IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1324 Filed November 13, 2025
RICHARD JOHN SIEMER JR., Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Eric J.
Nelson, Judge.
An applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his second application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and
Langholz, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Richard Siemer appeals from the summary dismissal of his second
application for postconviction relief (PCR). He asserts that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether phone records constitute a new ground of fact
that could not have been raised within three years of his conviction; the statute of
limitations should be tolled by the relation-back doctrine established in Allison v.
State, 914 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 2018); and the 2019 amendment to Iowa Code
section 822.3 violates both the equal protection clause and the due process clause
of the federal and Iowa constitutions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Siemer was charged by trial information with six counts of sexual abuse in
the third degree, second offense, class “A” felonies. On November 5, 2020,
pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of
sexual abuse in the third degree and an amended charge of sexual abuse in the
second degree. The remaining charges were dismissed as part of the plea
agreement, and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Iowa also
dismissed pending federal charges against Siemer.
The district court sentenced Siemer in accordance with the plea agreement
to ten years of incarceration for the third-degree sexual abuse conviction and
twenty-five years of incarceration for the second-degree sexual abuse conviction.
The sentences were run concurrently. Siemer was required to serve seventy
percent of his sentence for the second-degree sexual abuse conviction before
parole eligibility. 3
Siemer did not file a direct appeal from the convictions, but rather, in August
2021, he filed a PCR application. He moved to dismiss his application on
September 21, 2023. The district court dismissed the application the next day. In
November 2023, Siemer moved to reinstate his PCR application; the district court
denied his motion. Siemer appealed the court’s order declining to reinstate his
application. Our supreme court dismissed his appeal on May 31, 2024.
In the interim, on May 21, 2024, Siemer filed a second PCR application.
The State moved for summary disposition, asserting this second application was
filed beyond the three-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the
State’s motion and summarily dismissed Siemer’s second PCR application.
Siemer appeals.
II. Standard of Review
This court generally reviews an appeal from a denial of PCR application for
correction of errors at law. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010).
“Our review of the court’s ruling on the State’s statute-of-limitations defense is for
correction of errors of law.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).
We will affirm if the district court’s “findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence and the law was correctly applied.” Id. at 520. This court reviews
constitutional claims de novo. In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547
(Iowa 2000).
III. Analysis
A. New Ground of Fact
Siemer acknowledges that his PCR application was filed outside the three-
year period of limitations set forth in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2024). But he 4
alleges that his application fits within an exception, specifically that the limitation
period does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised
within the applicable period. See Iowa Code § 822.3. Siemer asserts that recently
obtained phone records prove “that his accuser could not have been assaulted at
the date and time she reported to the police because she was not at his house.”
But the State produced evidence that Siemer’s trial counsel provided phone
records to the State in preparation for Siemer’s criminal trial. And even if those
are not the exact records Siemer now claims equate to a new ground of fact that
could not have been raised within the three-year period, he has failed to
demonstrate that his counsel could not have obtained the additional phone records
in question at the time of the underlying criminal proceedings. We determine that
Siemer has failed to demonstrate the existence of a fact or law that could not have
been raised within the applicable period.
B. Relation-Back Doctrine
Siemer also raises an Allison v. State relation-back doctrine claim. See 914
N.W.2d at 891. But Allison was abrogated by the 2019 amendment to
section 822.3, as our court has repeatedly noted. See, e.g., Johnson v. State,
No. 19-1949, 2021 WL 210700, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (collecting
cases); accord Goode v. State, No. 20-0282, 2021 WL 4889249, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 20, 2021). The amended version of section 822.3 was in effect when
Siemer filed his second PCR action. As his second PCR action fell outside the
three-year statute of limitations in section 822.3, this claim fails. Brooks v. State,
975 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). 5
C. Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
i. Equal Protection
Siemer alleges that Iowa Code chapter 822 violates the equal protection
clause. The United States and Iowa Constitutions guarantee the equal protection
of the law to all persons. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6.
The equal protection clause essentially requires that similarly situated persons be
treated alike. If people are not similarly situated, their dissimilar treatment does
not violate equal protection. “To meet constitutional standards, it is sufficient if all
members of the same class [are] treated the same.” Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548.
Siemer asserts that as an applicant “whose first PCR appeal [was] not
resolved within three years of the final judgment in the criminal case,” he is similarly
situated to other second-or-later PCR applicants whose applications are timely
filed but are treated differently.
The first step in any equal protection analysis “is to determine whether the
challenged law makes a distinction between similarly situated individuals with
respect to the purposes of the law.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 104
(Iowa 2021).
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1324 Filed November 13, 2025
RICHARD JOHN SIEMER JR., Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Eric J.
Nelson, Judge.
An applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his second application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Gary Dickey of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and
Langholz, JJ. 2
SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.
Richard Siemer appeals from the summary dismissal of his second
application for postconviction relief (PCR). He asserts that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether phone records constitute a new ground of fact
that could not have been raised within three years of his conviction; the statute of
limitations should be tolled by the relation-back doctrine established in Allison v.
