Richard K. Archer, M.D. v. Bobby Tunnell
Opinion
ACCEPTED
05-15-00459-CV
FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
5/19/2015 9:10:21 AM
LISA MATZ
CLERK
NO. 05-15-00459-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS
AT DALLAS DALLAS, TEXAS
5/19/2015 9:10:21 AM
LISA MATZ
Richard K. Archer, Sr., an individual, The Richard K. Clerk Archer Profit Sharing Trust, The Richard K. Archer Pension and Profit Sharing Plan, the Richard K. Archer Keogh, and the Richard K. Archer IRA,
APPELLANTS
VS.
Bobby Tunnell, an individual APPELLEE
APPEALED FROM THE 298th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
[State Court #DC-12-08161-M]
RESPONSE OF THE ARCHER APPELLANTS IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS OF APPELLEES
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS SITTING IN DALLAS:
Come Now, Appellants Richard K. Archer, Sr., an individual, and representative of The Richard K. Archer Profit Sharing Trust, The Richard K. Archer Pension and Profit Sharing Plan, the Richard K. Archer Keogh, and the Richard K. Archer IRA, and Ruth E. Archer, and file this their Response of the Archer Appellants In Opposition to Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion for Sanctions of Appellees (erroneously denominated as Appellant in the first paragraph of Appellees Motion) and would show the Court the following:
Page 1
I. The Archer Appellants respond and clarify Appellee’s rendition of the case background because it is misleading and a distortion of the true facts in Appellant (sic) Tunnells favor to such an extent as to be a total mischaracterization of what actually took place.
In addressing the petition for writ of mandamus filed by Richard K. Archer, Sr., et al, Appellee suggests Archer waited until the week before the scheduled trial setting to do so. Appellee states the Archer Motion to Dismiss had not been set for hearing before trial. Although true it was not because a setting had not been requested as suggested by the Appellee. The request for a setting was made and the Court Clerk advised that the Motion would not be set before trial because there was not time available (see affidavit of Jonathan Bearrie, attached hereto as Exhibit “A”). (Tr. P.11). Likewise, Jonathan Bearrie appeared at the pre-trial on the week before January 12, 2015, to urge the motion at the pretrial conference - see Exhibit 7-A to Appellees Motion which specifies “Pretrial Conference - 1 week before trial.” When counsel appeared at the pretrial to urge the Motion to Dismiss he was advised nothing was set and the Motion would be not be heard. Accordingly, Archer Appellants filed their Petition for Writ of Mandamus seeking a ruling on their Motion to Dismiss before trial to avoid an argument of waiver. The trial court denied said motion. That matter did not delay the trial, as asserted by Appellee, the trial was simply not reached that trial week – another false implication suggested by Tunnell’s counsel. The Petition for Writ of Mandamus simply sought to have the trial court rule one way or the other since the Archer appellants could not get a setting before trial to hear said motion to avoid any waiver of that motion.
The Appellee implies that the Archer Appellants were dilatory in getting the Motion to Dismiss set for hearing following the resetting of the trial date due to not being reached in
Page 2
January by asserting that the motion was set just days before the trial was scheduled – yet another distortion. In view of the prior problems in getting a setting due to the Court’s busy schedule , the Archer Appellees obtained two dates for the hearing and were advised those two dates were the only two available (see Bearrie affidavit) and when the earlier setting of the two was requested the Appellees counsel – Dean Boyd – advised he could not do it on that date because he would be on vacation, see Boyd letter attached as Exhibit “B” hereto. Again, the Appellees implication the Archer Appellants waited until the last moment to schedule a hearing is disingenuous and simply false. The vicissitudes of the trial courts docket are something over which Appellants have no control and to suggest they planned these delays is simply false.
Until the Supreme Court changed directions on May 1, 2015, in Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, the law was clear that Appellants Archer were entitled to have the case dismissed for lack of an expert report pursuant to West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williams, supra. Appellants Archer was through counsel pursuing their rights as enunciated in West Oaks Hospital. To do anything less would have been malpractice at the time.
At page 5 of Appellee’s Motion the suggestion is made by Leighton Durham that he sent a letter to Appellants counsel as a matter of professional courtesy “requesting dismissal of the case.” Counsel did send such a letter but it was anything but a courtesy. The letter challenged Appellants counsel’s ethics, was sprinkled with snide remarks and demanded dismissal on threat of sanctions (see Appellants “Status Report” filed May 7th, 2015).
At p.6 of the Motion, Leighton Durham claims to have sent a second letter to Philip R.
Russ demanding the appeal be dismissed. Such a statement is another falsehood by Mr. Durham. No such letter has been received by this office to date. The first time the purported letter was
Page 3
seen by Appellants office was as the exhibit to Appellee’s motion. Motion to Dismiss:
Appellants move the Court to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss rather then dismissal for want of jurisdiction. This request is supported by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ross, supra. Motion for Sanctions:
Appellants’ counsel has not “repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to pursue patently frivolous arguments in an obvious effort to unnecessarily delay trial and increase the cost of litigation.” Such a statement is another falsehood in an effort by Mr. Durham to falsely cast the implication of delay on appellants counsel. Appellants did not wait until the eve of trial to seek a ruling on the motions to dismiss – indeed, that was one of only two times the Court would schedule the motion, the earlier setting being ruled out by Mr. Boyd’s vacation plans. (See Bearrie affidavit hereto attached and Dean Boyd February 18, 2015 vacation letter, Exhibit “B” hereto).
It is one thing to characterize the facts in the light most favorable to one’s client, it is entirely a different matter to cast the facts to give a totally false impression of what actually occurred. Mr. Durham has done that in an apparent effort to bootstrap his client into a position to claim sanctions and somehow gain an unfair advantage. This Court should not countenance such behavior.
The balance of the Appellee’s argument at p.9 of the Appellee’s Motion the Appellants will not raise to dignity of a response.
Appellees position is little more than an assertion that the Archer Appellants are not
Page 4
entitled to representation and if they assert their rights as set forth in West Oaks, supra, they should be sanctioned. Such a position should not be countenamed by this Court.
Wherefore, premises considered Appellants/Defendants request the Appellees’ Motion be denied.
Respectfully Submitted,
Jonathan J Bearrie, Esq.
SBN 24034990
The Littlefield Building
106 E. Sixth Street, 9th Floor Austin, Texas 78701
Tel. 512-938-8862 / 212-203-0795 bearrie@gmail.com
-and-
Philip R. Russ
LAW OFFICES OF PHILIP R. RUSS 2700 S. Western, Suite 1200 Amarillo, Texas 79109
(Tel.) 806-358-9293 / (Fax) 806-385-9296 philiprruss@russlawfirm.com
BY: /s/ Philip R. Russ
Philip R. Russ, SBN: 17406000
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Richard K. Archer, M.D. v. Bobby Tunnell (Richard K. Archer, M.D. v. Bobby Tunnell) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.