017 WL 816881, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3775, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richard-kinzel-v-bank-of-america-ca6-2017.