State, 914 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 2018); and the 2019 amendment to Iowa Code
section 822.3 violates both the equal protection clause and the due process clause
of the federal and Iowa constitutions.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Siemer was charged by trial information with six counts of sexual abuse in
the third degree, second offense, class “A” felonies. On November 5, 2020,
pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to and was convicted of one count of
sexual abuse in the third degree and an amended charge of sexual abuse in the
second degree. The remaining charges were dismissed as part of the plea
agreement, and the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Iowa also
dismissed pending federal charges against Siemer.
The district court sentenced Siemer in accordance with the plea agreement
to ten years of incarceration for the third-degree sexual abuse conviction and
twenty-five years of incarceration for the second-degree sexual abuse conviction.
The sentences were run concurrently. Siemer was required to serve seventy
percent of his sentence for the second-degree sexual abuse conviction before
parole eligibility. 3
Siemer did not file a direct appeal from the convictions, but rather, in August
2021, he filed a PCR application. He moved to dismiss his application on
September 21, 2023. The district court dismissed the application the next day. In
November 2023, Siemer moved to reinstate his PCR application; the district court
denied his motion. Siemer appealed the court’s order declining to reinstate his
application. Our supreme court dismissed his appeal on May 31, 2024.
In the interim, on May 21, 2024, Siemer filed a second PCR application.
The State moved for summary disposition, asserting this second application was
filed beyond the three-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the
State’s motion and summarily dismissed Siemer’s second PCR application.
Siemer appeals.
II. Standard of Review
This court generally reviews an appeal from a denial of PCR application for
correction of errors at law. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010).
“Our review of the court’s ruling on the State’s statute-of-limitations defense is for
correction of errors of law.” Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).
We will affirm if the district court’s “findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence and the law was correctly applied.” Id. at 520. This court reviews
constitutional claims de novo. In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547
(Iowa 2000).
III. Analysis
A. New Ground of Fact
Siemer acknowledges that his PCR application was filed outside the three-
year period of limitations set forth in Iowa Code section 822.3 (2024). But he 4
alleges that his application fits within an exception, specifically that the limitation
period does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised
within the applicable period. See Iowa Code § 822.3. Siemer asserts that recently
obtained phone records prove “that his accuser could not have been assaulted at
the date and time she reported to the police because she was not at his house.”
But the State produced evidence that Siemer’s trial counsel provided phone
records to the State in preparation for Siemer’s criminal trial. And even if those
are not the exact records Siemer now claims equate to a new ground of fact that
could not have been raised within the three-year period, he has failed to
demonstrate that his counsel could not have obtained the additional phone records
in question at the time of the underlying criminal proceedings. We determine that
Siemer has failed to demonstrate the existence of a fact or law that could not have
been raised within the applicable period.
B. Relation-Back Doctrine
Siemer also raises an Allison v. State relation-back doctrine claim. See 914
N.W.2d at 891. But Allison was abrogated by the 2019 amendment to
section 822.3, as our court has repeatedly noted. See, e.g., Johnson v. State,
No. 19-1949, 2021 WL 210700, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021) (collecting
cases); accord Goode v. State, No. 20-0282, 2021 WL 4889249, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 20, 2021). The amended version of section 822.3 was in effect when
Siemer filed his second PCR action. As his second PCR action fell outside the
three-year statute of limitations in section 822.3, this claim fails. Brooks v. State,
975 N.W.2d 444, 446 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). 5
C. Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause
i. Equal Protection
Siemer alleges that Iowa Code chapter 822 violates the equal protection
clause. The United States and Iowa Constitutions guarantee the equal protection
of the law to all persons. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6.
The equal protection clause essentially requires that similarly situated persons be
treated alike. If people are not similarly situated, their dissimilar treatment does
not violate equal protection. “To meet constitutional standards, it is sufficient if all
members of the same class [are] treated the same.” Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548.
Siemer asserts that as an applicant “whose first PCR appeal [was] not
resolved within three years of the final judgment in the criminal case,” he is similarly
situated to other second-or-later PCR applicants whose applications are timely
filed but are treated differently.
The first step in any equal protection analysis “is to determine whether the
challenged law makes a distinction between similarly situated individuals with
respect to the purposes of the law.” State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 104
(Iowa 2021). If Siemer cannot show that he is similarly situated, we do not consider
further whether different treatment is permitted. See id.
We conclude that Siemer’s equal protection claim fails on the first element.
Because he dismissed his application, Siemer is not similarly situated to a PCR
applicant whose appeal was not resolved within the three-year period. And
because the relation back doctrine set forth in Allison has been abrogated, Siemer
is not treated differently than other applicants who filed an untimely application. 6
Siemer has failed to demonstrate that “the challenged law makes a distinction
between similarly situated individuals with respect to the purposes of the law.” Id.
ii. Due Process
Siemer also argues that the amended statute violates his due process rights
because it limits his ability to be heard. Siemer’s due process claim also fails, as
he does not have a due process right to advance stale claims. Davis v. State, 443
N.W.2d 707, 710–11 (Iowa 1989). The three-year limitation period of section 822.3
afforded Siemer “a reasonable opportunity to be heard, thus ensuring his federal
and state due process rights.” Id. at 711. Accordingly, we reject this challenge.
IV. Conclusion
Upon our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of Siemer’s second
application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.